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The schism between the antagonistic ideologies of 
world Communism and democracy is demonstrated on a smaller 
scale in the division of Germany into East and West states. 
The German division is a product of the grand schism and 
further represents the anomalous situation wherein the 
former enemy German state has become a prize in the greater 
conflict. 
It was in the Allied occupation of Germany that the 
Western Powers clearly recognized the threat from the Soviet 
Union and where efforts at co-operation proved futile. In 
view of the aims and requirements of the Soviet Union, it 
was evident that discord would develop in the attempted 
Four Power administration of defeated Germany. 
The question of Germany's future, remains after a per-
iod of ten years, a part of the basic East-West conflicto 
The unyielding Soviet conditions upon which it would allow 
reunification are as unacceptable to the West as are the 
tenets of Commun:i.sm itself, and the settlement of the Ger-
man problem remains for the reconciliation of the schism 
which divides the world. 
This study is an attempt to show the position which 
Germany holds in the basic security requirements and expan-
sionist desires of the Soviet Union. Aiso included in the 
iii 
study are a.n analys Ls. of the under.lying motiv.e..s. J:1 ... nd . .results . 
of Soviet policy a.nd a. description of the ·methods utilized 
by_ t~e ~v.ssia.ns to achieve the,ir,.objectiveso 
Four methods have been selected for study in the Soviet 
attempts to effect the permanent containment of Germanyo 
Tp.~s.e methods include the concepts of the Great Power Con-
cert, the division of Germany, qeutralization and disarma-
ment 9f Germany, and the European Concerto 
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CHAPTER I 
BASIC RE~UIREMENTS OF SOVI.ET DEFENSE 
Establishment of Viable Frontiers 
In the treatment of Soviet foreign policy in its 
relation to the reunification of Germany, the satellite 
states of Eastern Europe must be considered. Soviet con-
sent to the absorption of its subservient East German 
regime into a free and united Germany would seriously jeop-
ardize the minority rule of the Communist governments in 
these states. It would be difficult to permit government 
of free choice in one area without a reciprocal grant of 
freedom in others. 
~here fore, it is necessary to recap~ tul~ te the Sov-
iet ascendancy in Eastern Europe. Europe lies within the 
immediate Soviet plans of expansion and future world domi-
nation. To expand outward, however., a State must be secure 
within its own sphere. The subjugation of the states of 
Eastern Europe may be described as a necess.ary element with-
in the primary Soviet concern for the security of its own 
frontiers, and secondarily., as a part of the expansive de-
sire for world domination. 
1 
Extension of Control Over Eastern Europe 
If the Soviet Union nad sincerely ~dhered to the 
Atlantic Charter9 1 the terri to1•ial gains which resulted 
from the Nazi-Soviet Pact of 19392 would have been nulli-
fiedo But throughou~ the war Stalin maintained that the 
territories annexed from Poland 9 Rumania 9 a.nd Finland in 
1939-1940 belonged legally to the S~v1et Union_; a~d t~t 
Latvia.9 Lithuania, and Eston1a,.annE:)xed and incor,porated 
in 1940, h~d become member republics of the Union of Soviet 
Socialist Republicso3 · Both the United States and Great 
Britain refused to acknowledge these annexat.1ons.o 4 Other 
than these acquisitions,\) which were declared toe.be histori-
cally and legally Russian territories 9 Sovie~ pro:te.statlo~a 
against further annexations were offer~d on repea.te.d occas-
ionso 5 By its adherence to the "Declaration on.Libf!trated 
Europe" at the Yalta Conference 9 the Sovie.t Union agreed ·tQ 
. . . ·-
respect the principle of Big Three co-operation !'or the es-
tablishment o'f respop.slble democratic governments ln th~ 
2 
1wmo Hardy McNelll 9 Survey of International Affalrs 
1939ml946: "America.11 Britaln,11 anci' Russ1a 9 Their co-operation 
anaCoii?Ilct, 19,1:1=194611 { London, 1953), Po. 430 Hereinafter 
referred to as·survey ~-19460 
2Jane Degras ,11 ed Q 9 Soviet ·Documents· on .Foreign Policz. 
1933-1941 {London 9 1953), III, pp. 376-38'C:"' ~--
3surver ~939-1946 9 PPo 406-4070 
4Ibido .9 Po 179, PPo J.66=1680 
. 5Ib1do; Po 3330 - At the Foreign Minlst.era' Co.nfererice 
in Mo~1-cow during Octob~r, 1943., agreemen.t wi!.a re~ched- that· 
no spheres ot influence would be e_stabl1ahe.d . .in. Europeo 
3 
former Axis satellites and liberated states of Eastern 
Europe. 6 The more realistically-minded Churchill, as com-
pared to the idealist Roosevelt 1 had early recogni.zed Soviet 
designs in the Balkan area. 7 Although thwarted in his at-
tempts to place Anglo-American armies in the Balkans, 
Churchill continued his efforts to limit the Soviet influ-
ence in this area. The successes of the Red Army in early 
1944 ma.de it imperative, in his view)) that some form of de-
limitation be achieved. A tentative arrangement was agreed 
upon in May, 1944 whereby Rumania and. Bulgaria were. to be 
in the Soviet sphere 1 with British influence to be predomi-
nant in Greece and Yugoslavia. 8 In October, 1944 a more 
definitive agreement was reached, with the understandi~g by 
the Americans that the arrangement would not extend beyond 
the termination of hostilities. ·pre-eminent Soviet influ-
ence was guaranteed in Ruml3.niaj) Bulg.aria., and Huri~ary. 
Britain was to be assured predominant lnfluenc.e oyer Greek 
affairs, while in Yugoslavia., Russia and Britain we.re to 
exercise an equal proportion of influence. 9 
6Edward R. Stettiniusjj Jr., Roosevelt and the Rus-
sians: The Yalta Conference, ed. Walter Johnson"TGarden 
City, 1949), pp. 335-336. 
7survey 1939=1946 9 p. 272, pp. 303-305,1) p. 352. 
Churchill endeavored repeatedly· for an Anglo-Ame.rican Balkan 
campaign in preference to a cross-channel invasion; I. . 
Deutscher, Stalin: A Political Biograpl:ly_ (New York,_ 1949), 
pp. 507-508. Roosevelt sided with'Stalinat the Teheran 
Conference against a Balkan campaign, which gave Stalin a 
free hand in the Balkans. 
Bsurvey 1939-1~46, Po 422. 
9Ibido, p. 4950 
Neither the agreements concluded between the British 
and the Russians, nor the Soviet espousal of the principles 
enunciated in the "Declaration on Liberated EuroJ?e'\ were 
4 
of lasting extent. They could be mo"re appropriately labeled 
a part of the Soviet machinations to gain complete control 
·- - -- ··-
in Eastern Europe. The British, although able .. to maintain 
their influence upon Greek affairs, could not_eatablish the 
necessary military basis for the exercise of thei_r claim to 
equal influence in Yugoslavia. 10 
The Soviet Army, )n its victorious sweep through East-
ern Europe, placed the Russians in complete cori~rol of 
these countries o Armistice agreements .conc.ludad wi.t.h Ruma.n-
ia, Bulgaria, Hungary, and Finland., a..~though. don~ in the 
·name of the Allies, enabled the Russians to co.ntr.ol the 
coa.li tiori government_s which_ were estab.11.she.d.,. wllh the ex-
ception of Finland. 11 Allied Control C.omrni.s . .s.iana in the 
former Axis satellites were not permitted to function 
smoothly due to Soviet obstructiona. 12 The coalition gov-
ernments were required to be composed of representatives of 
the various political parties within ea.ch country. These 
normally included Comm11nists 9 So?ialists, Peasants, and 
Clerics.lists. The most strategic and decisive gave.rnmental 
- . 
positions (police and army) were secured __ by the. Communists, 
lOibido, Po 496, P• 537. 
llrbid., pp. 466-476; Deutscher, p. 533. 
12stettidius, p. 312. 
which enabled them gradually to extend their control over 
thti; country and over other members of the coalition. 13 
-t; 
At the Potsdam Conference (July-August 1945) Stalin at-
.. - ·.- ....... -~..,-..... ,,,.._.,, __ ,.·· -.. ~ -· ~--.·-·-··-.,-• -·- -..... . 
tempted to secure American and British_recognition of these 
satellite governmentso The only concession whi.ch .. he_ could 
gain toward this end, however, was the agreement by the 
United States and Great Britain to study the subject of rec-
ognition prior to the conclusion of the pea.ca tre.a:t.i.es o 14 
- . ·- - . - -
The Council of Foreign Ministers, established by the Confer-
ence to draft the peace treaties, ~id. not complete 1 ts ~ask 
until '.December 6, 1946. Signatures were af..f'lxed .to these 
treaties with the ~x-enemy ~tates (Italy, B.ulga.ria.9 ·Rumania, 
and Finland) in Paris on February io, 1947015 
The United States extended recognition, along with 
Orea t Britain, to Hunga~y on No:,rember 2, _ 1945 on tl:le co~di-
tion that free elections would be held as soon a.s possible. ,,.._ 
E1ections held on Noveniber 4 produc·ea only a sma..11 .minority 
for the Communists •16 Oy-erwhelming victories war~ scored 
by the Communists in Bulgaria and Yugoslavia 1.n the same '-
- . -· 
m.ohth. 17 Diplomatic recognltionwas extended to the Ruman-
is.n Government by the Uni tad States a.nd Great. B.r.1.tain on 
February 5, 1946 when it added members of the OpPo.sition to 
13I)eutscher, p. 533. 
14survey 1939~1~46, Po 624. 
15 · · · __ Ibid., Po 723. 
1$rbid_., Po '702. 
17Ibido 9 PPo 702=7030 
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the Government. The Bulgarian Government did not make these 
changes, in accordance with agreements reached in Moscow the 
previous December; therefore, recognition was denied to it. 18 
By the time the peace treaties were signed, Soviet con-
trol had been consolidated throughout the ex-enemy states 
in Eastern Europe. Trade agreements had be.en negotiated 
with these states which effectively bound the.m to_ the Rus-
sian economy. Following the poor Communist showing in the 
' I 
November, 1945 elections in Austria (Soviet-occupied sector) 
and Hungary, measures were applied to the election machinery 
which would prevent the recurrence of such developments. 
·Elections were not held in Rumania until November 19, 1946 11 
and in Poland until January 19, 1947, with the results de= 
noting the effectiveness of Communist police action in 
crippling the Opposition. 19 
The conclusion of the peace treaties meant that the 
United States and Great Britain would have no further legit= 
imate claim to contest the actions of the Soviet.Union in 
Eastern Europe. The actions of the Soviet Union could be 
effectively disguised and manifested through the puppet re= 
gimes of these states)) giving to it the appearance of being 
a 11 beneficent" protector of the principle of non~interference 
in the internal affairs of sovereign states. Protesta. to 
Soviet actions by the Americans and the British.were. declared 
by the Russians to be vioiations of this principle. 
18Ibid., p. 707. 
191bid., p. 734. 
Retention or East Prussia 
Soviet policy toward the German state of Eas..t Prussla 
has been governed by three considerationso One was a puni-
tive consideration and was concerned with t~e di.s.me.mberment 
or Q:ermanyo20' This state 9 the symbol or the highly effi-
cient German clvil administration as well as the source of 
the GeI'IJlan militaristic tradition, was formally liquidated 
by action or the Allied Control Council on February 25, 
1946 9 with approval of this action given b7 the Coun~il of 
Foreign Ministers on February 25 9 1947. Its eleven, prov-
- inc~st:and administrative districts had previous.ly: been 
dlvided between. the Soviet, British, and .lmel:'icari zon~s~ . 
and Poland. 21 The detachmen~ of East Prussia., as a __ measure 
to weaken permanently the capacity of ~rmany to_wag• ~r, 
had been agreed upon by the three Powers earl.7 in .. t.he ftr. 
Pt>larid was to be the primary beneficiary.22 
.. -- --
The second consideration .. r~.r So:victt _1>0.lic.7 ~.n .. rel~tion 
to East Prussia conce:rns .. the res.ol11te Russ.ian. qua.at tor a 
. -· . -
1~ar-around ice=free p_ort o Ta:C.it .. co.n.a .. an.t .. t.o. the S.oviet an-
nexatio? of the Baltic port of Koenigs.berg was .. gi.:v.en. at the 
20see below, Chapter IIo 
.. . 2lpeter· Calvocoressi., Surve:y of International Affairs 
1947-1948 ( London, 1952) 9 Po 229. --uerelnatter referred to· 
. ii'""!urve::r 1947=1948; United States Department or State, Ger-
~ l94'7-mg":--ime ~ in Documents, Dept. or_ State ffi. 
'~3~(Wain1ngton., -r950)., p. 151. Hereinafter referred 
to as !h!, !ll'ory in Documents. 
22survey 1939-1946., pp. 166-1689 Po 319, p. 333. --- ----- _,....._ 
Potsdam Conference with the proviso that final settlement 
must awa.i t the peace conference. 23 An atmosphere of perma-
nence pervaded this arrangement, as in the following year 
the name of the city was appropriately changed to the more 
Russian "Kal1ningrad 11 • 24 · 
The third consideration concerns the disposition of 
the southern portion of East Prussia. Amar.lean_ and.British 
consent was secured at Potsdam to the unilateral Soviet ac-
tion which placed this area, in addition to Upper Silesia, 
all but a tip of lower Silesia, a part of Brandenhurg, and 
all but the western extremity of Pomerania under Polish ad-
\ i. '. 
min~stra.tion, subject to final settlement by the peace 
conference. 25 However, consent was not given to the mass 
expulsions of the inhabitants of these areas. Within this 
third consideration, the Russians, by placing these areas 
under Polish control, hoped to escape t~ onus for the sev-
erance of German territory and the expulsion of its 
inhabitants. It was hoped that German animosity would be 
directed toward the Poles 11 causing a subsequent dependence 
of Poland upon the Soviet Union. 26 
8 
23 James P. Warburg~ Germany-Bridge or Ba.t_tleg,round ( New 
York, 1946, ~947), p. 30. 
24survey 1947-1948, p. 227. 
25warburg, p. 95. 
26rbid. 
Hegemony over Czechoslovakia. and Pola.pd 
The establishment of Soviet hegemony over Poland and 
Czechoslovakia was a further step in the Soviet plan to 
secure viable frontiers. As in the states of southeastern 
Europe:, 1 t was considered essential that the Sovie,t Union 
have 11 fr1endly 11 states along its western frontier.s as guar-
antees of its own security. Also, as in these states, 
11 friendly 0 governments, in Soviet terminology,. denoted sub-
serviency. 
Control over these areas extends the Soviet sphere of 
influence into the heart of north-centra 1 Europe. These 
two states become buffers against the possibility of a fu-
ture German or Western attack upon the Soviet Union. 
Czecboslovakla, with a higher degree of technologinal devel-
opment than the agrarian states of southeastern Europe, 
became a welcomed addition to the Soviet economy. Extension 
of Soviet control to these areas also gives to the Soviet 
Union a decided tactical advantage in the event of war in 
addition to providing a defense in depth to its own bounda-
ries. The area in which the armies of the.Western coalition 
would be required to fight defensive operations has been 
seriously limited. by this Soviet expansion.. For this reason, 
a determination to hold Western Germany within the Western 
defensive system has arisen. This in turn gives rise to 
serious doubts as to the possibility of German reunification 
until such time as the greater problem of East-West animos-
ity is resolved. 
10 
The Communist coup Q' eta t in C zechos1ovakia_, on 
February 10, 1948, 27 demonstrated to the Western world the 
full intentions of the Soviet Union to gain control of Eur-
ope as a. part of the greater plan for world domination. 
Furthermore! it demonstrated an essential requiretJ1ent of 
the Soviet system, i.eo, the overriding need for uniformity. 
As one author has stated, 28 Moscow is guided by the realize.= 
tion that it must have complete uniformity in the areas 
- . . 
which it controls. These st_at~s of Eastern Europe could not 
be .Jeft ~Jone to develop a system between "popular democ-
racy0 and parliamentary institutions because of the danger 
of the emergence of social forces and ideas which might 
prove unfavorable to the Soviet Union. Therefore, it fol-
lowed that in the states of Eastern Europe it was necessary 
to install in power either Russian Communists or local Com-
munists who were so thoroughly indoctrinated.with the Soviet 
viewpoint that.all their actions would resultantly reflect 
this view. 29 
Czechoslovakia~ because of the appeasement policy of 
the Western statesmen at Munich, had occasion to be disil-
lusioned with the West. In its disillusionment, it had 
27Kenneth Ingram, History of the Cold War (New YorkJ 
1955), PPo 86=90o 
. 28Ma.x Beloff, 11 No Peace, No War 11 , .Foreign Affairs j. 
XXVII (1949), 222-223. 
29rbid. 
11 
turned to the Soviet Union, which ma.de ostensible efforts to 
aid it. 30 The spirit of friendship and co-operation with 
the Soviet Union wa$ renewed following the Soviet entry into 
the war. 31 Subsequent to the evacuation of Soviet and Amer-
lean forces of li bera. tion in December, 1945, e lee tions were 
held on May 27, 1946 in which a genuine coalition gove!nment 
under a Communist Prime Minister was elected. 32 Although 
containing sufficient non-Communist members to give it a 
Western orientation, the lnfluence of Soviet Russia was seen 
in the July, 1947 refusa 1 of the C zechos lava.kl.an .. Go.vernment 
to participate in the Marshall Plan, which .was.a complete 
reversal of its previous position. 33 
There were indications, during the summer and fall of 
1947, that the popularity of the Czechoslovakian Communist 
Party was seriously deteriorating. This prompted a coup 
d'etat by which the Czechoslovakian police system came 
30Edward T~borsky, "Benes and the Soviets", Foreigr1 
Affairs, XXVII ( 1949), 302-304. The Russians declared that 
"they would come to the aid of the Czechs against the Ger-
mans in accordance with the Czechoslovak-Soviet Tr~aty of 
1935, providing the French would first show thelr willing-
ness· to invoke the ass is ta.nee terms of the Franco-Czech 
Treaty. This the French were not willing to do. 
3lrbid., p. 308, p. 311, pp. 311-313. Czechoslovakian 
forces were trained in the Soviet Union; a Treaty of Friend-
ship, signed in December, 1943, placed the Soviet Uni6n as 
favoring an independent Czechoslovakia with its own national 
government; a treaty of May, 1944 provided that areas liber-
ated by the Soviet Army would be turned over to emissaries 
of Dr. Benes for administration and control. 
32survey 1939-1946, p. 734. 
33rngram 9 pp. 86-87. 
12 
under Communist domination. With the police safely in 
Communist hands., el~ctions were held on May 30, 1948 for a 
single list of Communist-sponsored candidate,.s.... The. results 
were of the stereotyped Soviet variety., with the Communists 
receiving an overwhelming majority. President Benes, _who 
had believed that co-operation with the Russians was possi-
bJ.e.11 resigned from the Presidency of the Republic on June 
"7, 1948. 34 
In Poland, Soviet policy was _ cerl:~ere_d llJ>_~n closing, 
once and for all, the !11:..~.~o:t'ical i?;~_tE3way through which the 
!f!.~.t_E3;r>J:1_p_ortJgt1 _ot t~~- Soviet Uni9_t1}1ad been subject,ed, .to 
. ~evastating invasions., As a part of this policy, there was 
.......... __ ,..,....-,.,- ... ~ •• _.., ___ ,., .......... ___ •• ..,. ...... , ••• , •• -'- < ~ ·.-·-·-· ,.,..,_ - .-- • : 
an up_r.~lll:!.~-~Jr:i.~ .. ~f.fott by the Soviet Government to ~~~_n :r>EJc:-
qgni_~j.c,t] ___ of the Russo-Polish ?oundSt!'¥ as:_ es_tabl;she~ by the 
N~~~=~~yl.~.t. partition of Poland in 1939. At that time, 
territories were regained by the Soviet Union which had 
been lost to Poland during the Russo-Polish War of 1920-
1921.35 The most incessant opponent to Alli~d recognition 
of the Soviet Union's infamous acquisitions was the Polish, 
G.ovetr,nm.Ji.._nt ___ in E4ile, established in London following the 
- ·-, ... ,.~"7"""· .. ... . -. 
Nazi-Soviet partition. 36 However, the efforts of this Gov= 
ernment to prevent the loss of this territory and what it 
feared most, Soviet domination of Poland, proved unsuccess-
ful. 
34rbid., pp. 89-90, p. 93. 
3~warburg, p. 93. 
36.Andrew J. Krzesinski, Poland's Rights To Justice (New 
York, 1946)/J p. 24. 
The Soviet Union, in pressing the government~ of the 
United States and Great Britain for their recognition of 
the Curzon Line as the postwar Russo-Polish boundary, ar-
gued that the lands to the east of this line had been 
historically Russian and that as a matter of honor they 
should be returned to the Soviet Union. It was also de-
13 
clared, that in the interests of Soviet security, the 
postwar Polish Government must be It strong, independent, and 
democratic---, to help protect the Soviet U~ion". 37 
Stalin won the approval of Roosevelt and Churchill at 
Yalta for the establishment of the Curzon Line as the post-
war Russo-Polish boundary. The Poles were to be compensated 
fo:r_j;JJ(:3 loss of the eastern areas with German_ territory. 38 
Although the decision of the Big Three to recognize. the 
Curzon Line wa.s made without the consent or even with the 
consultation of the London Polish Government, it was indis-
puta.ble that control of the area in question was exercised 
by the Soviet-sponsored Provisional Government_of Poland, 
supported by the Red Army o 39 The areas which constitute 
western White Russia and the western Ukraine had been 
37stettinius, P-o 1540 The Curzon Line was. a supposedly 
ethnogra.phical demarcation proposed in 1919. 
38Ibld. p p. 155, p. 21L Final delimit.atib_n of the 
western frontier would be decided at the peace conference, 
Stettinius, pp. 337-338. 
39survey 1939-1946, Po 431; Po 528. The Polish Commit-
tee of National Liberation wa.s set up by the Russians on 
July 26j 1944 to administer liberated areas. It proclaimed 
itself the Provisional Government of Poland on.December 31, 
1944. 
formally annexed by the Soviet Union in January, .. 19440 40 
Although the Provisional Government was not recognized by 
the United States or Great Britain, 41 these states had no 
other alternative than to attempt a compromise at Yalta to 
14 
insure that the :po_~_twar Polish Government would include mem-
bers of the London Polish Governmento The actual compromise 
provided that the existing Provisional Government would be 
reorganized to include Poles from within Poland and from 
abroatl. The reorganized government or the Polish Provision-
al Government of National Unity would be "pledged to the 
holding of free and unfettered elections as ~oon aa possible 
on the basis of universal suffrage and the secret ba-llotn. 42 
A Commission was established by the Yalta. Conference, 
representing the three Allied Powers.'/ which was to hold con-
sultations in Moscow with the various Polish elements in 
relation to the formation of the new Provisional Govern-
ment. 43 The Russian insistence that no Polish leader could 
participate in the new Provisional Government who dld not 
accept the Yalta Agreements re la ti ve to the Cu.rzon Line44 
seriously obstructed the work of the Commls:sion. 45 
40Ibid • .'I Po 4120 
4lstettinius, p. 158. 
42Ibido 9 PPo 337-3380 
43Ibid. 
44survey 1939-1956, Po 5760 
45rbido, p. 414. 
15 
The stalemate in Moscow was broken during May with the 
arrival of the personal emissary of Presid~nt Truman, Mro 
Harry Hopkins, for personal consultations with Stalin. On 
July 5, 1945, the reorga~ized Provisional Government of 
Poland received the recognition of the United .. Sta..tes and 
Great Britain. Of its total twenty-one seats, fourteen of 
the most important (anddecisive) were retained by former 
members of the Soviet-sponsored Provisiona.l Gove-rn,:nent. 46 
Although it had been agre~d at Yalt.a .that Po.land was 
to receive German lands as compensation for her 1o~_ses to 
Soviet Russia, final delimitation was to await th~ peace 
. . 
conference. 47 Both Roosevelt and Churchill opposed any ex-
tens ion of :Polish domain to the west of the Oder· Rivero 48 
!:I~wever, prior to the Potsdam Conf.erence, unilateral action 
by the Soviet Union had placed the Germ.an territory to the 
Oder and Western Neisse Rivers under. Polish ad1!11f:11stration, 
with the exception of the Baltic port of Koenig.abe.rg and the 
surrounding area, which was reserved to the Soviet Union. 
This act ion received the tacit consent of the Unit.ad States 
and Great Brite.in at Potsdam, but re.mained. conditional upon 
the final peace settlement. 49 
46 Ibid.,. Pl?• 588-589. 
47st~.tt.inius, pp. 337-3380 
48 ,, •·· . Ibid. _t pp._ 210-211., 
49survey 1939-1946, p. 608. ~-
16 
Inside Poland, final claim to undisputed authority lay 
with the Communists upon the announcement of the results of 
the first postwar election which was held on January 19, 
1947. The Democratic Bloc (the Communists and their allies) 
won 394 of 444 seats in the parliament. Opposition to Com-
munist control had by this time been rendered lnconsequen-
tial, notwithstanding the belated and ineffective protests 
voiced by the British and United States Governments to this 
travesty committed in the name 50 of democracy. 
Establishment of a Viable Balance of Power in Europe 
The second major requirement of Soviet defense entails 
the establishment of a viable balance of power in Europe. 
For the stabi 11 ty of its hegemony over Eastern Europe, it is 
essential triat G-ermany re_main divided, or be united under 
Comrt1u_r1ist cqntrol. It is essential that Ge.rmany rr.9.:t .. be per-
mitted to ;r€3g~.Jri. Jts former_ dominant Eµropean position. If 
,.·"."•" --., • .• •,-•,p·",".-".·.. ,.,• c•'' '<' . ·,,·, ·_, - _., .'•• ; •• • . • • ".• ,'-. ,,_ •,_' '.,.<~, ·,:·.· ~·:--•c ' . ,_·-,,,· .·-" '. -- ' •' ~ 
such a development should materialize, the ba.lance of power 
in Europe would be seriously jeopardizeqo In the Soviet 
view, not only would the Communist domination of Eastern 
Europe be threatened, but also the security ~f ita own fron-
_tJ~_~s would be imperiled. 
In the pursuit of its po],1.cy of c,pntainmEmt of G-erman 
P?_!~-!~ four major concepts have been employed. They are: 
( 1) a Great Power Concert, envisaging an alliance with the 
50 · Ibid., PPo 185-188. 
17 
United States; (2) the division of Germany between East and 
West blocs; ( 3) the neutralization a.nd disarmament of Ger-
many into a. buffer zone; a.nd ( 4) a. European Concert. 
At the zenith of its victorious sweep thr~ugh Eastern 
Europe, it was the <;>E_J_~?~_of Soviet :E)Olicy to_~_t~~1:_ri, if 
possible, the degree of control in Germany aa had been ob--------..... ·~-- ·' ·- .. ~· . - - .----·-- - - . -
tained in the subjugated state,;'l of Eastern .Europ_e •.. This 
..... - . --- . 
could be ascertained in the Soviet I"'.~Y.~.rJ;igJ. of it.a .wa;:t!me..,, 
position favoring German dismemberment to support of a poll-... __ , _________ ..,_. __ ">-·-c:, 
cy demanding the unification of GermanY,. 51 :In.relation to 
this demand for unification, the Soviet Union advocated a 
'7.-.-." -~~-·-·--~ •. -,-,_ •. ·-· -·-~·· .-
strong_ cep.tral government, 1. e., one in which s.trategically-
- - --~· ·--""-·---~ ,.- -·· -- .. -· . - .... 
placed Communists could m'?re easi.1¥, as.s.um.e contr.'?l over 
decisive positions. 52 Awakened to Soviet de.slgns. by the 
subversion of free government in Eastern Europe.,_ the Soviet 
plans for the unification of Germany hav.e be_en. st.eadfastly 
opposed by the West. The Soviet Union, in view of .. the dev-
astating losses in manpower and property during World War 
II, has a;i:i.e_~~-" ~e,a,sgr1 to fear and respect tlle c:apab1,li ties . 
of :t]:ie _G~rman,;'l_. A desire to prevent the rebirth of German 
m~?::~':'::;!~~~-~l.CJ.. .. ~-~t ... :t:>ej n~p was it, condemned. But a con-
comitant desire and moti va. tion of Sovi.et polic.y has been 
for the c_C?,rn:12.~~~ ~ "~.1::l9.S~if3."t1?::i. qf g~_f!J:1~.mr. and uti.ll_z.a t ion of 
its dynamic resources in the pursuit of its expa.nsi_onist 
aims. 
51 Ibid • , .P • 16 7 , p • 5 48, p • 58 6 • 
52survey 1947-1948, pp. 225~227, p. 233. 
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Great Power Concert 
The wartime alliance of the United States, Great 
Britain, and the Soviet Union containe.d within .. itself a con-
tradiction of ideals. It was hoped that these. thre.e .. Powers 
would continue their co-operation in the postwarwo.rld to-
·-·-·-~-···--··········--··' .. ···-··~~ ... ---·--·--·~-----~-.--, -- ·-----,- ... --,~··· 
ward the perpetuation of peace. This objective was 
expressed repeatedly by the wartime leaders., and within this 
objective, the punishment and containment of future .. German 
aggression was unanimously agr~eci t1pon. 53 As for the math-
. ~ 
ods by which this would be ~ccomplish~d, it was agreed that 
the three Great Powers, complemented by Franc.a. ;n recogni-
tion of its pre-war status and of its wartime. suffering at 
German hands, would co-operate in the quadripartite control 
and direction of Germany until such time as it could be en-
trusted with the return to a sovereign status among the 
democratic, peace-seeking nations of the wo.r.ld_.54 There 
was complete agreement among these Powers. that f.or the sake 
of a peaceful world, Germany must be contained and re-
educated to democracy.55 
The Great Power Concert began to ~h~'lJ\r !h:e __ st_~a~hs ... of 
its inner contradictions 1:l~Jore. the fighting, .. .b.a.d oome to a 
~~o~e,. The agreements with the Russians at Yalta were in 
part bgse_d :t.lPQP. th~ belief .. t.hat Rus.sia,J'.l ald. _wot1l!:1.s .. be 
53survey 1939-1946, p. 502. 





necessary in concluding the war with Japan. They. were based 
~--·-----·~ ··•·•··~~-,,~.-~-. _., .. •-• ••• ._.---··"-"• •"•·•-·c "'" .--, .• _,, • ·" • •• 
in part on a mistaken analysis of Soviet motives.~. They were -- . ...,._ ---- .. --· - ·- ·- -.: 
based in part on a belief in the sanctity of agrfa~l!len~~-' a 
tenet totally alien to Soviet diplomacy. And poss.ibly the 
greatest, and most damaging basis for concluding the agree-
ments which put the Soviet Union in firm control.in Eastern 
Europe, was the Ameri_~a.:i.::i_J~a}._l~F.~ ~o __ recQgpJz_e. J:;~e Im_port~nt 
]?_~~J~!_?t; .. which it would be required to fulfill. in the post-
war world. rt was thus the lingering vestiges of isolationism 
-·--·- - ----- ·-·-----· ----- .. h~-- ·-------------- -- .. -- ···-·· ----· 
which caused American policy to be based upon .the desire for 
a speedy conclusion to American participation.in European 
affairs and a return to hemispheric relattons. 56 
As events in Eastern Europe revealed, _prior. to the end 
of hostilities, the Soviet Union was ~ent ~:pan i:a, unilateral 
course of action. In Germany, the inner contradictions 
among the Great Powers revealed their irreconciliable nature 
soon after the beginning of the occupation. Only upon mat-
ters of the most pe!l'functory nature could accord be 
reached. 57 rronically, not the Russians, but the fr-_e__I_'l:c_~ 
~~g_v.:.ideg __ tl:l~_ 1,pJ:tJEl:1- ol:)f3truct ;gns_ to the achievement of the 
objectives of the occupation as had been established at 
Potsdam. France, not a signatory to the Potsdam Agreements, 
had been assigned a zone of occupation and a seat on the 
Allied Control Council. It could, as a result of the 
56survey 1939-1946, Po 532. 
57Lucius Do Clay, Deci.:sion in Germany ( Garden City, 
1950), Po 157, pp. 160-161, PPo 350-3530 
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failure to secure its signatu:r>e to the Potsdam Agreements, 
pursue a unilateral course when it so desired. In view of 
the French fear of German mill tary and economic strength, 
France offered rep~~-~-E3d oppe>sJtio~ to measures.. by which.: .9~r1.-
~~J~~E'3~ -~l_l~lle>I'iJy., wou.ld be _placed in German hands.o 58 
At the beginning of the occupation, the Soviet Union 
desired a unified Ge_r~9:r_iy_? 59 This was a logical develop-··· -···- .. ~-, . ·-... . ··- -.- . - - . . . -~ . ,_. 
ment of a policy which would enhance the posslhi,.:IJ,t,ies .. for 
Soviet crn.ntro1 over all of Germany o The expressed desire of ................ -_.,.. ______ ,_ ..... ~"'- ~: - -· ·-. . - . 
the United States to disengage itself from.German.an,p. Euro-
pean affairs at the earliest possible opportunity 60 must 
have encouraged Soviet hopes for the a ttainmen.t. of .its ob-
IV<',-
jectives. Any realization of the attainment of.a highly 
centralized administration in Germany was counter to the 
beliefs of the three Western Powers in.. regard to a future 
governmental system for Germanyo France obstinately opposed 
any but the most decentralized type of administ.rative struc-
ture o 61 The _!!nt ted States and Gree. t Britain. pe.rslstent ly 
a.,dvoca ted a centralized e?onomic ad~~nistrati<?.El.- f'o_r Germ1:1.ri.y, 
as had been directed by the Potsdam Agreements ... 62 Tn regard 
to a po!.;~i?l:l} administration9 they agreed upon a feclera-1 
sxst.e.m,. with Great Britain desiring more centralization 
58rbido, Po 39)1 PPo ~32-133, pp. 178-179. 
59survey l939rml946j Po 167 o 
60rbido, Po 532. 
6lclay, p. 39, Po 3960 
62 · . Ibido, pp. 40-41~ pp. 163-185. 
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than considered wise by the United States. A federal system 
was thought best suited to prevent the recurrence of the 
63 highly centralized mill tari stic German state. Al though 
--· .... ". .. . . . 
advocating a centralized political administratio_n for Ger-
many, ~he .l:!~~~tans consistently obstructep. Bri.tlsh and 
American efforts to effect the unified ~gonpgi.ic admi.nistra-
tion directed by the Potsdam accords. 1rhis. o.bs.t.ructionism 
was an ~-~1:1:rr1pl~ __ of sln.or.t-term Soviet policy whic.h. t~war.~ed 
l:_ong:-:r~n_g~ __ Qpj~qtiyr:35._. Short-term Soviet po.licy had a~ its 
objective the pursuit of a repara~ions pollcy which would 
both deplete the German war-making potential _and a-lso aid 
the reconstruction problem within_theSoviet U:nion.64 No 
agreement could be reached among .the Allie_d __ p_awe,rs as to 
the final amount of reparations to be as_sessed ae;ainst the 
Germans. 65 In view of this inability to reach. agreenient, 
the Russians were to be permitted to exact andwi.thdraw 
reparations in advance of the settlement of a t_ota_L amount. 
These advance reparations were to be accounted again~t the 
final sum allotted to the Soviet Union. 66 .. It had been 
agreed at Potsdam that no reparations would be taken from 
current German production. In order to minimize the costs 
of the occupation upon the occupying powers, each zone was 
63Ibido I Po 396 • 
64Peter Nettl» "German Reparations", ForeignAffa.irs, 
XXIX _(1951), 300-308. 
65stettinius, PPo 266-267; Clay, Po 319. 
66survey 1939-1946~ p. 623. 
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to provide for the whole the goods and services for which 
it was best equipped. 67 However, in this vital function, 
both the French and the Russians refused to co-operate. In 
addition, the Soviet authorities refused to cease their pol-
icy of exactlng reparations f'rom current German production. 
This policy had been adopted upon the realization of the 
wastefulness of the Russian policy of removing plants and 
equipment to the Soviet Union. Also, by leaving the plants 
in operation in the Soviet zone to produce for reparations, 
jobs were created for German laborers o 11his placed the 
Russians in a temporary political advantage, due to unem-
ployment problems in the Western zones which were created 
by the influx of expellees from the former German territor-
ies and Eastern Europe, and also by the Russian_ refusa 1 to 
provide the Western zones with needed raw materia1so The 
Soviet authorities refused to make an accounting of the 
withdrawals of equipment from their zone in addition to the 
open abrogation of the understanding reached at Pot:;3dam. 68 
As a result of the Soviet intransigence, the .American 
and British zones were merged for economic administration 
in January, 1947. However, they retained their separate 
identities for military administration. American offers to 
Russia and France to join in the merger were rejected. 69 
67rbid. 
68Clay, PPo 121-122. 
69rb'd _, _J._·_o J P o 163. 
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Further events in 1947 underscored the detertorating 
state of relations between the Soviet Union and the Western 
Powers. Among these events 1 the Soviet -~efusal to partici-
pate in the Marshall Plan for the economic recovery of 
Europ~ and its refusal to allow the participation of the 
satellite states of Eastern Europe emphasized the diversity 
of interests between Ea.st a.nd West. ?O In Germ.any itself, 
the Allied Contrql Council increasingly became. a .. forum for 
-.,.. .. -··------:.:_·,-·-··,,-. ,,., .. •,•-- - . ' . - - _._, -.- .. - . .. , . 
Soviet P.t9.J?agandistic harangues against the. Western Powers. 
Efforts at Four Power co-operation ended with the 
Soviet walkout from the Allied Control Council in March, 
1948. In defense of their actions, the Russians charged 
the Western Powers with attempting to create a separate 
German state. Soviet opposition was also expressed against 
the c_ur:re_ngy reform which was to be undertaken in the West-
ern zones. 71 The B(:)rltn blockade, which followed the 
Russian walkout from the Allied Control Councill was an at-
tempt to force the Western Povvers to drop their announced 
plans to proceed with the formation of a central government-
al authority for the Western zones in view. of Soviet 
obstructionism in the unified administration of Germany.72 
70 Survey 1947=1948, pp. 24-39. 
71clay, pp. 349-357. 
72Ibid., pp. 362-363, p. 369. 
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Division of Germ.any Between East and West Blocs 
~lthough the Berlin blockade served to magnify the 
serious divergence of interests between East and West, the 
actual_-~ i 'IT_i_s_1-?.n o_f Germany had begun prior to this action 
by the Russians. ~o_licy in the Soviet zone had _been from 
the outset of the occupation directed toward the creation 
of a_ repi!_Qa .Q_f .the satellites of Eastern Europe.. The Sov-
iet authorities were the first of the occupying powers to 
permit the formation of political parties. 73 A1though the 
parties were initially allowed a modicum of freedom from 
interference, election results proved that such a policy 
was not beneficial to the attainment of Communist objec-
tives. 74 A fusion of the Social Democratic Party (SPD) 
with the Communist Party (KPD) was directed in the Soviet 
zone in April, 1946, prior to zonal elections. The result 
of this merger was a 0 united worker's party" or as it was 
officially known, the Socialist Unity Party (SED). This 
- -
. . 
party was to become the instrument for the fulfillment of 
Soviet policy in the Soviet zone. 75 Both the SED and the 
nominal opposition parties were gradually purged of all 
elements opposed to Soviet policy.76 
73Beate Ruhm von Oppen, ed., Documents on Germany Under 
Occupation 1945-1954 (London, 1955), pp. 37-39. Hereinafter 
referred to as Documents £E1: Germany 1945-1954. _ 
74Joachim Joesten, Germany: What Now? (Chicago, 1948), 
pp. 63-72. 
75Ibid., pp. 136-144. 
76J.P. Nettl, The Eastern Zone and Soviet Policy in 
Germany 1945-50 (London, 1951), pp. 99-114. 
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The sovietization of the Russian zone was pursued 
further in the -~~~!_?:_l-ization measures taken in agric:ml~_~re 
and industry. 77 These measures have been used as bargaining -~--~-.-.......... -- .. \ .. , _,. -·-----.- .. ·-
positions in subsequent negotiations among the Four Powers 
in the attempts to achieve reunification. 78 By divesting 
the Junker landowners of their large holdings and dividi~g 
them among small farmers, agricultural workers. and refugees, 
and by nationalization of major industries in the name of 
the working population, the Russians have incurred the op-
posi ti~t:1- 9.f ___ th~ free'.'.'.(9nterprise. adherents in Western 
C3:e:r1111:a,ry_. This has subsequently created a deterrent to re-
unification. Although there may be a true desire for 
?'.'eunification, various vested interests on either s.ide will 
be reluctant to endanger the system whic.h i.s. mo.s.t. beneficial 
to their interests. This has had its effects not only in 
the social and economic fields, but also in the political 
field. 79 In East Germany j the Co_.tl1!Il_UO,Js_ts were ins.talled in 
power by the Soviet a~thorities, and on:Ly sg_ long a~ the 
Sg_viet Union maintatl'.l_~ . vested interests in Germany can this 
group r~_tain its control. The Communist.a could not effec-- . -.-..... _______ . 
tively compete with either the Christian Democratic Union 
77Documents on Germany 1945-1954., pp. 59-64; J.·P. Nettl., 
pp. 151-184. 
78united States Department of State, The Geneva Confer-
ence of Heads of Government, July 18-23, 1955, Dept. of ·· 
State Pub. No. 6046 (Washington, 1955T; pp. 77~80. Herein--
after referred to as Geneva. Conference of Heads of Government 
1955. 
79peter Netti, "Economic Checks on German Unity", For-
eign Affairs, XXX ll952), 559-560. ----
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(CDU) or the Social Democra.tso80 Because free elections 
would mean almost certain defeat for the Communists, ~t ls 
questionable that such a development will be consented to 
by the Soviet Union. It would mean the renunciation of all 
their objectives in respect to eventual control of Germany 
and would also be contradictory to what a.re considered genu-
ine Soviet fears of a reunified, free and independent 
Germany. 
As a part of the di.vis ion of Germany both the Frencq_ 
. . -.. ~-- ____ . .,,,, ..... 
and the R_t1ssians, in their refusal to participgte:,_in a uni-
fied economic administration of Germany, er~_?_ted. Z(.)rial 
barriers to trade and communications. These barriers be-
• -- • 0 • • • 0 •• ,,:~, 0 ' • •• , • • 0 •" • 0 • •' • I •, 
came increasingly difficult to surmount. Int.erzonal 
movement became almost as difficult as that between 
nations. 81 The French were gradually indu.ced to. lower their 
zonal barriers and to co-operate with the A.nglo~American 
-- -
bizone for economic purposes. This co-operation was further 
extended when, at a conference of the Three Powers__ .in London 
. 
during February and March, 1948, it was a.greed that the 
three Western zones should be merged and that the German 
population be allowed to establish a Government for the 
merged area. The Germans were to be permitted to call a 
constituent assembly in September, 1948. Simultaneously, 
the three occupying Powers would draw up an Occupation 
80Joesten, p. 146. 
8lc1ay, pp. 111-112. 
Statute which would transfer the functions of military 
82 government to a civilian High Commission. 
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The Basic Law of the new German Federal Republic and 
the Occupation Statute were promulgated in May,_ 1949, simul-
taneous to the lifting of the Soviet blockade of BE:3rlin. B:S 
'Although maintaining the blockade for a year, the Russians 
failed in their objectives of driving the Western Powers 
from Berlin and in diverting them from their plans to allow 
the establishment of a central government for the.Western 
zones. Instead, the decision to institute the blockade had 
.made the Western Powers more resolute in their d.ete;r>mination 
to remain in Berlin and to oppose at all costs. the Soviet 
desire to control all of Germany. The giyi,;;og~ .. af.- Ge_rmany 
took a more permanent character when in SeptembeJ:', 1949. the 
first Government of the West German Federal Republic was 
officially installed .. 84 
Upon the initial announcement by the three Western 
Powers of their intentions to allow the. formation of a can-
tral government in their zones the Russians charged these 
governments with fomenting the.division of Germany.85 How-
- . 
evE3rg the Soviet authorities had laid the foundati_on for an 
East German Government (and the division of Germany) prior 
s2rbid., pp. 404-406. 
83rbid., p. 390. 
84James P. Warburg~ Germany-Key To Peace (Cambridge, 
1953), pp. 118-120. 
85c1ay, pp. 355-357. 
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to any like action by the three Western Powers. An 
embryonic central government for the Soviet zone was estab-
lished in 1945. Its scope was gradually extended to the 
degree that the transformation to a governmental status was 
but a mere change in name. A 11People's Congress" was sum-
monad in December, 1947 which met at various times during 
1948. It had embryonic governmenta.~ organs in the forms of 
a "People's Council" or Volksrat and a Presi.dium. This Con-
gress approved a constitution, ostensibly drafted for all 
of Germany, which envisaged the formation of a Upeople's 
Republic" similar to the satellite states of Eastern Eur-
ope. This cons ti tut ion became the fundame.nta.L law. for the 
German Democratic Republic, which was proclalmed on October 
7, 1949, following the establishment of the first Government 
of the West German Federal Republic o 86 The first Government 
of East Germany was of a provisional nature, as e_lections 
were not held until a year later. 87 This Government imme-
diately made commitments, in relation to the disputed east-
ern provinces of Germany and the expelled inhabitants of 
these areas., which have seriously prejudiced the.hopes of 
reunification. I:n their efforts to gain recognition as a 
sgve;reign __ 1;1:t;ate, the leaders. of the new. G?ver0111.e.nt estab-
li~_b,~d_ rel~tions:.,.iwith the Communist-bloc countries in 
Eastern ·Europe. In the process, the East Gerrnans disavowed 
86survey 1?47-1948., PPo 257-260. 
87 b d · .!_!_o, Po 192. 
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any future claim of Germany to the eastern territories which 
had been separated from Germany at the end of the war. Any 
claims of the expelled inhabitants of these areas were also 
disavowedo 88 The renunciation of any future claims in these 
areas has been repudiated by the Government of the German 
Federal Republic and by the three Western Powers. 89 
Neutralization and Disarmament of Germany 
The concept of a unified but neutralized and disarmed 
Germany began to be vigorously applied following the an-
nouncement in April, 1949 of the formation of the North 
Atlantic_ Treaty Organization (NATO). As stated previously, 
it was unanimously resolved by the victorious Allies that 
Germany must be disarmed and demilitarized, Leo, ~the must 
be rendered incapable of creating another war machine. The 
Potsgtam Agreemer:i:t~ directed the dismantlement or destruction 
--' _c ,.' •·-' • • ·,, .· •• •-,,v--e:', --,-.-«o'';"c~•.--:co•c• ,--~,.cc-:,-,.,:,,,-~-·-· < .· ··s.'" 
of industries producing or capable of producing war materi-
als or materials essential to the conduct c:rf- war. 90 As with 
the other areas of disagreement in regard to Germany, this 
field was not immune to controversy and conflict. Charges 
and counter-charges were made to the effect that demilitari= 
zation was not being faithfully carried out. 91 Reports of 
88Ibid., PPo ~93-196. 
89Peter Ga1vocoressi~ Surve;z of International Affairs 
1949-1950 ( London, 1953), Po 1940 Hereinafter refe:rred to 
as Survey 1949-1950. 
90survey 1939-1946, Po 618. 
9lrbid., Po 726; Clay, PPo 127-1290 
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the increases being made in the para-military East German 
''People I s Police" added to the consternation in the West as 
to Soviet intentions. 92 NATO had received its inspiration 
in the context of rapidly deteriorating East-West relations 
and the mounting apprehension that t~e Soviet Union would 
resort to force in order to accomplish its aims.. The forma-
tion of NATO brought forth charges bf the Russians that this 
organization was an aggressive grouping directed solely 
against the Soviet Uniono 93 
Subsequent to the outbreak of hos till.ties .. in Korea in 
June, 1950, the matter of German participation in the de-
fense of Western 1:1:urope became increasingly important, in 
particular to the United Sta. tes Governme.nt. Prio.r to the 
beginning of this conflict,_a. German contribution to Western 
defense had not been contemplated publicly. However, the 
increasing fear that a si tua.tion similar to Korea would de-
velop in divided Germany led American officials to press 
for the establishment of a system of European defense which 
could utilize the German potential. It was advocated in-
creasingly in the United States that an effective defense 
of Western Europe could be made only with the participation 
of West Germanyo 94 
92survey 1949-1950, PPo 241-243; Warburg,_ Germany-Key 
To Peace, PPo 129-130. 
93survey 1949-1950, PPo 13-140 
94rbid., PPo 154-155; Warburg, Germany=Key To Peace, 
Po 126.-- -
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Negotiations were conducted throughout 1951 which 
culminated in the signing on May 27, 1952, of the European 
Defense Community (EDC) Treaty by France, Belgium, the Neth-
erlands, Luxembourg, the German Federal Republic, and Italy. 
The organization which would be established, upon ratifica-
tion of the Treaty by the signatory nations, would provide 
for a supranational F~uropean Army to which a German contri-
bution would be ma.de. This organization satisfied the 
demand of the United States for a West German contribution 
to European defense while its supranational chara.cter helped 
to allay the fears engendered by the proposal to re-create 
a national German armyo On May 26, 1952 the United States, 
Great Britain, France, and West Germany signed the Contrac-
tual Agreements. Under these Agreements, which were to 
enter into force with the EDC Treaty, virtual sovereignty 
would be restored to West Germanyo 95 
Upon the announcement of the plans for the rearmament 
of West Germany, it became the object of Soviet policy to 
prevent their maturity. The Russians were aided in this 
policy by propagandists in East Germany and the satellites 
of Eastern Europe. As has become common policy since, the 
lure of reunification was utilized in the efforts to prevent 
West German alliance with the Western Powers.. Rearmament 
was declared to be the complete antithesis of reunification. 
95peter Calvocoressi, Survey of International Affairs 
1952 (London, 1955), PPo 106-1090 ~ereinafter referred to 
as Survey 1952. 
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It was further declared that West German rearmament within a 
basically anti-Soviet bloc would mean the permanent division 
of Germany. 96 In addition to ~:r1?us ingGe rman fears of perm-
a_nent~~ vi siot1,, Soviet propaganda was directed toward 
m:111.gnifring the. French. fears of German mill tarism and the 
easily provoked suspicion of the supranational character of 
EDC. Soviet propaganda. continued to play upon the French 
apprehension of the loss of its sovereignty in an organiza-
tion such as EDC, and alluded to the 11 inevitable 11 German 
domination of the organization. This line was continued 
after EDC met defeat in the .French National Assembly in 
August, 1954 with its object then to create the same fears 
· in relation. to the Western European Union. ( WEU}, which re-
placed EDc.97 
In its campaign to prevent ratification of the EDC 
Treaty, the Soviet Union proposed the reunification of Ger-
many upon an armed, but neutralized basis.98 Such a proposal 
finds many adherents, but is opposed by the leaders in West 
Germany and the three Western Powers o 99 This proposal, if 
96u.s. Dept. of State, Bulletin, XXVII (1952), 518-521; 
U.S. Dept. of State, Bullet in, XXIX ( 1953), · 7li::5.:.,749; Current 
Digest of the Soviet Press, v; Dec. 9, 1953, pp o .17..,18; · Cur.:. 
rent Digest of the Soviet Press, V, Jan. 6, 1954, pp. 20-=-lrr. 
97current Digest of the Soviet Press, V, Jan. 20, 1954, 
PPo 40-41; Current Digest of the Soviet Press, V, Dec. 9, 
1953, Po 18; New Times (Moscow;, No. 41, Oct. 9, 1954, pp. 
9-15. 
98u.s. Dept. of State, Bulletin, XXVI (1952), 531-532. 
99u.s. Dept. of State, Bulletin, XXVII (1952), 92-93; 
Survey 1952, Po 89. 
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carried out through a system of internationally supervised 
free elections, would be dangerous both to East and West. 
It was therefore surmised that the Soviet proposal was made 
either for propagandistic purposes, or else the Soviet Union 
felt it could be more secure with a. untted, armed gpd_neu,., 
tralized Germany than with a rearmed Western Germany all,iE:ld 
with the West. 100 The value to the Soviet Union in the neu-
tralization of Germany would lie in the removal of Western 
d~J~E-.@~ fqr9es :f'p9rt1 GE31;ma.ny pr>oper. This would aid any Sov-
iet plans for gaining covert control while simultaneously 
placing a severe curtailment upon the area in whi~h Western 
forces could prepare defensive operations.lOl 
The policy of a unified, armed, and neutral Germany is 
discounted by the West. Such a policy is· rejected by the 
Adenauer Government and is declared to be an endangerment 
to German freedom and security and is an open invitation to 
Soviet controi. 102 The major opposition party to Adenauer's 
Christian Democratic Union, the Social Democratic Party, 
likewise opposes neutralization. It, however, is more prone 
to negotiation with the Russians in the matter of reunifica-
ti 103 on. 
lOOSurvey 1952, PPo 88=89. 
101Eric Dethleffsen, nThe Chimera of German Neutrali-
ty", Foreign Affairs, XXX (.1952) 9 369. 
102survey 1952, pp~· 7.3.:.74; Konrad .Adenaue.r~ · "Germ ..any, 
The New Partner~ore ign Affairs, XXXIII ( 1955 J, .182. 
103carlo .Schmid, "Germany and Europe: The German Soc-
ial Democratic Program", Foreign Affairs, XXX ( 1952), 537, 
544. 
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When the EDC Treaty was defeated in the French National 
Assembly in August, 1954, over two years subsequent to the 
negotiation of the Treaty, a disillusioning blow was struck 
to the concept of Western European defense in that West Ger-
many continued to remain outside the North Atle.nti.c .. defense 
system. Although the capabilities of NATO had .been,increa.s-
ed measureably during this period, it continued to be the 
belief of Western leaders that so long as West Germany re-
mained outside the system, the cape.bllities of Western 
--......_."'·-'"-''·~--~' -.: .. ~·- ""' . " .- ' '···, ·. 
European defense would be seriousl~ lim;ted. 104 ·Asa result 
of pressure exerted by the United States, and a British con-
cession to its traditional insular policy, agreement was 
reached at London during September and Octobe.r, 1954 upon 
an organization to supplant the defunct EDC, l05 The pro-
ceedings begun here culminated with the signing.at Paris, on 
October 23, 1954, of agreements establishing the Western 
European Union (WEU). The structure of the existing Brus-
sels Treaty Organization (BTO), formed in March, 1948 by 
Great Britain, France, Holland, Belgium, and Luxembourg as 
a defensive measure against the Soviet threat, was to_be 
utilized by the new organization. The WEU would include the 
original members of the Brussels Treaty Organization, in 
- -
addition to Italy and West Germany. Although WEU would 
104u.s. Dept. of State, Bulletin, XXXI (1954), 13, 49, 
515. 
105Ibid., pp. 515-522, p. 845. 
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permit the retention of national armies, in this regard 
lacking the ~upranational character of EDC 9 safeguards were 
provided against any member embarking upon a unilateral 
course of aggressiono The United States and Great Britain 
joined in a Declaration guaranteeing these safeguards.106 
This rapid progression of events was climaxed on May 5, 1955 
when the Paris Agreements came into force and the West Ger-
man Federal Republic regained its complete sovereigntyo In 
addition to its position within WEUJ West Germany was now 
adrg.i tted to NATO. lO? In its efforts to prevent .EDC arid 
laterj) the W:ELJ 9 from becoming effectivej) the Soviet Union 
emphasized th~ 11 a.gg:r'es siy-e II c~racte r of these organizations 
and their antithetical relation to German reunification. 
rrhis policy undoubtedly had 1 ts effect upon the apprehensions 
of the French in regard to the rebirth of a German army. It 
was likewise effective upon German disquietude relative to 
permanent divisiono However, an important factor responsi-
ble for the miscarriage of EDC j which was correct.ad in the 
organization of WEU, was the reluctance of the British to 
become firmly committed to a policy of positive and long-
range participation in continental affairs. 
l06un1 ted Sta. tes Department of State~ Lond-cin and Paris 
~~~~n_!;~~ De.pt o of State .Pub" No o 5659 -{ Wasfilngtonj · 1954) ~ 
~~idney Bo Fay, "The UoS. and .West Europe", Current 
IUstor;L: 9 XXVIII ( 1955), 36""40o 
107U o S. Dept o of State, Bullet in~ XXXI.I ( 1955) 9 791. 
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European Concert 
The Berlin Conference of the Foreign Ministers of the 
Four Powers, meeting during January and February, 1954, was 
convened primarily for the purpose of renewing discussions 
upon the G·erman problem. At the time, ratification and im-
plementation of EDC looked promising; therefore, it was 
believ~d that a Four Power conference would not delay rati-
fication.108 Although no agreements were reached on the 
German problem, the Soviet Foreign Minister., V.JYI. Molotov, 
introduced hls ~~E!.p for European collect! ve se·cur.it.y • 109 
Thia plan, with variations, represents to the p~e~~rl~. time 
the S.o . vlet .in.ter.pretations .. of.its needs for security ln Eur-
op~_!r:i~. fo: thE9 reut1~:fication and. containment of Germany. 
As originally presented, the plan envisaged the establish-
ment of an a3:.;b:~t:t):•9pe~r1 ..... 99.l+E3.9tJY~ ~e.GJJttt;)L. system which 
~,, ,.«·;:«-~ )_ .e·. ·'·','-~· 
would r~plaq_e.the ~~isting regional collective security 
--, ·, - ' -.. ~.-. __ ,, --·· . , , :.,.,,_ - --
systems. 110 This was obviously aimed at NATO and the pro-
posed EDC. It was further aimed at displacing the United 
States position in European affairs. Such a concept was 
completely alien to United States policy. When American 
policy changed to that of full participation in the defense 
108united States Department of State, ForeiJ:2:nMinisters 
Meeting, Berlin Discussions, J~n. 25-Feb~ 18, 1954~ Dept. of 
State Pub. No. 5399 (Washington, 1954~pp-.-xv-xvii, p. l; 
U.S. Dept. of State, Bulletin, XXVIII.{1953), 287-289. 
109u.s. Dept. of State, Bulletin, XXX (1954), 270, 317-
318. 
llOibid., p. 270. 
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of Western Europe against further Soviet encroachment, the 
tremendous outlay of money, men and materials for the devel-
opment of an effective defense system was not to be 
sacrificed solely upon the basis of a Soviet proposal. Un-
der the direction of Mr. John Foster Dulles, American policy 
had become very skeptical of Soviet proposals. 111 The West-
ern nations, although susceptible to Soviet proposals and 
entreaties in furtherance of the policy of 11peaceful co-
existenceu, have continued to follow the American lead in a 
policy which is directed at containing the spread of Commun-
ism. West Germany, once the power to be contained., has now 
been accepted conditionally as an equal in the struggle to 
contain Communism. 
Unsuccessful in the proposals at Berlin, the Soviet 
Union lG-_t~r proposed that the United States join the all-
EurcYpean collective security system, or, if this proposal 
were unfavorable, that the Soviet Union be allowed to join 
NATO. The latter suggestion was bluntly rejected as being 
incompatible with the principles for which NATO was estab-
lished.112 
Primary opposition to the numerous Soviet proposals for 
an all-European collective security system (modified to in-
clude the United States) arises from the oyerall objective 
of these proposals which aims at the eventual dissolution 
111rbid., pp. 267-269. 
112Ibid., pp. 757-759. 
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of the existi~g regional security systems ( NATO and WEU and V 
the Warsaw Pact) 113 and their absorption i;to one ali-
European system. Concomi ta.ntly, these propose. ls are ''?.!!3~~~ 
upon the continued division of Germany, in regard to which 
-'<-•• ,-·""···~·······: ;.,,.,, •••.• .-.~-- _, .~s •• ; • ..:;•. -~-, ,•, .- ·- ..• - ·. . .. . . ,-·'•' .,.. ..• . -
Westirn policy ls ostensibly opposed. 114 As stated above, 
the division or· Germany into two states with divergent poli-
tical, economic and social systems is use~,-~Y the Russians 
as a bargaining position in its proposals for reunification. 
~--~ ,,.... • ..,.,._ .... , •. _, __ --.... ~._, __ ,..._~-- .-, •• _,.;,, ••• -,:··~..::----···· b' ,. : ..... - .... ·--........ -.<....-- .. 
The Russians declare that unification must be preceded by 
.,.,.._,_.-,~. ' .- -., ... J~·-·-···- - '·--~ -. .M.d··:. ·- .,.-.. __._,-,. ·-· .. - ,., .• ~-- ·- ,, ,-~,-~-·--~- . --- ', ... , ·;c--~ 
the establishment of a Provisional German Government com-
,0 ....... c:-.s-:.:.::~-- .,-:y--~-.,-y· ,.. ~,..,-..,,..,.. ,,. ' .:.. .. - ·-· ,··-.----··-.,.~---- ·~: · ...... -·, - , ............ , .• , •.• _.,·-•..... ,._._ .. , .... _.., __ . ,,,,·••, · •.. ,..,.,_._ __ .,__, . .,._>~ :· _., .. ---~ , ......... _ ... ,. ···-· _;,.;:,· .. -~. ··,"'" 
posed equally c,f representatives from each Germa.n state. 
This Government., if constituted accord in~ to the. So_viet ,pro-
posals, would be authorized to perform func_tlons .which could 
easily establish Communists in sensitive positions •.. From 
these vantage points they could possibly prejudice the re-
sults of elections which would be held for the. establishment 
of the permanent government. 115 According to the Russian 
proposals, each German state would participate equally in the 
all-European collective security system prior to German 
113New Times (Moscow), Noo 16, May 21; 195ff, pp. 68~70. 
The Warsaw Treaty, adhered to by the Soviet Union: and-the .. 
satellites of Eastern Europe, establishea a regl-6na.l ·-secur;.;; 
ity system of these states in May, 1955 following the imple-
mentation of the Paris Agreemer1ts. 
114u.s. Dept. of State, -Bulletin, XXX (1954), 757; New 
Times (Moscow), No. 46, November lo, 1955, p. 10. ~ 
115united States Department of' State., The Geneva. Meeting 
of Foreign Ministers, Oct~ 27-Nov. 16, 1955-;--f5ept •. of State 
"15ub. No. 6156 (Washington, I'9'55f;" P-o-95, pp. 98-99. 
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reunification. The objective to be attained, according to 
the Soviet formula, would be the eventual merger of the two 
German states within this security system into a npeaceful 
and democratic", unified Germany.116 
This system ls basically opposed by the Western Powers 
because: (1) it would be dangerous to dissolve NATO and WEU 
prior to agreement upon international disarmament which pro-
vides positive methods of inspection and control; (2) a 
unified Germany without adequate controls is as unsatisfac-
tory to the West as to the East; and (3) although committed 
to a policy which has as its objective the eventual reuni-
fication of Germany, the West is adamant in its refusal to 
permit reunification upon a basis which would allow for 
Communist domination of Germany.117 
ll6Ibid., pp. 77-81, pp. 98-99. 
117u.s. Dept. of State, Bulletin, XXXIII (1955), 819-
823. 
CHAPTER II 
SOVIET FEARS OF GERMANY AND THE DESIRE 
TO CONTAIN GERMAN POWER 
Punitive Measures to Weaken Germany 
s·oviet defense demands the establishment and maintenance 
of viable Soviet frontiers. It further demands a stable 
balance of power in Europe. These requirements have their 
origin in part from a fear of German power and a desire to 
contain and prevent the renaissance of this powero 
' The fear of German military might was accentuated ~y 
the devastation accompanying the Nazi invasion of the Soviet-
Union in 1941. The repulsion of the Nazi invaders required 
a supreme effort on the part of the Soviet people. The Sov-
iet Government, in order to inspire its people and.to :placate 
its allies, revived Russian nationalistic aspirations at the 
expense of Communist internationa~ism. 1 As a corollary, the 
Soviet Government had endeavored strenuously to diffuse 
among all e laments of the population a feeling _of bitter 
. . -
hatred toward the Nazi invaders. 2 Stalin, however, 
lr. Deutscher, Stalin: A Political Biography (New York, 
1949), p. 475, Po 491~ 
2rbid., pp. 489-493. 
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distinguished between the followers of Hitler and the 
G 1 . 1 3 erman peop e in genera • Although favorable to the taking 
of punitive measures against Ge:r>many, Stalin was opposed to 
a.ri.y public pronouncement of such contempla. ted a.ction.s during 
the war. The fear that the German will to resist wo.qld be 
bolstered by such action motivated Stalin's opposition.4 
This distinction between Nazis and Germans in general in-
stilled a suspicion among Russia's allies as to the 
possibility of a separate Russo-German settlement as had 
transpired at Brest-Litovsk in 1918. 5 However, the distinc-
tion ma.de by Stalin soon became obscured in the bitterness 
of the war. 
Territorial Dismemberment 
The concept of territorial dismembermant, as a punitive 
measure to contain possible German aggression in ~he future, 
was contemplated at a precipitate stage in the war. Even 
when the war was balanced heavily in favor of the Germans, 
Stalin demonstrated a proclivity for partition of Germany 
and the exaction of reparations in kind as retribution for 
the immense destruction in property and lives suffered by 
3Ibid., pp. 489-490. 
4wm. Hardy McNeill, Survey of International Affairs· 
1939-1946: "America, Britain and Russia, Their Co-operation 
and Conflict, 1941-1946 11 ( London, 1953), p. 348. .Herein-
after referred to as Survey 1939-1946. 
5rbid., p. 168. 
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the Soviet Union. Never separated from the Soviet concept 
of dismemberment was the desire to win the recognition by 
its allies of the territorial gains accrued during the per-
iod of Nazi-Soviet rapprochemento This recognition was 
ma.de a condition of a proposed .Anglo-Soviet tree. ty of for-
mal alliance in December, 194L These cond.Ltions were 
rejected by Great Britain because of British friendship 
with Poland and also because of the fear that such an agree-
ment would endanger United States-British relations. 6 
Although the Atlantic Charter of August, 1941 and the 
United Nations Declaration of January, 1942 had expressly 
repudiated territorial aggrandizement as an object of the 
Allied conduct of the war, the persistent claim of the Sov-
iet Union to the regions annexed during 1939-1940 made an 
incursion into the noble principles proclaimed in these 
documents. As final victory began to appear attainable, 
Western attitudes became more reconciled to the Soviet de-
mands. The West used as its rationale the necessity to 
punish Germany for its inhumane wartime actionso They would 
accomplish this and prevent the future recurrence of Ger-
man aggression through territorial dismemberment and would 
simultaneously compensate Poland for the loss to the Soviet 
Union of its territory beyond the Curzon Lineo 7 In pursu-
ance of this line of reasoning, it was agreed at the 
6rbid., pp. 166-168. 
7rbido, p. 319. 
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Foreign Ministers Conference in Moscow during October, 1943, 
that Germany should be deprived of territory acquired sub-
sequent to 1938 and that Poland should receive East 
Prussia. 8 However, the conferees did not reach agreement on 
the principle of complete dismemberment. Earlier in the 
year, President Roosevelt and British Foreign Secretary 
Ed~n had considered favorably the concept of dismemberment 
of Germany into several stateso 9 At the Moscow Conference, 
however, the Russians were noncommittal on the subject and 
declared that they had not given it sufficient study. 10 The 
Foreign Ministers did agree to the establishment of the 
European Advisory Commission. ~EA.C), which would have its 
headquarters in London. Its primary tasks were to .consider 
all specific questions pertaining to terms of surrender and 
their execution which might arise between the principal~l-
lies. It could make recommendations, but had no mandatory 
. . 
authority. Following the Teheran Conference in November and 
December, 1943, its primary tasks were to draw up an instru-
ment of unconditional surrender for Germany and to reach 
agreement upon the postwar policy to be pursued by the Al-
lied Powers in relation to Germany.11 
8 Ibid., Po 333. 
9Ibid., Po 319; Philip E. Mosely, "Dismemhe:rment of 
German?-;-Foreign .Affairs, XXVIII ( 1950)., 488. 
lOsurvey 1939-1946, p. 333; Mosely, pp. 488-489. 
llSurvey 1939-1946, p. 332, p. 480. 
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Premier Stalin had candidly opposed the unconditional 
surrender policy as proposed at Teheran by President Roose-
velt o He considered that the pursuit of such an unyielding 
Allied policy would effectively strengthen the German will 
to resist.12 It was at Teheran that the Russian fear of 
German power and apprehensiveness as to the contingency of 
its re-emergence was most pronounced. Stalin emphasized 
that the prevention of the renascence of Germany as the dom-
inant continental power would require an extended period of 
military occupation. Unless this policy were followed, he 
said, Germany, or any part of it, would dominat_e any con-
federation of states in which it was allowed to enter.13 He 
opposed dismemberment because, in his opini_on, the ."Germans 
would always endeavor to unite 11 ol4 
The policy of dismemberment had undergone study in the 
United States as early as January, 1942. An Advisory Com-
mittee on Postwar Problems concluded its study by advising 
~gainst dismemberment, and favored instead a lo.ng-ra.nge 
policy for prevention of German rearmament, promotion of 
demo era tic institutions, and reduction or .control of Ger-
many's economic preponderance in Europe. 15 A memorandum by 
the Postwar Programs Committee of the Department of State, 
12Ibid., p. 348. 
13rbid., pp. 356-357. 
14Mosely, Foreign Affairs, XXVIII, 490. 
15Ibid., Po 489. 
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approved by Secretary Hull in July, 1944., also C?PPOS_ed German 
dismemberment. The memorandum stated that unless the German 
people desired dismemberment., forcible partition would even-
tuate in a desire to reunify at all costs. Furthermore, the 
State Department was of the opinion that a partitioned Ger-
many could not exist economically. Partition, continued the 
memorandum, would result in some states seeking to gain in-
fluence over German affairs through promises of aid in 
reunification. The memorandum concluded by stating prophet-
ically that unless a co-ordinated Allied policy wa~ agreed 
upon prior to the end of the war the effect of establishing 
zones of occupation16 might lead to a de facto par-tition.17 
_ The EAC had reached ag_reement by July, 1944 on the 
basic outlines of a tri-zonal division of Germany for occu-
pational purposes. The Soviet zone had bee,n defined and 
accepted by the Russians on February 18., 1944.. Th,is zone 
contained an estimated forty per cent of the territory, 
thirty-six per cent of the population, and thirty-three per 
cent of the productive resources of pre-1957 Germany. 18 
Disagreement between the Americans and the Bri ti.sh as to 
which would receive the northwestern zone of occupation was 
resolved at the Quebec Conference in September, 1944. 
16Ph.ilip E. Mosely, "The Occupation of Germanytt, For-
eign Affairs., XXVIII (1950), 590, 594. 
17Mosely, Foreign Affairs, XXVIII, 490, 491. 
18rbid., pp. 589-590. 
46 
President Roosevelt agreed to accept the southern zone of 
occupation; but to meet the American requirements for port 
facilities, the ports of Bremen and Bremerha.ven were to be 
placed under American control. Rights of passage were guar-
anteed through the British zone.19 In accordance with the 
decision made at Yalta to include France in the occupation 
of Germany, the Americans and British transferred portions 
of their zones of occupation to the French. In the jointly-
occupied city of Berlin, the French sector was constituted 
by withdrawing portions from the American and.British sec-
tors.20 
The EAC, although reaching agreement upon. the occupa-
tion zones, was unable to reach agreement upon a co~ordinated 
policy for the postwar treatment of Germany. This had re-
sulted primarily from a dispute within.the.United States 
Government which prevented the American representative on 
the Europea~ Advisory.Commission, the late Mr. John G. 
Winant, from following a defin1 te J:>Olicy. The dis.p.ute cen-
tered around the proposed Morgenthau Plan,. whic.h had been 
favored by President Roosevelt during the period July-
October 1944, but which had been bitterly opposed by the 
State and War Departments. 21 The plan, which was agreed to 
by President Roosevelt and Prime Minister Churchill at the 
19rb1a., pp. 596-597. 
20ibid., p. 600, p. 602. 
2lrbid., p. 491. 
Quebec Conference ( September 11"."'19, 1944), envisaged the 
internationalization of the Ruhr and the transfo.rma.tion of 
Germany into pastoralized North and South German .states. 
Specifically, Germany would be completely disarmed, which 
would include the removal or destruction of all industries 
basic to the creation of armaments. Southern Silesia and 
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part of East Prussia would be transferred to Poland, with 
the remainder given to the Soviet Union. France would get 
the Saar and adjacent territories bounded by the Rhine and 
Moselle Rivers. The Ruhr would be stripped of all~capabil-
ities of regaining its iQdustrial might. The mines of the 
Ruhr would be closed, and the area would be international-
ized. Restitution and reparation to countries invaded by 
Germany would be effected through the transfer_ of .. existing 
German resources and territories, rather than from future 
payments and deliveries. Emphasis was placed upon politi-
cal decentralization and the formation of' federal govern-
ments in the partitioned areas with a high degree.of states' 
rights and local autonomy. Responsibility for sustaining 
the German economy would be left with the Germa.n peor:>le. 
The responsibility for the execution of this._p_lan .w;ould have 
resided primarily with Germany's European.ne.i.ghbors.22 
. - - . .. 
The news of the Roosevelt-Churchill agreement u;pon the 
Morgenthau Plan was inadvertently leaked to the pres1:1 shortly 
after the conference ended. The President abruptly 
22Henry Morgenthau, Jro, Germany Is Our Problem (New 
York, 1945), pp. 1-4. ~ ~-
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dissociated himself from the plan. His regression was 
possibly motivated by the adverse public reception to the 
plan and perhaps by his own realization of the incongruity 
of the plan with previously announced principles concerning 
the Allied conduct of the war. 1rhe disastrous effect which 
the plan would have had upon the general economic recovery 
of Europe conceivably influenced his withdrawaL However, 
Roosevelt did not prefer to consider alternatives to the 
plan at the time. This served to nullify the action of the 
American representative on the EAC, and effectively stale-
mated the possibility of Allied agreement upon postwar aims 
and policy in Germany. 23 
At the Yalta Conference in February, 1945, it was 
agreed in principle by Roosevelt, Churchill, and Stalin that 
Germany should be dismembered. Actual dismemberment.was to 
be postponed until an indefinite date following the German 
surrender. 24 A Committee of Dismemberment was established 
to develop plans for the implementation of the decision. 
Its terms of reference made the problem of di.smem.berment 
secondary to the basic problem of what military and economic 
measures should be taken to prevent a renewal of German mil-
ltarlsm. Stalin made this a significant condition to his 
23survey 1939-1946, pp. 491-492. 
24Edward R. Stettinius, Jr., Roosevelt and the Rus-
sians: The Yalta Conference, ed. Walter Johnson\Garden 
City, 1949), pp. 121-126. .. 
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acceptance. 25 The Committee had only two formal meetings, 
at neither of which were substantive questions discussed.26 
The Yalta conferees had agreed that the decision to 
dismember Germany would be imparted to the Germans in the 
instrument of unconditional surrender. 27 However, the Act 
of Military Surrender which was substituted at the last mo-
ment by the Supreme Headquarters, Allied Expeditionary 
Forces, because of conflicts in terminology in the surrender 
document approved by the :EAC and that approved at the Yalta 
Conference, was exclusively a military surrender and the 
word "dismemberment'' was not used. 28 Not until June 5, 
1945, when a complete document of unconditional surrender 
was signed, in which it was succinctly impressed upon the 
Germans the finality of their defeat, did the future of the 
German state become subject to the supreme discretion of the 
victorious powers.29 
On May B, 1945, the day the Military Surrend~r was 
signed in Berlin, Marshal Stalin announced in his 11Proclama-
tion to the People 11 that ''the Soviet Union---does not intend 
25:Mose ly, _ Foreign Affairs, XXVIII, 492-494. 
26rbido, p_p. 494-498. 
27stettinius, pp. 121-126. 
28Beate Ruhm von Oppen, ed., Documents on Germany Under 
Occupation 1945-1954 ( London, 1955),. Po 28. Hereinafter re..: 
ferred to as Documents on Germany 1945-1954. 
29rbid., PPo 29-35. 
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to dismember or destroy Germanyn.30 This Soviet refutation 
of the policy so recently agreed upon at Yalta indicated the 
continuation of the belief that forcible division would 
serve only to intensify German revanchism. Furthermore, it 
marked the initiation of the Soviet policy to effect the 
establishment of a servile government in Germany which would 
serve Soviet security interests through the conversion of 
Germany into another Soviet satellite. Although the concept 
of dismemberment was permitted to drop, following the Rus-
sian disavowal, the 11 teral dismemberment of Germany 
occurred in the establishment of occupation zones as had 
been predicted by the American State Department in 1944. 
Because of the inability to achieve a. common policy for all 
of Germany, the zonal boundaries became, in effect, barriers 
which divided Germany into four separate states. As funda-
mental East-West views and objectives became more_ pronounced 
and divergent, a crystallization of 'Western policy reduced 
the quadripartite partition into the present division of 
the two German states. 
Although Marshal Stalin had re_Jected the concept of 
dismemberment, the Russians by unilateral action, prior to 
the convening of the Potsdam Conference ( July 17 ... 25, 1945), 
transferred to Polish 11 administra tion11 that part of Germany 
under Soviet control to the east of the Oder-Western Neisse 
Line, with the exception of the Baltic port of Koenigsberg 
30Mosely, Foreign J;i.ffairs, XXVIII, 498. 
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and its immediate surrounding area.31 This area contained 
Germany's second-largest coal deposits, its second most con-
centrated industrial area, and its most important food 
producing regions. One-fourth of Germany's pre-war food 
supply had come from this area. When considering that Ger-
many was required to import twenty to twenty-five per cent 
of its foodstuffs, the loss of this area to the industrial-
ized western areas would be a serious handicap to their 
economic revivalo 32 
~t Potsdam, this Soviet action was denounced as being 
very irregular and was protested vociferously by President 
Truman and Prime Minister ChurchilL Marshal Stalin defend-
ed the Soviet action by arguing that the advancing Red Army 
had required an effective administration of the liberated 
areas in order that subversive activities did not hinder the 
advancing army in its major objective. It had been neces-
sary, he declared, to turn the area over to Poland for 
11 administration11 s:Lnce the German population.had fled from 
the advancing Soviet army.33 Although the arguments over 
the disputed area were prolonged and often stormy, especial-
ly between Churchill and Stalin, Marshal Stalin was firm in 
31James Po Warburg, Germany-Bridge or Battleground 
(New York, 1946, 1947), pp. 36-31, p. 95; Stettinius, pp. 
210-211. 
32warburg, p. 31. 
331:rarry S. Truman, Memoirs: 
City, 1955), I, pp. 366-367. 
Year of Decisions (Garden 
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his insistence upon continued Polish administration of the 
area. Truman and Churchill, cognizant of the fait acc?mpll, 
hoped to achieve concessions from the Russians elsewhere in 
return for their decision to postpone the final solution of 
the problem until the peace conference.34 
In the light of subsequent failures by the Four Powers 
to reach agreement upon the establishment of a central Ger-
man Government with which a peace treaty can be negotiated, 
the severance of the territory from Germany has assumed the 
characteristics of a permanent settlement., the.reby fulfill-
ing Soviet objectives. The action was punitive in that it 
deprived Germany of valuable territory and forced millions 
of its inhabitants into an already overcrowded Germ.anyo It 
also resulted in the dis~olution of the feudalistic Prussian 
state, symbol of German arrogance and militarismo The ac-
tion was protective in that it places Poland in perpetual 
dependence upon the Soviet Union. The fear of German re-
vanchism leaves Poland no other alternative but to rely upon 
its powerful eastern neighbor. Soviet control of the sub-
servient Communist Government of Poland in effect gives the 
Soviet Union a strategic position on the eastern border of 
Germany should it decide to withdraw from its bastion in 
East Germa.ny.35 
34rbid., PPo 367-370; Survey 1939-1946, Po 624. 
35warburg, p. 95. 
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Under the Potsdam Agreements, the United States and 
Great Britain agreed to support, at the peace conference, 
the Soviet claims to the Koenigsberg area. 36 However, an 
explicit condition of the agreement to turn over to Polish 
administration the area to the east of the Oder-Neisse Line 
was that the "final delimitation of the western frontier of 
Poland should await the peace settlement". 37 
Western support for Soviet annexation of the port city 
of Koenigsberg was reaffirmed by Secretary of State James 
F. Byrnes in a speech at Stuttgart, Germany in 1946. But 
American policy-makers have persevered in the contention 
that the Oder-Neisse controversy and the question as to the 
area that Poland should receive as compensation for its 
deprivations in the east are matters which cannot be deter-
mined until such time as the peace conference is called. 38 
The action of the puppet Government of the East German Demo-
cratic Republic, by which a treaty with the Polish Government 
recognized the permanent status of the Oder-Neis.se frontier, 
has been denounced by the West German Government as well as 
36united States Department of State, German~ HJ47-1949: 
The Story in Documents, Dept. of State Pub. No. 5'5Ef"TWash-
ington, 19o0), pp. 52-53. Hereinafter refer.red to as The . 
Story in Documents. 
37 Ibid., pp•' 53-54. 
38James F. Byrnes., Spee.king Frankly (New York, 1947), 
p. 190. 
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39 by the three Western Powers. In subsequent Four Power 
negotiations in relation to the overall question of reunifi-
cation, the Soviet Government has uriremittingly argued that 
the question of the eastern German frontier was irrefutably 
settled at the Potsdam Conference.40 
Expulsion of Germans from Eastern Europe 
Immediately following the Russian cession of the east-
ern German provinces to Poland, a program of rnass expulsions 
of the German population was beguno 41 Many had fled in 
front of the advancing Soviet armies. When the .Potsdam Con-
ference was convened, Premier Stalin, in justification of 
the Soviet action placing the area under Polish control, 
maintained that "all" the German population had fledo 42 
Yielding to a fai t accornpli, the Americans and British 
agreed to recognize an interim Polish administration of the 
disputed area. As a quid pro quo, the Russians agreed to ------
provide food and coal from their zone in exchangefor ten 
per cent of the surplus German capita 1 equipment from the 
39peter Calvocoressi, Survey of International Affairs 
1951 (London, 1954), p. 1540 Hereinafter referred to as 
Survey 1951; Perry Lauckhuff, nGerrnan Reaction to Soviet 
Policy,1945-1953", Journal of International Affairs, VIII 
(1954), pp. 70-71. ~ 
1952 
40peter Calvocoressi, Survey of InternationaLAffairs 
(London, 1955), p. 89. 
4lsurvey 1939-1946, p. 624. 
42Truman, pp. 366-367. 
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Western zones. Fifteen per cent of this equipment would be 
transferred gratis to the Russians on their reparations a.c-
count. 43 
The conferees at Potsdam did not sanction the Polish 
expulsion of the German inhabitants from the territory 
placed under its administration. However, the Poles de-
clared that the presence of the Germans caused unrest among 
the Polish inhabitants and also that German houses and farms 
were urgently needed for the resettlement of the Poles who 
were uprooted by the Soviet annexation of the eastern Polish 
areas. 44 The Potsdam conferees did agree ''tha t the trans-
fer to Germany of German populations, or elements thereof, 
remaining in Poland, Czechoslovakia, and Hungary, will have 
to be undertaken" and it was stipulated that the transfers 
were to be undertaken in an "orderly and humane ma-nnertt. 45 
The Allied Control Council was directed to effect a sched-
ule for further transfers. 
This solution to the problem of the unwelcome German 
minorities46 proved a taxing burden to the alread;r over-
crowded "rump 11 Germany, shorn a.s it was of East Prussia, 
Pomerania, Brandenburg, and Silesia. The pre-war population 
43Byrnes, pp. 79-87; Survey 1939-1946, pp. 622-625. 
44sidney B. Fay, "Eur•ope I s Expe llees u, Current His-
tory, XII ( 1947), 325 •.. 
45The Story in Documents, p. 55. 
46Lucius D. Clay, Dec is ion _ln German-y: ( Garden City, 
1950), p. 315. 
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of the detached area was approximately 8,000,000. Five-
sixths of the 1939 German population had lived in the more 
heavily industrialized !trump" Germany, i.e., the area com-
prised by the four zones of occupation. 47 As the thousands 
who later fled the Soviet zone were added to the millions 
expelled from the former German provinces and the countries 
of Eastern Europe, staggering social and economic problems 
were created. 
The expellees who were crowded into post-Potsdam Ger-
many were in two categories. One category was known as the 
Reichsdeutsche or those who were German citizens prior to 
1939. They were the Germans from beyond the Oder-Neisse 
and constituted the largest segment of the expellees and 
refugees. The other category was known as Volksdeutsche 
or Germans who had lived outside the 1939.boundaries of the 
Reich and who were not citizens. The Sudeten Germans from 
Czechoslovakia and the German minority groups. from Poland, 
Hunesary, Rumania, and Yugoslavia comprised the latter cate-
gory. 48 
On November 20, 1945, the Allied Control Council 
. . 
formulate.d plans for the transfer of Ge.rmans from .Austria, 
Czecrioslovakia, Hungary, and Poland into the four zones of 
occupation. The Soviet and British zones were to receive 
47Fay, p. 326, p. 328. 
48charles Sternberg, "The German Refugees and Expel-
lees O , Journal of Inte rna tiona 1 .Affairs, VIII ( 1953), p. 36. 
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the entire German population from Poland, some 3,500,000 
. ' 
persons. The German populations in Austria, Czechoslovakia, 
- -
and Hungary, some 3,150,000 persons, were to be received by 
the American, French, and Soviet zones. The transfers were 
scheduled to begin during December, 1945 and were to be com-
pleted during July, 1946.49 
The transfers were accomplished in a. categorically op-
posed manner from the "orderly and humane ma.nner 11 directed 
by the Potsdam Protocol. Expellees arriving in the American 
zone from Hungary had been assembled without a full allow-
ance of food and personal baggage and were hungry and 
destitute. Those from Czechoslovakia had had their person-
al possessions withheld. The Czech authorities detained 
young, able workers while sending the aged, the women, and 
small children. Their reception and care were major prob-
lems to the inexperienced Laende r (state) governments of the 
American zone. Shelter, food, and clo.thing ... were by .. no means 
adequate, but enough was provided for subsistence. 50 
The American and British zones assumed the social and 
economic responsibility for 7,877,000 expellees, which con-
stituted an increase of 23.6 per cent over the normal 
population of 33,383,500. 51 In the Soviet zot:-e, the liar~e 
number of expellees was offset by the refugees who fled to 
49Documents on Germany 1945-1954~ pp. 8.9.-9.0. 
50c1ay, p. 314. 
51Ibid., pp. 314-315. 
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the Western zones to escape the Russians and/or Communism. 
Due to French intransigence and because it was not bound by 
the Potsdam Agreements, its a.dd1 t iona.l burden was almost 
non-existent. The population of the French zone in 1948 was 
0.2 per cent less than the pre-war figure.52 
Germany's first postwar census, conducted on October 
29, 1946, listed 9,700,000 expellees and refugees (6,000,000 
in the Western zones). In September, 1950, there were about 
8,000,000 in West Germany and 4,400,000 in the German Demo-
cratic Republic. The 1953 figure for both East and West 
Germany totaled 12,500,000 people.53 
In the Russian zone, many of the expellees and refu-
gees were benefitted by the land reforms of September, 1945. 
However, they also provided the Russians with a lucrative 
source of free labor. They were heavily exploited, _both in 
East Germany and in the Soviet Union where many were trans-
planted under "contract'' and ''resettlement" plans. 
In the Western zones, these persons were pronouncedly 
unwelcome and were subjected to job and housing discrimina-
tion and to social ostracism. 54 As long as these people 
have not been fully integrated into the economic, social and 
public life of West Germany, they will present a. fertile 
52Ibid., p. 315. 
53sternberg, p. 37. 
54Ibid.~ pp. 37-40. 
field for the growth of a revanchism which demands the 
return of the former German provinces in the east. 
Spoliations 
59 
The indifference in respect to the adverse effects 
created by the mass displacements of Germana was displayed 
also in the a_,z:!_~--~pgJJat!o_?_ __ E'?_~l-~1- carried out by the Soviet 
Union. Immediately after a~suming control of its zo~e, and 
prior to the Potsdam Conference, the Russians commenced an 
intensive program of removals of capital goods to the Soviet 
Union. 55 The Soviet policy in regard to spoliations and 
reparations led to the final breakdown of Allied co-operation 
and to the division of Germany into two sta.tes~56 
Both at Yalta and Potsdam, the United States and Great· 
Britain displayed their acquiescence to a liberal allowance 
of reparations to the Soviet Union in compens.at.i_on f_or its 
overwhelming war loss-es. Neither the Americans_ nor the 
British were inclined to demand large reparations from the 
Germans. They, as did the Russians,_emphasized ~he perma-
nent weakening of the German. capacity to make war. 
Cognizant of the abortive reparations poli.cy, imposed upon 
Germany after World War I, they r~jected financia_l repara-
tions in favor of reparations in ca.pi ta_l equipment and goods 
in kind. Therefore, the reparations policy agreed upon was 
to be prohibitive, retributive, and punitive. However, the 
55peter Nettl, "German Reparations in the Soviet Em-
pire", Foreign Affairs, XXIX ( 1951), 300. 
56clay, pp. 121-122. 
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Americans and the British were also concerned that the 
reparations policy dld not so impair the German economy that 
subsidization would be necessary. American and British pol-
icy, in relation to Germany, had turned a full ci.rcle in the 
few months following the espousal of the Morgenthau Plan.57 
The Soviet objectives in regard to reparations were ~-
twofold: (1) punishment, i.e., they desired to insure perm-
anently that Germany did not regain its dominant position in 
Europe. They insisted that the German economy be so con-
trolled as to insure that the German standard of living did 
not in the future rise above that of the Eastern European 
states; 58 (2) exploitation, or utilization of existing and < 
future Ge :rman · ca.pi tal resources to aid the reconstruction 
and further development of the Soviet economy.59 
_The economic principles agreed upon by the conferees 
at :Potsdam for the guidance of the Allied Control Council 
in governing Germany had as their objectives the complete 
elimination of Germany's war potential, the decentralization 
of its economy ( deca.rteliza.tion~, and the encouragement of 
the growth of agricultural and peaceful d.ome.sti_c indus-
tries, 60 Germany was to be 11 treated as a single .. economic 
unit" in order that the program of reparations, industrial 
disarmament and demilitarization could be effectively 
57survey 1939-1946, pp. 549-551. 
58 · Ibid., p. 549. 
59rbid. 
60The Story in Documents, pp. 49-50. 
carried out, and also in order that the Germans themselves 
would be paying the costs of the occupation.61 
61 
In order that the basic political objectives of the oc--
cupation might be satisfactorily achieved, economic unity 
was essential. These political objectives included disarma-
ment and demilitarization, impressing the Germans with the 
utter finality of their defeat and their responsibility for 
their condition of political and economic chaos, de~truction 
of National Socialism, and the eventual rehabilitation of 
Germany as a peaceful, democratic nation.62 
It was agreed that reparations, which wou.ld be a part 
of the disarmament program, should not be permitted to in-
terfere with Germany's ability to produce suffi.c.iently for 
its own existence. This would entail production_o~ a suf-
ficient quantity of materials for export to pay for the 
necessary imports which would be allotted by the Allied 
Control Council. It was further agreed that proceeds of 
exports from current production and stocks '!s.hall.. be avail-
able in the first place" for_ payment. o_f necessary imports. 63 
Russian reparations claim.a would be met.from r~i;novals 
of capital equipment from its zone, and from German exter-
nal assets located in Bulgaria, Finland, Hungary, Rumania, 
and Eastern Austria. I.n addition, it was to receive 
61Ibid., p. 50. 
-62rbid., pp. 48-49. 
63rbid., p. 50. 
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fifteen per cent of the industrial capital equipment in the 
Western zones as determined to be unnecessary for a peace 
economy, in exchange for an equal amount of food and other 
raw commodities. It would receive gratis ten per cent of 
the industrial capital equipment in the Western zones as 
determined to be unnecessary for the development of a peace 
economy. Removals of this equipment were to begin as soon 
as the total amount unnecessary for a peace economy had been 
ascertained by the Allied Control Council and were to be 
completed within two years. The Russians were to .begin the 
delivery of exchange commodities immediately and the deliv-
eries were to be extended over a five-year period. It was 
agreed that advance deliveries would be started prior to the 
final determination by the Allied Control Council of the 
total amount of industrial ca.pi tal equipment unnecessary for 
the successful development of a peace economy.64 
A common leve 1 of industry for the German e.conomy was 
agreed to by the Allied Control Council in December, 1945.65 
This was an absolute mlnimum for subsistence, and in order 
for this leve 1 to be attained, the co-ope rat ion of ea.ch zone 
was essential. The Russians, howeverj upon the ... realization 
of the relative wastefulness of their dismantling and remov-
als policies, began to extract reparations from. the current 
production in their zone. This was a.n open abrogation of 
64rbidog pp. 50-51. 
65cle.y, p. 108. 
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the Potsdam directiveso When the Russians would neither 
cease this policy nor account for the amounts of equipment 
removed prior to the inception of this policy, the Americans 
halted deliveries of advance reparations from their zone in 
the spring of 1946. The American action was followed by 
similar British action. They justified these actions in 
that the Russian transgressions necessitated their subsidi-
zation of the economies of their zoneso They declared their 
refusal to subsidize, in effect, the Soviet spoliations in 
its zone. Until the Russians agreed to treat Germany as an 
economic whole, they would receive no further reparations 
from the Western zones.66 
The Russian desire to extract as much as possible from 
their zone for their own uses made reconciliation appear 
very remoteo The mulcting of East Germany behind 
increasingly-impenetrable zonal barriers was relatively a 
more lucrative prospect than that offered by Germany as a 
single economic unit, producing solely for its own subsist-
ence in accordance with the level of industry plan. 
Subsequent to the American and British action, the 
dismantling process was fitted into an overall scheme for 
reparations, including delivery from current production, 
expropriation of works in Germany and export of German out-
put on Soviet account. After the autumn of 1946, 
dismantling decreased but did continue to affect certain 
66rbid., pp. i20-122. 
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elements drastically, such as railway repair shops, 
agricultural machinery plants and railway lines.. This poli-
cy continued through 1948. The total value of dismantled 
plants has been estimated at about 1,600,000,000 d@~l.ars.6'7 
The Russians, in the summer of 1946, expropriated over 
· two hundred of the largest industrial works in the Soviet 
zone. They were thenceforth termed "Soviet Corporations!t 
or "SAG". This action also contravened the Potsdam Agree-
ments which directed the decentralization of German. 
industry. Three-fourths of the SAG production went direct 
to the Soviet Union or was exported on Russian account; one-
fourth went to the East German economy which, however, was 
required to contribute a disproportionate share of the raw 
materials. By the end of 1950, ninety-seven of these works 
had been returned to East Germany after partial disman-
tling.68 
The most profitable type of reparations was that from 
current industrial production. In addition to being an 
enormous aid to the Soviet economy, the decision to extract 
reparations from current output required putting more plants 
into operation, thereby enabling the Russians to reduce un-
employment in the zone. Although required to subsidize the 
plants producing for reparations, it nevertheless was a 
good political weapon in the Soviet hands. By 1950, 
67peter Nettl, p. 301. 
681bid., p. 304. 
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reparations from current production amounted only to seven 
per cent of East German output. 69 At the end of 1951, the 
Russians valued reparations at just over three billion dol-
lars, with the equivalent amount remaining to be paid by the 
East Germans over a fifteen year periodo70 
Following the uprisings in East Germany in June, 1953, .,./ 
an agreement was concluded between the Soviet Union and the 
puppet Government of the German Democratic Republic, which 
exemplified the seriousness of the situation. According to 
the agreement, the East Germans would be released from fur-
ther obligations to make reparations payments on January 1, 
1954. The requirement for East German financia.l support of 
Soviet occupation forces was reduced, liberal credits were 
to be extended to the East German Government, and thirty-
three industrial enterprises were to revert to East German 
control. 71 
Soviet Foreign Minister V.M. Molotov attempted to jus-
tify the Soviet reparations policy at the second meeting of 
the Council of Foreign Ministers in 1946 at Paris, where he 
demanded a higher level for German industry, more economic 
freedom, four-power control of the Ruhr, and the 
69rbid., pp. 302-303. 
70rbid., p. 307; Carl G. Anthon, "East Germanyn, ~-
rent History, XXX (1956), 234. The author states tbat repa-
rations to the value of twelve billion dollars had been 
removed through 1953. 
71Documents on Germany 1945-1954, PPo 592-596. 
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establishment of a central German Government.72 In addition 
to its being an attempt at rationalization of Soviet action, 
this was considered an insidious endeavor to curry German 
favor as the champion of German unity. The United States 
reacted by offering to merge its zone with any or all of 
the other zones for the administration of Germany as a 
single economic unit as had been directed by the Potsdam 
Agreements. Only the British were inclit?,ed _ to accept~ 73 
The unilateral Soviet pursuit of its objective to re-
const_ruct its own economy at German expense while 
simultaneously creating an economic and political satellite 
in East Germany led to the economic merger between the Amer-
ican and British zones on January 1, 1947 and to _the eventual 
transformation of the three Western zones into the West Ger-
man Federal Republic in May, 1949. The Soviet refusal to 
put the resources of its zone into a common pool,.and the 
~- . - -·-·-
resultant Anglo-American decision to cease the subsidization 
of Soviet reparations and to put the Ger~n econon1:y o~ ~ 
self-supporting basis, were mutually antagoni.at.ic __ aims which 
eventuated in the final division of Germany. 
Denazification 
The denazification of Germany, along with .. the destruc-
tion of German militarism, and the eventual reentry of 
72survey 1939-1946, p. 727; Clay, PPo 129-130. 
· 73survey 1939-1946, pp. 727-728; Clay, pp. 130-131. 
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Germany into the family of nations as a peaceful, democratic 
state, were common aims enunciated by the anti-Nazi coali-
tion during the course of the war and more specifically at 
the Yalta and Potsdam Conferences. At Yalta, the Three 
Powers reaffirmed their intentions to "bring al.l war crimi-
nals to swift and just punishment---; wipe out the Nazi 
Party, Nazi laws 9 organizations, and institutions~ remove 
all Nazi and militarist influences from public office and 
from the cultural and economic life of the German pe-opleu. 74 
The decisions made at Yalta were amplified by the 
United States, Great Britainj and the Soviet Union at the 
Potsdam Conference in a set of political and economic prin-
ciples by which the Allied Control Council would be guided 
in the occupation of Germany. In addition to the 11 complete 
disarmament and demilitarization of Germany and the elimi-
nation or control of all German industry that could be used 
for military production", it was declared to be an objec-
tive of the occupation to impress upon the German people 
the finality of their defeat and their responsibility for 
their condition.. Another major purpose of the occu;pation 
was to ltdestroy the National Socialist Party and its affili-
ated and supervised organizations., to diss.olve alL Nazi 
institutions., to insure that they are not revived in any 
74Leland M. Goodrich and Marie J. Carroll, ed., Docu-
ments on American Foreign Relations, July 1944-June 1945 
(Princeton, 1947), VII, p. 351. Hereinafter referred to as 
Documents on American Foreign Relations VII. 
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form and to prevent all Nazi and militarist activity or 
propaganda". The poli tica 1 principles then. directed the 
abolishment of all Nazi laws and the apprehension and trial 
of war criminals, "Nazi leaders, influential Nazi supporters 
and high officials of Nazi organizations and institutions 
and any other persons dangerous to the occupation _or its ob-
jectives---'' o It was further directed tha.t "all members of 
the Nazi party who have been more than nominal participants 
in its activities and all other persons hostile to Allied 
purposes shall be removed from public and semi-public office 
and from positions of responsibility in important private 
undertakings". The directives further provided for the con-
trol of German education in order to eliminate Nazi and 
militarist doctrines, reorganization of the judicial system, 
and decentralization of the political structure with concen-
tration upon the development of local responsibtl;tyo The 
right to form "democratic poll ti cal parties 11 was granted and 
it was provided that representative government would be in-
troduced on the regional, provincial and Land, ( atate) levels 
as quickly as it became justifiable. 7 5 
·preparations had been under way for some time previous 
to the Potsdam Conference to bring the ma_jor wa.r. c.r.iminals 
to just ice. It had been agreed upon by the. Unit.ad States, 
75Raymond Dennett and Robert Ko Turner, edo., Documents 
on-American Foreign Re la ti6ns, ~ul~ 1, 194.B~De.c. o 31., 1946 
TPrinceton, 1948), VIII, pp. 92 .-9 80 ·. Hereina.fte~referred 
to as Documents .2.!! American Foreigp. Relations VIII._ 
69 
the United Kingdom, and the Soviet Union in October, 1943, 
and issued in a "Declaration on Atrocities" that full retri-
bution would be made to victims of Nazi atrocities. It was 
provided that wherever possible the perpetrators of these 
crimes would be returned for judgment to the countries 
wherein the crimes were committed. For those whose offenses 
had no particular geographic location, appropriate machinery 
for meting full justice would be established. 76 On August 
8, 1945, representatives of the United States, the United 
Kingdom, France, and the Soviet Union signed an agreement 
for the establishment of the International Military Tribu-
nal. This Tribunal would try the major war criminals whose 
offenses had no particular geographic location. 77 The com-
position of the Tribunal was confined to the United States, 
the United Kingdom, France, and the Soviet Union, who rep-
resented the collective United Nations. Prosecu.tion was 
likewise in the hands of the Four Powers. Jurisdiction of 
the Tribunal extended to the following crimes: (1) Crimes 
Against Peace; (2) War Crimes; and (3) Crimes Against Hu-
manity. A fourth charge was included within the first 
category. Broad in scope, it included "participation in a 
common plan or conspiracy for the accomplishment 11 of any of 
the crimes against peace. 78 
76Documents on Germany 1945-1954, pp. 1-2. 
77office of the U.S. Chief of Counsel For Prosecution 
of Axis Criminality, Nazi C onspirac;y: and Aggressi.oh~ U.S. 
Government :Printing Office (Washington, 1946), I, pp. 1-2. 
78rbid., p. 5. 
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The International Military Tribunal, from November, 
1945 to October, 1946, found nineteen of the twenty-two de-
fendants guilty on one or more counts of the indictment, 
and acquitted threeo It sentenced twelve to death by hang-
ing, three to life imprisonment, and the four others to 
terms of ten to twenty years of imprisonment. The 1I'ribunal 
also declared four Nazi organizations to have been criminal 
in character. These included the. Leadership Gorps of the 
Nazi Party, Die Schutzsta.ffeln or SS, Die Sicherhei.tsdienst 
or SD, and Die Geheimstaatspolizie or Gestapo. Die Sturm-
abteilungen or SA, the Reichscabinet, and the General Staff 
and High Command were not declared criminal. 79 
Following the conclusion of the Nuremberg trials, 
which had as a basic purpose the demonstration to the de-
feated German nation the intent of the victorious powers to 
extirpate Naziism and militarism, the task of prosecuting 
the in.riumerable lesser criminals devolved upon the Military 
Governments of the four zoneso The prosecutions were di-
rected against representatives of all the important 
segments of the (rhird Reich, including industr.La1ists and 
financiers, leading cabinet ministers, top SS and police 
officials, and militar::istso so 
The eradication of the doc.trines of National Socialism 
involved an exhaustive scrutiny of the records of se.veral 
79Documents on American Foreign Relations VIII, p. 345. 
80Ibido, Po 347; Clay, pp. 250-251. 
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millions of people. In 1939, there were some nine million 
party adherents. 81 A problem encountered in each zone of 
occupation was the necessity to rehabilitate economic life, 
making it necessary upon occasion to disregard the denazi-
fication directives in order that this might be achieved. 
For example, in September, 1945, it was necessary for Gen-
eral Eisenhower to publicly rebuke his commandant in 
Bavaria, General Patton, for failure to carry out denazifi-
cationo82 At the time of the armistice, the majority of the 
Nazi adherents were located in the American, British and 
French zoneso This coincidence was possibly motivated by 
an assumption that the denazification policy would be less 
vigorously enforced in these zoneso 83 The virulence of the 
Communist attacks against National Socialism during the 
course of the war, in addi t1on to the vituperative tenor of 
the ideological exchanges prior to the modus vivendi of 1939-
1941, left little question in Nazi minds as to what fate 
awaited them from the Soviet occupation forces. 
As has been stated, it was necessary to conclude the 
denazification process as rapidly as possible in order that 
the economy of Germany could begin to functiono In addi-
tion, it was necessary that other processes resume their 
functions, conditioned upon their denazifica. tion.o These 
81J.1?. Nettl, The Ea.stern Zone and Soviet Policy in 
Germany 1945-50 (London, l95l),~5-:--
82warburg, pp. 80-81. 
83J.P. Nettl, Po 11. 
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lnclud.ed the police, schools, courts, media of information, 
and government. The political, economic, and social proc-
esses of German life would be seriously curtailed until this 
primary objective of the occupation was satisfactorily 
achieved. 
In the process of denazification there was a consider-
able degree of unity of effort insofar as the Allied Control 
Council was concerned. The implementation of the numerous 
denazification laws issued under its aegis, however, was 
dependent upon the zonal commanders ( who collectLvel'y formed 
the Allied Control Council). 84 It was in the implementation 
of these laws wherein divergences of policy appeared and 
caused controversy. 
Denazification progressed very slowly in the French 
zone. To the French, a G~rman was a German... The .fact that 
he was or was not a Nazi neither added to nor detracted 
from the inherent French animus toward Germans. French 
84nocuments .2£ Germany 1945-1954, pp. 79-81, · pp. 83-85, 
pp. 97-102, pp. 102-107, pp. 134-136, pp~ 142-143, pp. 179-
180., pp. 233-234; Control Council Law-'No. 2 providing for 
termination and liquidatio.n of Na.zLorganiza"fions., Oct~ 10, 
1945; Law No. 4, reorganization of the judicial system, Oct. 
30, 1945; Law .!£· 10, punishment of war criminals, Dec. 20, 
1945; DirecTive No. 24, for the removal of Nazis from posi-
tions of responsT'bility, Jan. 12, 1946; Order No. 4, 
directing the confiscation of literature and m'al;erTal of a· 
Nazi and militarist nature, May 13, 1946; Directive No. 32., 
providing disciplinary measures against persons guilty o~ 
militaristic, Nazi or anti-democratic propaganda, June 26, 
1946; Directive Noo 38, providing for the arrest and pun-
ishment of war criminals.11 Nazis and militarists, and the 
internment, control, and surveillance of potentially dan-
gerous Germans, Octo 12, .1946; Directive!£· 54, providing 
the basic principles fo~ the democratization of education 
in Germany, June 25,. 194'7. 
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policy 9 dictated by its security interests, lay primarily in 
attempting to secure the severance of the Saar, the Ruhr, 
and the Rhine land from Germany. 85 
Similarly, in the British zone, denaz ifica t ion prog-
ressed at a slow pace. The British were concerned with 
rehabilitating the coal and steel industries of the Ruhro 
Because Germany had been a good market for British products 
prior to the war, the British were interested in effecting 
a rapid economic recovery in Germany. This necessitated 
the utilization of many individuals with Nazi backgrounds; 
yet their peculiar skills were non-replaceable in the emer= 
gency. 86 
From comparisons with available information, it appears 
that the denazification problem was attacked most scrupu-
lous ly in the American zone. The denazification program 
proved to be so immense in this zone that it was necessary 
to transfer the load to the Germans themselveso The 
Laenderrat, or Councll of States, which was composed of the 
Minister-Presidents of the three Laender in the American 
zone, adopted the "Law for Liberation from National Social-
ism and Militarism 11 in March, 1946, thereby assuming 
responsibility for purging major Nazis from positions of 
leadership. 87 This law, extending in its scope to the 
85warburg, Po 640 
86Rus se 11 B. Hill, Struggle For Germany ( New York, 
1947), PPo 72-73. 
87clay, PPo 258-260. 
fields of business and industry, received vigorous 
application.88 Denazification continued to be supervised 
by Military Government. 
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In the Soviet zone, varying standards were applied to 
the d.enazifica tion policy. Generally, the Russians applied 
thorough denazification procedures to public servants and 
to citizens engaged in politics. :tn the fields of industry, 
commerce, and agriculture, only the most influential Nazis 
were removed. 89 In view of the abuse bestowed upon Nazis 
and German militarists by the Communists prior to, during~ 
and following the war, broken only by the mutually benefic-
ial interlude of 1939-1941, it would be expected that the 
Russians would be most devout in the extirpation of the 
last vestiges of Naziism and militarism. However, denazi-~ 
fication was _pursued in a practical s~nse, i.e., it was '\ 
related to the basic Soviet objectives in their zone and in / 
J 
all of Germany. The Russians were des iJ:>ous of gaining huge / 
i 
I 
reparations from Germany. This necessitated the restora-
tion of the economic life of the zone as rapidly as 
possible. In order to accomplish this objective., .. it was 
necessary to ignore or to give little force to the imple-
mentation of Allied Control Council .laws. and direc.ti ves. 
In relation to the establishment of political control over 
the Soviet zone, it was necessary to institute a thorough 
88clay, p. 68; Hill, pp. 71-72. 
89warburg, p. 55; Hill, p. 73. 
purge of a.11 elements opposed to the assumption of Communist l 
control, whether they might b~ Nazi or otherwise. In this 
process, as in the process of socialization and na.tionaliza-
tion, denazification served to cloak the Communist designs 
to gain complete control of the poll tical and economic life > 
of the zone. 
The distinction ma.de by Stalin early in the war between 
the German people and the Nazis was revived with intensity 
immediately upon the cessation of hostilities. 90 The Rus-
sians were the first of the occupation authorities to allow 
the formation of political parties of an ''anti-fa.scist 11 
nature. Naturally, German Communists were to figure promi-
nently in any political activity in the Russian zone. The 
next major move made by the Russians was the initiation of 
land reforms at the expena.e of Nazis and Junkers.91 These 
exhibitions of 11 democracy" were intended, first, to insure 
that the German Communist Party (Kommunistische Partei 
Deutschlands or KPD) would have a role in the establishment 
of any central government for Germany, if and when the Four 
Powers agreed upon its timeliness. Secondly~ the Russians 
were endeavoring to present themselves in a different light 
90Mosely, Foreign Affairs, XXVIII, 498. 
9lnocuments ~ Germany 1945-1954, pp. 37-39, pp. 49-64. 
The Soviet Mill tary Adm in is tra tion decreed on July 10,11 1945 
that 11 anti-fasc ist" political parties could form in the 
zone; the first land reform was decreed in Saxony on Septem-
ber 3, 1945, and was followed by similar measures during the 
same month in the other provinces of the Soviet zone. 
to the German people, i.e., to mitigate the animosity and 
fear of retribution and reprisal. Their objective was to 
display themselves as stern yet just conquerors. Iri this 
manner, the overall objective, which was the sovietization 
of all Germany, would be greatly facilitated. 
The establishment of an "anti-Fascist" or "Democratic 
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bloc", comprised of all the political parties in the Soviet 
zone, was utilized both in the Soviet denazification process 
and also to disguise Soviet activities committed under the 
mantle of denazification. Committees of the 0 bloc" were es-
tablished throughout the zone to supervise the work of the 
local administrations and also to deal with denazifica.tion. 
Opposition by members of the ''blocn to policies proposed by 
the Socialist Unity Party (SED) was quickly labeled nneo-
Fascist" or "anti-occupation" and thereby effectively 
squelched.92 
The failure by the Soviet occupation authorities to im-
plement Allied Control Council directives in their proper 
spirit was attacked by Secretary of State Marshall at the 
Moscow meeting of the Council of Foreign Ministers .. in 
1947. 93 The Foreign Ministers directed the Contro.l Council 
to accelerate the denazification pro~~ss and to enc6tirage 
the German authorities to adopt uniform legislation for 
92J.P. Nettl, p~. 76-78. 
54. 
93nocuments £g American ·Foreign Relations VIII., pp. 53-
completion of denazification.94 The Soviet occupation 
authorities made a nominal compliance with this directive 
but simultaneously extended the right to vote and hold of-
fice to an extensive number of ex-Nazis.~5 Following the 
unsuccessful Soviet effort to force a Western withdrawal 
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from Berlin during 1948 and 1949, a political amnesty for 
ex-Nazis was grantedo This was apparently designed ~o cul-
tivate the support of this group for Soviet policy.96 The 
anti-Nazi policy which had been utilized by the Russians to 
consolidate their control over the zone was dropped at that 
time. In its stead, the subservient politicians of the East-
ern zone took up the hue and cry for German reunification. 
The cognomen "Fascist•• then was applied to the Western Pow-
ers and elements within Western Germany who, accord~ng to 
the Soviet view, were attempting the permanent division of 
Germany. 97 As has been seen., the Western efforts to reach 
agreement with the Soviet Union for a unified administration 
of Germany had met with failure. This failure prompted the 
decision to proceed without the Soviet Union and attempt 
the unification of West Germany. Subsequen·t efforts to 
bring West Germany into the Atlantic security system have 
drawn th.e opprobrium of the Soviet Union. It has striven to 
94clay., pp. 152-153. 
95Documents .2E:. Germany 1945-1954, pp. 234-238. 
96J.P. Nettl, p. 109. 
97rbid., pp. 1os-110. 
ensconce itself in a position as the cha~pion .. of' German 
reunification. The actual conditions under which it would 
agree to German reunification have in turn been repudiated 
·by the Western Powers as well as by responsible potitical 
leaders of Western Germany. 
Democratization of the Political Elite 
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The efforts undertaken by the Soviet Union to ndemoc- '-
rat ize O its zone of occupation were part of the basic Soviet 
plan to secure ultimate Communist control of Ger~any~ Thus 
it was a necessary element of this plan_to ~reate a politi-
cal atmosphere favorable to Comrn.unis.t assumption of 
authority. The plan, as it evolved in. the Soviet zone, fol-
lowed the basic design utilized in the Communist subjugation 
of Eastern Europe. This involved the establishment of a 
bloc of "anti-Fascist" political parties, ostensibly free 
and equal, but in actuality controlled by the Communist 
Party in the operation of the 11 blocn. The program was be-
- -
gun by the authorization of the establishment of political 
. . 
parties prior to their sanction in the other zones of oc-
cupation. 98 Orlg1.nally., four parties we!e licensed in the 
Soviet zone. Th~se included the Commun~st. Party ~KPD) ~- the 
Social Democrat;c Party (SP~), the Chr!s:tian_.Democrat1c 
Union (CDU), and the Liberal Democratic Party:·(LD?) .99 
~Bsee above, footnote no. 91. 
99 . . .... J.P. Nettl, pp. 75-80. Nettl states that the CDU and 
the LDP did not apply for permission to organize in the Rus-
sian zone until the fall of 1945. 
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The German Communist Party ostensibly had been 
extinguished by the Nazis o It the re fore required substan-
tial assistance by the Soviet authorities to resuscitate the 
Party and to effect its domination of the political life of 
the zone. A primary function of the East German Communists 
was to make Soviet policy palatable to the general popu-
lace.100 The favored position of the KPD was readily ascer-
tainable by the other parties. Following its amalgamation 
with the Soviet zone branch of the SPD into a "united work-
er's party'', the resultant partyj known as the Socialist 
Unity Party or SED, became the vanguard of Soviet.policy in 
the zone. Cognizance of the position of this party as the 
instrument for the expression of official Soviet policy led 
the other parties to temper their opposition in apprehension 
of the possible consequences of outspoken disagreement with 
Soviet policy. Another factor which abetted the German 
Communists in dominating the ll'anti-Fascisttf coalition was 
that of the fundamental Communist-NazLanta.gonls.m. The Com-
munists declared that since.they had suffered most exten-
sively at the hands of the Nazis then they logically were 
most suited to lead in the denazifica tion process. It was 
upon this basis that Communists were placed in many respon-
sible positions.101 
It would have been more simple to have installed Com-
munists or fellow-travelers at the outset; but at that stage 
lOOibid., p. 74. 
101Ibid., pp. 75-80. 
the Russians' .immediate concern was in establishing an 
orderly and efficient administration in the zone for the 
facilitation of their reparations policy. Flagrant disre-
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gard for democratic procedures would have caused concern in 
the West and would have immediately and openly revealed Sov-
iet objectives. Thus it was that the dictates of expediency 
and efficiency allowed for the nominal partic!pation of all 
political parties in the zone, with the obvious exception 
of the National Socialists. 
Although anxious to rejuvenate the political life of 
their zone, the Russians did not allow provincial elections 
to be held in the five provinces of the zone until October, 
1946. 102 During the intervening period, municipal, . regional 
and provincial governments were organized under the control 
and supervision of the Soviet Mill tary Administration ( SMA). 
These governments were appointed by the occupation authori-
ties and were responsible for carrying out their direc-
103 tives. Following the merger of the KPD with the SPD in 
April, 1946, it became increasingly evident that the multi-
party system of the zone was becoming a mere facade. The 
nominal opposition parties were subjected to such a degree 
of discrimination and official pressure that the mare con-
scientious leaders were forced to retire, leaving those who 
l02rbid., p. 90. 
l03rbid. p. 61. 
-- J 
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were willing to follow subserviently the Communist lead ln" 
the political life of the zone.104 
In July, 1945, the Russians laid the foundation for a 
central government for their zone in the establishment of 
Central German Administrations. Originally, twelve Central 
Administrations were established, with two additions made 
at a later date. Their functions were to co-ordinate the 
work of the provinces. Their major scope lay in the econom-
ic field. In this field, Central Administrations were 
established for Industry (categorized into basic, heavy and 
light industries), Fuel and Power, Trade and Su:pply 1 .Agri-::: _ 
culture and Forestry, Transport, Finance, Statistics, Labor 
and Social Affairs, and Posts and Telegraphs. In the non-
economic field, Central Administrations were established 
for Education, Justice, Health, and Refugees (since refugees 
were a good source for labor, this Administration soon be-
came an appendage of the Administration for Labo.r and Social 
Affairs). These German Administrations were on a central 
level, and initially issued directives only under. the .. author-
ity of the central SMA. The provincial authorities 
originally were permitted to functio.n_ .a.t .. .t.hei..r discretion in 
areas which had not been pre-empted by the. Cent.ral Adminis-
trations. The Russian penchant for centralized _planning., 
direction and control, however, permitted the exercise of 
this discretionary authority for only a short period. The 
104nocuments on Germany 1945-1954, pp. 121-125; J.P. 
Nettl, pp. 99-105.~ 
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provincial authorities then served merely, to fulfill central 
directives. Each Central Administration had a president, 
one or more vice-presidents, and was divided into depart-
ments. Departments had their counterparts on the provincial 
ministerial level and these were directly responsible for 
executing the central directives. 
Originally, appointments were made on the basis of ef-
ficiency and capability; however, Communists were usually 
placed in control of internal administration. After the 
formation of the SED, the Central Administrations came en-
tirely under Communist control. 
In the economic field, the major. task of the Central 
Administrations was to put the industry and commerce of the 
zone on a profitable basis, i.e., to satisfy the avidity of 
the Soviet reparations demands. Another major ob je·cti ve of 
the Central Administrations was to facilitate the sociali-
zation of the zone. In the non-econc>mic fields, t1:J.e 
Administrations aided the Russians in the denazification of 
the judicial, educational, and medical fields and .in their 
reori~ntation upon a Communist basis. 
In 1947, two additional Central AdministratLons were 
added. Q.ne was the Administration for Interna1. Aff'airs, 
which established the "People I s .Police" of the zorie, and 
which was under the control of the Russian secret police. 
The other addition was the Commission for Sequestration and 
Requisitioning., which had as its function the co-ordination 
and control of the work of the local Sequestration 
Commissions. Its establishment indicated the acceleration 
of the policy for the nationalization of industry. 
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As the Central Administrations gradually consolidated 
their powers vis-~-vis the provincial governments, opposi-
tion arose from these elements which was not to the 
policies pursued, but to the increase of central control. 
To settle the controversies, an Economic Commission was es-
tablished which was superior to both the Central Adminis-
trations and to the provincial governments o The Central 
Administrations then became departments of the Economic 
Commissiono '11he Economic Commission itself consisted of a 
plenum, a Secretariat, seventeen general departments, and a 
sub-commission for the Safety of the Na tiona.l Property o 
r.rhe SED was in effective control of the Economic Com-
mission. The degree of centralization and the authoritative 
character of the Commission was demonstrated by the transfer 
of two-thirds of the capacity of nationalized industry to 
the control of the Commission, one-third remaining__ under 
the provincial governments. 
The Economic Commission was readily transformed into 
the Government of the German Democratic Republic in October, 
1949, following the establishment of the West German Feder-
al Republic. The Russians hoped to convey the impression 
that their action in establishing this government was simply 
their final alternative in view of the Western determination 
to proceed with the establishment of a German government for 
the Western zoneso However, the lengthy process involved 
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in the organization of a government entirely subservient to 
the Soviet Union, in addition to the sovietiza.tion of the 
Russian zone, indicated that the decision to guarantee the 
inclusion of East Germany within the Soviet orbit had been 
made considerably in advance of the ·western action. 
The departments of the Economic Commission became min-
istries of the new Government of the German Democratic 
Republic. The "People's Council 11 , which had been convened 
to protest the "division" of Germany by the Western Powers, 
became the lower chamber of the legislature ( Volkskammer). 
An upper house (Laenderkammer) was elected by the legisla-
tures of the five provinces. A constitution, which had 
been voted previously for all Germany by the 0 :People's Con-
gresstt, gave legality to the whole system. Because it was 
questionable whether the SED could secure a majority in an 
election, the election of representatives to the provincial 
and republican legislatures was postponed until October, 
1950. 105 Elections had not been held in the Soviet zone 
since October, 1946, when relatively unobstructed elections 
had demonstrated the weakness of the SED. Simultaneous 
elections in Berlin, where the Social Democrats were allowed 
to compete, resulted in the routing of the SED. As a 
105J.P. Nettl, pp. 114-144. The discussion of the de-
velopment of centralized authority in trle Soviet zone, 
above, pp. 81-84, is taken from the author's Chapter v; 
"The Development of Administration arid Government". It 
presents a comprehensive view of this aspect of tbe Soviet 
"democratization" of its zone as pa.rt of the overall design 
to project thi$ system to the entirety of Germany. 
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result, it became necessary for the Soviet authorities to 
apply more coercive measures to aid the SEDo These moves 
were masked behind the activities of the 11 antl-Fa.scistH bloc 
wherein opposition to Soviet policies could mean, a.t the 
minimum, political suicideol06 
Socialization and Pacifist Re-orientation 
of Germany 
According to a Soviet propaganda publlca.tion,1o7 "a. 
firm foundation for socialism'' has been la.id in the German 
Democratic Republic 0 in the shape of a socialist sector in 
industry and agriculture". The article continues by stating 
tha. t all the ma. jor industrial plants are now the property 
of the people, that the banks have been nationalized, and 
that the mineral resources, means of transportation, and the 
key positions in trade have likewise been brought into the 
"socialist sector". According to this information, the 
"socialist. sector was---accounting for eighty-six per cent 
of the total industrial output---in 1954"0 There are agri-
cultural producer's co-operatives, agricultural sale-and-
supply co-operatives, artisan's co-operatives, and 
consumer's co-operativeso The nsocialist sector in agricul-
ture controls one-third of the total cultivated area". 
Heavy industry output exceeds that of industry in general, 
l06Ibid., PPo 90-94, pp. 100-105. 
12. 
107New Times (Moscow), No. 41, October 6 9 1955, pp. 10-
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showing a priority to major capital goods in iron, steel and 
engineering. The "agrarian reformstt instituted in September, 
1945, confiscated the estates of 11 7,136 Junkers and land-
lords", or thirty-one per cent of the total area of the 
German Democratic Republic. According to the report, this 
was distributed among ''559,089 peasant households". 
Seventy-five per cent of the foreign trade of the German 
Democratic Republic is with Soviet-bloc countries. This Sov-
iet satellite follows, or attempts to follow, the Soviet 
line in its entirety. It bas a "democra. tic foreign policy", 
hueing to Soviet guidance in this respect: ttnorma.l rela-
tions with all the countries of the world, for a united 
effort of all the forces of the German nation, and for the 
unification of the country on democratic lines". It advo-
cates all-German negotiation on reunification "and is 
vigorously opposed to the resurrection of German mili tar-
ismn. 108 
The socialization of East Germany is a primary deter-~ 
rent to the reunification of Germany. Those who have 
benefitted from the socialization measures, both politically 
and economically, have the suppo-rt of the Soviet Union in 
demanding that as a condition of reunification nothing be 
1081bid. The information from this Soviet publication 
in relation to the extent of socialization in East Germany 
is assumed to be reasonably correct. The extent to which 
the 11 people" have benefi tted from such "reforms'' is open to 
question. · 
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allowed to jeopardize these benefits. 109 The adherents of 
the free e nterprise system, in control of West Germany and 
staunchly supported by the United States and the West German 
industrialists, . refuse to recognize that the socialization 
·. of East Germany is an achievement of the democratic proc-
ess .110 
Socialization began with the land reforms in Saxony, in ~ 
September, 1945. This was followed by simila r measures in 
the other four provinces of the zone . This was perhaps the 
most far-reaching of the socialization me a sures, since a 
large group of property-owners were createdlll who depend 
upon the governme nt in power to maintain their holdings . 
The fear of a change, which possibly could deprive them of 
their gains, cements their loyalty to the re gime. 
Initially, expropriations of private property for the 
state were directed against Nazis and Junkers. Although 
continuing to use dena zification as a cloak, the expropria-
tions soon became merely the f ulfillment of the objective 
of the SED to socialize East Germany . Failure of the nomi-
nal opposition parties to condone such expropriations would 
have led to their denunciation as Hfascists" or "monopoly 
capitalists". 112 
109New Times (Moscow), No. 46, November 10, 1955, p. 10. 
llOu.s. Dept. of State, Bulletin, XX.XIII (1955), 819-
823. 
lllNew Times (Moscow), No. 41, October 6, 1955, p. 11. 
112J.P. Nettl, pp. 101~102. 
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Expropriated industries were initially administered by 
the Provincial Ministries of Industry. As the power of the 
Central Administrations grew, their functions likewise 
changed from co-ordination to control, including planning 
and supervision and the power to take remedial measures 
against provinces which fell behind in assigned tasks. This 
centralization was carried to its ultimate step in 1947 with 
the formation of the Economic Commission, a central planning 
and co-ordinating authority, which was superior to both the 
Central Administrations and the provincial governments. The 
announcement of a 11 Two Year Plan'' for the zone in 1948 indi-
cated the extent to which socialization upon the Soviet 
model had progressed. The Economic Commission took over 
two-thirds of the capacity of the nationalized industry, 
leaving one-third to the provincial governments. The zonal 
industry was administered by the departments of Industry and 
Fuel and Power of the Economic Commission. Between the end 
of 1948 and the summer of 1949, two monopoly organlza tions 
were established: the German Import-Export Corporation and 
the Commerce Organization (Hand.els Organization). This put 
the field of commerce under central controi. 113 
When the Economlc Commission was transformed into the 
Government of the German Democratic Republic, the sociali-
zation measures which had been instituted by the SED with 
the guidance and support of the Soviet authorities, 
received a legal basis for their continuation. Socializa-
tion has been extended into all fields, such as industry, 
·- - . 
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commerce, agriculture, health, medicine, welfare, education, 
and labor. 114 Thus, what began as a punitive measure against 
the adherents of National Socialism was expanded as a major 
factor in the sovietization of East Germany in hopeful prep-
aration for the Communist domination of both sectors of the 
divided state. 
114rbid., Po 133. 
CHAPTER III 
CONSEQUENCES OF rl'HE DIVISION OF GERMANY 
Breakdown of Great Power Concert 
During the occupation of Germany, the 'Western allies 
became fully cognizant of the expansionist designs of the 
Soviet Union. This recognition eventuated in the disinte-
gration of the Great .Power Concert and in the integration 
of the western portion of Germany into the Western defen-
sive system. 
Success for the objectives of the occupation of Ger-
many had necessitated a continuation of the wartime unity 
among the Great .Powers. That this unity of purpose had 
disappeared upon the defeat of Germany became increasingly 
perceptible to the Western Powers in the sing:;1lar_rep§:E§:-
~~~---P~-~!~! pursued by the Soviet Union. Its legitimate 
claim for reparations was inverted into a policy which had 
as its object the maximum exploitation of the productive 
resources of its zone of occupation.l Simultaneously, the 
Soviet Union followed a course which had as its objective 
the sovietization of_:EastO:ermany and its inclusion within 
...........____ ___ ,~. • --~---- ---- .. ..---·-.,-----~---,-,___..,,u·- ,, 
lpeter Nettl, "German Reparations in the Soviet Em-
pire", Foreign Affairs~ XXIX ( 1951), 300-308. 
90 
91 
the satellite orbit of Eastern Europe.2 The sovietization 
of its zone offered to the Soviet Union a base for a ~rospec-
tive communization of the entire German state. As an 
alternative objective, if Soviet efforts to achieve German 
unification upon its terms proved a failure, the addition ... 
of East Germany to the Soviet bloc would in itself afford a 
beneficial stimulus to the Soviet-bloc economy. In addition, 
as long as there is a GE3rman desire for reunif~cation9 .the 
Soviet domination of East Germany will continue to offer 
German Communists a wedge for gaining admittance into the 
government of a reunified Germany. 
Obstinate Soviet application of its reparations policy ~ 
I to the exclusion of the overall objectives of the Allied 
occupation led to the avowal by the Western Powers to pro- 1/ 
/.(_ 
ceed in the unification of the three Western zones.3 The 
Soviet Union, in an effort to curry favor with the German 
people, demanded the unification of Germany. It excoriated 
the Western Powers for professing to desire unification 
while pursuing a policy which the Soviet spokesmen des-
cribed as being aimed toward either extreme federalization 
or dismemberment. 4 Yet the Russians had refused to join 
2J.P. Nettl, The Eastern Zone and Soviet Policy in Ger-
many ( London, 1951;,pp •. 74-14~ -_-_ . ·- . 
3Bea tte Ruhm von Oppen, ed., Documents on Germany Under 
Occupation 1945-1954 (London, 1955), pp. 286-290. Herein-
after referrea:-to as Documents on Germany 1945-1954. 
4Peter Calvocoressi, Surve§ of International Affairs 
1947-1948 ( London, 1952), p. 23 , p. 242. Hereinafter re-
ferred to as Survey 1947-1948. 
/ 
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their zone to the American and British zones in the 
American-sponsored move to eliminate zonal barriers for the 
administration of Germany in the manner as directed by the 
Potsdam Conference.5 
The administration of Germany as four separate entities 
had created a situation whereby the reparations of the Sov-
iet Union were subsidized9 in effect, by the Americans and 
the British. The level of industry which had been agreed 
upon for Germany provided for the retention only of the pro-
ductive capacity necessary for the subsistence of the 
population in a peacetime economy. The production which the 
Soviet authorities removed or exported for reparations de-
tracted proportionately from the amount which should have 
been available, according to the level of industry, for the 
payment of the imports necessary for the subsistence of the 
population. Therefore, if the total proceeds of the ex-
ports from the four zones were not placed in a common pool, 
the level of industry plan would be placed out of balanceo 
Since the plan had been prepared upon the assumption that 
Germany would be treated as an economic whole, the loss of 
the returns from the exports of one zone required that the 
other zones increase production or else finance the neces-
sary imports themselves. To prevent starvation and 
disease, it was initially necessary for the Americans and 
5tucius D. Clay, Decision in Germany (Garden City, 
1950), PPo 130-131. 
the British to finance the deficits. Due to the general 
deteriorated condition of the productive facilities and to 
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the reparations and dismantlement programs, it was impossi-
ble to meet even the minimum levels allowed in the level of 
industry plano Although subsidizations were necessary fol-
lowing the formation of the Bizone, it was possible to 
formulate a new level of industry for this area and to pro-
vide assistance through loans which would enable the economy 
to eventually pay its own way.6 
Unification of West Germany 
The American and British zonal merger was not motivated) 
. I 
i 
by a desire to partition Germany, as was charged by the Sov-J 
r 
let Union. The merger was designed to effect a more ) 
efficient and economical occupation of the two zonea, ioe.,, 
; 
to eliminate the necessity for the anomalous situation / 
( 
whereby the occupying powers were meeting the expenses o~ 
. . \ 
the occupation in addition to their subsidization of the / 
I 
local economy.7 
There was no attempt at the outset of the merger to 
establish a political administration for the Bizone, al-
though a Bizonal German Economic Council was established. 
Its authority lay exclusively in economic and fl.seal a.f-
fairs and it was responsible to Military Government. Under 
6rbid.i PPo 156-157. 
7rbid., p. 164. 
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this Council were German administrative agencies for 
Economics, Food and Agriculture, Transport, Communications, 
Civil Service, and Finance. Each agency was headed by an 
executive committee.a 
Two meetings of the Council of Foreign Ministers of the 
Four Powers during 1947 failed to produce a resolution of 
the German problemo Therefore, it was decided by the Bizon-
al military authorities to reorganize the German ad~inis-
tra.tion and to give it more of a governmental eharactero 
Simultaneously, plans were formulated for the merger of the 
three Western zones and the establishment of a responsible 
German government for this area. The resulting structure 
of the Bizonal reorganization was of the federal type, al-
though it la.eked sovereign powers and its authority remained 
exclusively in economic and fiscal matters. Although the 
Russians had given no indication to warrant such a belief, 
the Western Powers continue·d to hope for a resolution of 
East-West differences and a solution of the German problemo 
In addition to the Economic Council, the members of which 
were elected by the Land (state) parliaments, there was es-
tablished a Landerrat to protect state interests. Its 
members were designated by state governmentso It could ini-
tiate legislation in all of the fields in which the Council 
could legislate except for revenue and appropriations billso 
An Executive Committee, composed of a chairman and the heads 
8rbid., pp. 168-169. -
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of the administrative agencies, carried out the decisions 
of the legislature. A High Court and a central bank also 
were established.9 
The decision to proceed with the establishment of a 
government for the three Western zones was made following 
the London meeting of the Council of Foreign Ministers dur-
ing November and December, 1947. At this nieeting, the 
Russians continued to defend their intransigent reparations 
po~icyo They r>efused to cwnsider unification until the.i!. _ 
reparations demands were met by the West. Thls. refusal con-
vinced the thre.e. Western Powers_ that the only way to 
eventual reunification lay in the merger of. the Western 
zones. 10 
Representatives of the three Western Powers and the 
Benelux states met in London during February and March, 
1948, and again during April, where agreement was reached 




zonal area. The French conceded the merger of their zone 
after provisions had been made for international control 
the Ruhr and security against Germany .11 The ·conference 
agreed in principle that a federal type of ~overnment would 
be best adapted for West Germany. It was agreed that the 
9rbido, pp. 174-175. 
10Raymond Dennett and Robert K. Turner, ed., Documents 
on American Foreign Relations, Jan. 1..:..nec.· 31~ 1948 {Prince-
ton, 1950), X, pp. 114-115. Hereina?t'e'r'"re?errea-:E'o as 
. Documents££ American Foreign Relations X. 
llJbid., pp. 111-127. 
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French zone would not be economically merged with the Bizone 
' ' 
until political fusion was achievedo However, during the 
interim the French were increasingly co-operative in co-
ordinating economic matters and in attending regular 
conferences of the military governors.12 A Parliamentary 
Council, composed of delegates elected by the Laender (state) 
parliaments, drafted the Basic Law for the West German Fed-
eral Republic.13 It convened on September 1, 1~48 an?: tlle 
Basic Law was approved by the Military Governors on May 12, 
1949. Simultaneously, an Occupation Statute was promulgated 
which gave full legislative, executive, and judicia~ P?W~rs 
to the Federal Republic except in certain reserved fields, 
including disarmament and demilitarization, the Ruhr ~uthori-
ty, and foreign affairs. Furthermore, it provided for the 
transferrence of the powers of the military governments to 
a three-man civilian High Commission. The Occupation Stat-
. ute was to be reviewed within eighteen months wi.th a view 
toward further increasing the powers of the Federal Repub-
lic.14 The f6reign ministers of the three Western Powers 
had previously announced their objective to integrate West 
Germany into a "European association11 o 15 Alao, West Germany 
12rbid., p. 110. 
13Ibid. 
14Raymond Dennett and Robert Ko Turner, ed., Documents 
on American Foreign Relations, Jan4 l~Deco 31, 1949 (Prince-
ton, 1950)., XI, pp. l09-lll. Hereinafter referreato as 
Documents_££ American Foreign Relations XI. 
15 · Ibid., p. 148. 
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would be permitted to negotiate for aid from the Economic 
Co-operation Administration (ECA) and it would be supported 
for membership in the Orga,'nization for European Economic Co-
operation (OEEC). 16 
Elections for parliament were conducted during the sum-
mer of 1949 a.nd the first Government of the German Federal 
Republic assumed office in September, 1949. 17 
Soviet opposition to the plans to establish a West Ger-) 
man Government was expressed in_ its imposition ~n June, 1948 J 
of the Berlin blockade which was designed to drive the West-
ern Powers from Berlin and to deter the plans for the ~ 
establishment of a government for the three Western zones. 
The only accomplishment of the blockade, which was lifted 
in May., 1949, was of negative value to the Soviet Union. 
The Soviet resort to openly coercive measures had bolstered 
the Western determination to consolidate its strength 
against the further extension o.f' Soviet rule in Europe. In 
a further attempt to deter the establishment of a West Ger-
_man government, the Russians proposed, at __ the May, 1949 
meeting of the Cou~cil of Foreign Ministers in _Paris, with-
drawal of all occupation forces to the :periphery of 
Germany, leaving the Germans to form a government for them-
selves o In the opinion of the Western Powers, thfa proposal 
portended a situation whereby Germ.any wou.ld _ he. 1-eft exposed 
16Ibido I Po 101.' 
17Ibido, Po 118. 
to complete Communist domination. It was now their belief 
that Soviet policy had as its major aim the subjugation of 
Germany to Communist rule. Therefore, Western policy-
makers felt that their aims to democratize and reunify 
Germany could best be achieved through proceeding with the 
plans for a West German government.18 
Integration and Rearmament of West Germany 
within NATO and WEU 
Another consequence of the division of Germany has 
been, at the firm insistence of the United States, the at-,.. -
98 
tempted integration of West Germany into the North Atlantic 
,•••••••·----------•--, •. - •• , ...... - -•• •-. -. •• ,.-• ·••-,-•••'•"• '••"" • ~ ~- .•• __ :_.- , • .,_.M:" "••"'-·--•-•r.•-..•.••,• .. •."•· . ._---=.-,_,-----.., 
e_?onomi_?.,. _:political, and def~.?~.1--~e alignment. Economic and 
political integration have had more success than has had 
rearma.ment.19 Rearmament has received its most extensive 
18Ibid., p. 101. 
19Peter Calvocoressi, Survey of International Affairs 
1949-1950 (London, 1953), pp. 159-160. Hereinafter referred 
t'o""as Survei 1949-1950. West Germany was admitted, in Aug-
ust, 1950, o--:aie Council of Europe; an organization -. 
established to study and co-ordinate Europe I s economic:, · 
social, cultural, and judicial problems. At thi~ time, de-
mands were increasing for a European ·Army which· would ... ·. 
include a German contingent; Peter Calvocoressi, Survey of 
International Affairs 1951 ( London, 1954), p. 99. ·Herein-
after referred to as Survet 1951. West Germany, ·with 
France, Belgium, Holland,uxembourg and Italy, signea the 
Treaty for the European Coal and Steel Community on April 
18, 1951. Ratifications of the Treaty by the· signatory 
states were completed in 1952. Designed to prevent the 
possibility. of recurrent war between France and Germany; it 
placed under a common authority the coal and steel indus-
tries of the participating n~tions. 
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support from the United States.20 Major ~osition has 
. ----· . ---------~ 
come from France, which is fearful of the renascence of a ~-- -·----..,_._.--~--~~ 
national German army. Although the solution arrived at for 
West Germany's rearmament has provided safeguards against. 
the revival of German military aggression21 and has put the 
industrial wealth of the Ruhr under international control 
and supervision, rearmament has not progressed apace" 
In the efforts to prevent German rearmament, Soviet 
propagandistic attacks have been airr.red at perpet1:1at~~g __ the 
Franco-German animosity and at antagonizing the fears of 
--···-----·· . -- .. ~--- ··----·- . 
other of Germany's neighbors. 22 tnother target for the 
Soviet attacks bas been the German people. The Russians hold 
that the inclusion of West Germ.any within the Western Euro-
pean Union (WEU) and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization 
20peter Vo Curl, ed., Documents£!! American Foreign Re-
lations 1954 (New York, 1955), PPo 104-106. Hereinafter 
referred to as Documents 52E; American For~ie;n Rela~ioris _1?54. 
2lrbido, pp;, 115.:.117 o In adhering to thei J.,6hdori 'a.rid 
Paris· Agreements, which es ta.blished ·wEU and granted ifover-
e ignty and membership within NATO to the German Federal 
Republic, the Federal Republic voluntarily r·elinquished the 
right ·to manufacture atomic, biological.i chemi.c.al and cer-· 
ta.in other types of weapons" It also ple.dged that it wou:Ld 
not resort to force to achieve reunification or the i:riodifi-
ca tion of its boundaries. Under WEU, the E!ize of the· -
internal defense force of West Germany and its contribution 
to NATO are limited. An Agency was established to enforce 
the limitations put upon armaments. The U.S., Great Brit-
ain, and France have declared· that any government whi.ch 
resorts to aggressive action shall be denied its rights 
under NATO. 
22current Digest of the Soviet Press, V, Noo 43, Decem-
ber 9, 1953, PPo 17-18; Current Digest of the Soviet Press, 
V, No. 49, January 20, 1954, po 41; New Times (Moscow), No. 
44, October 30, 1954, pp.- 1-7; New TTiiies (Moscow), No. 46, 
November 13, 1954, pp. 5-6. 
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(N.A/I'O) has seriou:sly jeopardized the chances for German 
reunifica tiono 23 Aside from the implications that rearma-
ment could lead to permanent division, the Russians have 
resorted to a display of the so-called cohesiveness of the 
0 socialist camp" and to thinly-disguised threats. Prior to· 
the final ratification of the Paris Agreements, the Russians 
declared that should the Agreements come into effect it 
would be necessary for the countries of "peace and democ-
racy" to prepare defensive measures against this "aggressive" 
grouping. When the Agreements came into force in Ma¥~ _1955.11 
the Soviet Union hastily convened a conference of its satel-
lite bloc and put into effect the pre-conceived Warsaw Pact. 
. ·-... '_ ... ·_.::;_; 
This provided for the establishment, in Soviet terminology, 
of a counterpoise to the "aggressive Western groupingtt. In 
effect, it added nothing to the extensive integrationand 
control already effective in the Soviet-satellite relation-
ship.24 
Because of the continued delay in West German rearma-
ment, Soviet policy unrelentlessly strives for its 
prevention through dubious proposals for reunifica. tion and 
through the maximum utilization of the 11 peaceful co-
existence'' campaign. The reunification proposals aim at 
23New Times (Moscow), Noo 48, November 27, 1954, PPo 
2-3 (Supplement) . npra vda" interview of former Soviet For-
eign Minister Molotov. 
24u.s. Dept. of State, Bulletin, XXXI (1954), 905-907; 
New Times (Moscow), Noo 21, May 21, 1955, PPo 68-70. 
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the neutralization and complete control of Germany.25 The 
ttpeaceful co-existence" campaign has as its objective the 
neutralization of as large an area as possible through the 
propagation of a doctrine which alludes to the peaceful in-
tentions of the Soviet Union while openly declaring the 
1'inevitable 11 victory of the 11 socialist campn.26 
Weakening of the Balance of Power 
and Increased Tension 
The division of Germany and the rearmament of West Ger-
many within the Wes tern bloc. s.erious.ly weakened the pr~?,9!1l-
in~~r:i,t P9'1!U'lJ'_.P.Os.ition of the Soviet Union in Europe. 'I1he 
zealousness with which it attempted to defeat West German 
rearmament demonstrated the concern with which the Soviet 
Union viewed the contribution which West Germany is capable 
of making to the Western defense effort. There are several 
factors which, when withdrawn from the reach of Soviet ex-
pansionist designs, seriously prejudice the European 
balance in favor of the West. These factors include: ( 1) 
the natural resources of Germany; (2) its position as hub 
of Europe's transport system; (3) the naturally aggressive 
bent of the German people; ( 4) the proportion of population 
in W'est as to East Germany; ( 5) the business and financial 
25New Times (Moscow), No. 48, November 27, 1954, pp. 2-
3 (Supplement). 
26New Times (Moscow), No. 8, February 16, 1956, p. 8. 
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acumen, responsible in part for the rapid West German 
economic recovery; and (6) the great Ruhr industrial com-
plex, viewed covetously by the Russians from the beginning 
of the occupationo27 However, until such time as West Ger-
man factories are producing armaments on a large scale and 
until West Germans have resolved their inner contradictions 
in relation to rearmament., the most positive benefit from-~ 
the present alignment, in the Western view, is simply that J 
the productive resources of West Germany have not fallen t~.J 
the Soviet Union. 
From the inception of the Berlin blockade to the period'\ 
\ 
\ subsequent to Stalin's death, which marked the lni.t ia tion of 
l the policy of "peaceful co-existence",_ the Soviet pol.icy I , 
f 
toward the West was one of venomous hostility.28 Under this 1 
.._.~--.. ~-., --~,..~~c.~--·-·~--•··• .,v--....-....,_-.~,.,- ·· -~¥-~_.,..,-_.-., 
incessant Communist vituperation., the Western nations were 
under compulsion to rearm as expeditiously as possible.29 
The necessity to divide resources between economic recovery 
and military preparation was a factor in the consideration 
upon securing a West German contribution to Western European 
27wm. Hardy McNeill, Survey of Interns. tional Affairs _ 
1939_-1946: · "America, Britain andRussia., The·ir· co.;.operation 
and Conflict., 1941-1946'1 (London., ·1953),·p. 625~--Po 727~. At 
Potsdam, in 1945; and at the Paris meeting··or the~.Council 9f 
Foreign Ministers in July, 1946~ the ·Russians f:fouglit B1g 
Four control of the Ruhr. But because of their obstinate 
stand on reparations., the chance for a voice in the control 
of the Ruhr slipped from their grasp. 
28R. C. Tucker., "Stalinism and the World Conflict n, 
Journal of International .A.ffai:rs, VIII ( 1954), pp. 7-21. 
29survey 1949-1950., PPo 158-160. 
103 
defenseo Furthermore, some felt that the resurgent West \ 
German economy should be included in the defense prepa.ra-
tions lest those states engaged in the di version of a large 
/
) 
portion of their resources to this effort would be economi- / 
I 
cally displaced. 30 Under the sometimes impatient .insistence 
of the United States and with the assistance by it o-f exten-
sive outlays of financial and material aid, the North 
Atlantic Treaty Organization has been developed into a capa-
ble, although comparatively small, defensive fo:r>ce_._ The 
climax of over four years' effort was reached ln May, 1955 
with the formation of the Western European Union (WEU), a 
continental defensive grouping of nations, which wil_3:._fune- · 
tion through the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and 
within which West Germany is allowed to rearm.31 
The defensive measures taken by the West were denounced 
by the Soviet Union as aggressive a?ts desie;ned so1.ely 
against Soviet Russia and the countries of the. "peace camp 1t. 
These defensive measures, furthermore, were coincidental 
with the anti-Western campaign adopted in the Soviet Union 
at the end of World War II. By reviving the doctrinaire 
concept which envisaged the "socialist s.tatett surrounded by 
tthostile, imperialistic capitalistn states, some reason 
30Ibid., Po 152; Michael T. Florinsky, "United States-
Soviet Relations: 1954", Current History, .XXIX (1955), 
16-17. · 
31Documents on American Foreign Relations 1954, p. 137, 
Po 146, p. 151, pp":'" 169-174. 
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could be given to the Soviet population for the prolongation 
of pre-war and wartime deprivations. These deprivations 
were, in actuality, engendered primarily. by the intense de-
sire of the Soviet leadership to attain maximum indus:triali-
zation and to surpass the United States, which represe~ts 
the major deterrent to the Soviet plan for world domina-
32 tion. · · 
Encouragement of German Nationalism and Revanchis.rn · 
The division of Germany has resulted in the creation of 
an intense, yet controlled, German desire to achieve ulti-. 
mate reunification. 33 Furthermore, the conditions under 
which the lands beyond the Oder-Neisse were transferred to 
- - - . 
Polish control have.been declared unacceptable to the West-
ern Powers. Neither they nor the West German Government 
accept the transfer of this territory to_ Poland as a p~rm,a-
nent settlement. This results, in effect, in the creation 
of a German "Irredenta" which thereby creates an unstable 
condition, especially for Poland. However, the West German 
Government has pledged that no forceful measures will be 
utilized in attempting an adjustment of the eastern German 
frontier with Poland.34 
32Tucker, p. 9, pp. 15-17. 
33Konrad Adenauer, ''Germany, The New ·Partner*·', Foreign 
Affairs, XXXIII ( 1955), 182. . 
34nocuments on American Foreign Relations 1954, p. 115, 
:P· 117. 
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In protesting the establishment of the West German 
Government and its rearmament, the Russians have charged the 
Western Powers with abetting the rebirth of fascism and re-
vanchism. It is true that there have been attempts within 
West Germany to form extreme nationalist and openly neo-
Fascist groups.35 However, the Basic Law of the German 
Federal Republic forbids the establishment o:f a~iy associa-_ 
tions "directed against the constitutional ordern36 and the 
Constitutional Court is empowered to dissolve any parties 
... . -
which "jeopardize the existence of the Federal Republic". 37 
This provision is directed against extremistgroups of both 
the Left and Right. Furthermore, the Electoral J;:,11t~ of 1953 
effectively abets this provision by making it extremely 
- -· 
difficult for splinter parties. to gain representation in the 
Bundestag ( lower house). 38 Naturally, such laws rely upon 
35Taylor Cole, "Neo-Fascism in Western Germany and 
Italy", The American Political Science Review, XLIX ( 1955 ), 
139. The Socialist Reich Party existed from 1948 until- -
1952 when it was disbanded while the Constitutional Court 
debated its legality. 
36nocuments on .American Foreign Relations XI, p. 123. 
Basic Law, Sec. 1-;-Art. 9, par. 3. 
37rbid., p. 125. Basic Law, Sec. TI, Art. 21, par. 2. 
38James K. Pollock, 11 The West German Electoral Law of 
1953", The American Political Science Review, XLIX ( 1955), 
109-110. One-half of the 484 Bundestag seats are elected 
from the 242 single-member constituencies in West Germany; 
half are divided proportionately among the parties in each 
~ according to t.he votes received by each party. A party 
does not receive any seats under proportional representation 
( PR) unless it has received five per cent of the valid votes 
cast for candidates on the Land PR lists. However, if a 
party wins a seat in a single-member district, .it will be. 
considered in the. .. .dis.t.r.i.b.ution .of .seats under PR. 
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the continuance of the democratic order for their proper 
enforcement. Although the democratic type of government was 
imposed upon West Germany, the system has functioned rela-
tively well, considering the adolescence of democratic 
institutions in Germany. 
As long as the present prosperity is maintained, ex-
treme nationalism and a return of fascism seem to present 
no major problems.39 Revanchism, or the desire to reacquire 
the lands beyond the Oder-:Neisse, is concentrated largely 
in the expellee groups, who have formed a political party 
which is represented in the Bundestag. Tts platform is 
centered upon the demand for the abrogation of the Yalta 
and Potsdam Agreements.40 
Growth of Unrest in East Germany 
The extent of the .popular. sup.port of the Soviet-
inspired and perpetuated East German regime was effectively 
displayed in the uprisings in the German Democratic Repub-
lic on June l '7, 1953. The intensity of the revolt was 
demonstrated by the necessity for the utilization of Soviet 
troops for its suppression.41 
In East Germany, as in the Soviet Union, the oppressive 
demands for higher productivity, yet with continued 
39cole, pp. 135-139. 
40Qffice of the U.S. High Commissioner For Germany, 
Elections and Political Parties in Germany 1945-1952 (Bad 
Godesberg/Mehlem, Germany, 1952), pp. 8-9. 
41u.s. Dept. of State,\) :Sulletin, XXIX (1953},·8-9. 
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deprivations for the workers, had reached its practical 
limitations. In July, 1952, the decision of the Socialist 
Unity Party (SED) to "build the foundation of Socialism", 
called for the collectivization of agriculture and increased/ 
productivity through higher work norms. Opposition to these 
measures was demonstrated in the mass defections to West 
Germanyo In an attempt to ameliorate the workers, as well 
as the middle class, economic, political, and cultural con-
cessions were made in June, 19530 Their objective was to 
increase the production of consumer goods at the expense 
of heavy industry. 42 Notwithstanding these concessions by 
the SED and the Government., the uprisings materialized on 
June 17. 
In August, 1953, the Soviet Union, in recognition of 
the insecurity of the regime in East Germany, provided fur-
ther concessions which had as their objective the reduction 
of the East German financial obligations to the Soviet 
Uniono43 Also, by previously proposing to the three Western 
Powers that these concessions be granted to all of Ger-
many, 44 the Russians had hoped to place a further obstacle 
in the path of the European Defense Community Treaty, which 
was then going through the process of ratification in the 
signatory states. The concessions, which beca.me ef'fective 
42Documents _££ Germany 1945-1954, pp. 585-588. 
43Ibid., .. pp. 592-596. 
44peter V. Curl, ed. 9 Documents on American Foreign 
Re la.tions 1953 ( New York, 1954), p. 225. 
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on January l, 1954, provided for the termination of 
reparations., the return of Soviet enterprises in the German· 
Democratic Republic to the East German regime, a reduction 
in the payments of the German Democratic Republic for the 
support of Soviet occupation forces,. the release from debts 
connected with the occupation, deliveries of raw materials 
and food products, and credits to the value of 485,000,000 · 
rubles. 45 
The concessions granted in June, 1953 were continued 
until March, 1955, when it was decided that heavy industry 
had suffered too drastically under the policy of relaxation, 
especially in the socialized sectors of the economy. There 
had been no striking improvement in the standard of living., 
nor had rationing and exorbitant prices been removed in 
state-operated stores.46 
45Documents _££ Germany 1945-1954, pp. 592-596. 
46carl G. Anthon, "East Germanyll, Current History, XXX 
( 1956), 233. 
CHAPTER IV 
SOVIET PROPOSALS FOR THE REUNIFICATION 
OF GERMANY 
During the interim between the 1949 meeting of the. 
Council of Foreign Nlinisters in Paris and the Berlin Con-
ference of the Foreign Ministers of the United States, 
Great Britain, France, and the Union of Soviet Socialist 
Republics, during January and February, 1954, East-West 
relations had deteriorated to the point of open conflict 
in the so-called isolated campaigns in Korea and Indo~ 
Chinao In Europe, the primary concern of the Western 
nati..ons was to strengthen European defenses by the inclusion 
of West German forces against a possible onslaught by the 
Soviet forceso Conversely, the policy of the Soviet Union 
was dedicated toward preventing the realization of these 
planso The Western Powers had relegated the subject of 
German reunification to a future period when a strengthened 
West could better deal with the ttrealisticn Russians, who 
seemed to respect only material force superior to their owno 
The Russians, however, as an element of their campaign to 
defeat West German rearmament, capitalized upon the Western 
' 
reluctance to ,jeopardize the progress made toward the in- / 
I 
elusion of West Germany in Western European defense. Soviet 
proposals for renewing Four Power negotiations on German 
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reunification', even though not acceptable to the Western 
Powers, created opposition within West Germany to ratifica-
tion of the Eu~opean Defense Community (EDC) Treatyo 
Acceptance of this Treaty by the West German parliament in 
May, 1953, however, opened the way, in the view of the West-
ern Powers, to ratification by all the signatory stateso 
As a result, 'in the estimation of the Western Powers, the 
climate for Four Power discussions upon German reunifica-
tion was considerably improvedo 1 The exchange of note3s !, 
leading to the agreement to call a meeting of the 1Yo~~ie;r:i. 
Ministers of the Four Powers, displayed such a divergence 
of methods by which German reunification would be effected 
that few positive achievements towa:rd reunification could be 
expected of the conferenceo 
Soviet support for the conference vacillated, however, 
as its interpretations of the progress of EI)C.lluctuatedo 
.... " .. ,... . . - .... <:·--o::.:~~· :·' 
If the progress on ratification of EDC app~ared favorable 
for its approval, Soviet obstructionism and propaganda in-
,. .·~ . :- ·. . 
creased; if the Treaty seemed to be meeting with ill-favor, 
the Russians seemed in no rush to call a confereneeo This 
,,, 
changeablepess of the Russians effectively displayed their 
fear of West German rearmament, and the false nature of 
their reunification proposalso 2 
1Peter Vo Curl, ed., Documents on American Foreign 
Relations 1953 (New Yor~, 1954), PPo~lB-220. 
2Ibid., pp. 220-222~ pp. 225-227~ p. 229; U. So 
Depto of State, Bulletin, XXIX (1953), 745-749. 
\ 
lll 
The Berlin Conference 
The Berlin Conference, which was in session from January 
25 until February 18, 1954, resulted in no progress on the. 
question of reunificationo It served in demonstrating the 
requirements of Soviet.security and the fundamental differ-
ences in objectives between the Soviet Union and the Western 
Powers. Objectively~ each side in this.controversy has 
-legitimate concerns for its security~ The West believes 
. ' .. . . ·, . •,:. 
that the possibility of recurrent. German ag1;ressLon is ade-
quately curbed in th.e provisions made for the ;earma.ment of' 
West Ger~a.ny within EDC {and later, the. Western European 
Union). 3 The Soviet Union i•s. firmly convinced that the re-
. . . 
armament of West Germany,.under any conditions, is a permanent 
threat to its s.ecurity and to that of the satellite regimes 
in Eastern Europe.4 
A. fundamental difference in approach to the solution of• 
the basic security requirements of Soviet Russia and the 
. . . ;./ .. 
Western Powers was made evident by the t:wo p,lans for German 
reunification put forward at the. Cbnference;-' t. e., tlle ·Eden 
and the Molotov Plans. The approach as exemplified in~the 
Eden :Plan demonstra. ted a belief i,n the principles of demo.c- .. · 
racy, as eoncei ved in the United States" Great Brita.in, and 
3u.s. Dept. of State, Bulletin, XXX (1954), 179-182 • 
. 4uni ted States Department of State, Foreign Ministers 
· Meeting, Berlin Discussions, Jana 25-Febo 18, 1954, Dept. of'. 
State Pub .. No .. 5399 (Washing:ton, 19541,ppc, 13-18.. Hereina,fter 
referred to as Foreign Mb'listers Meeting, Berlin Discussions, 
1954.. . . · · · · 
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Franceo In the outline of the ~~en Plan, the Western Powers 
\ demonstrated their willingness to jeopardize their lengthy . I 
efforts to integrate West Germany into the Western defense / 
system through their offer to allow a united Germany - re- / 
. . I 
united by free elections - its complete freedom of choice in) 
its international relations. 5 Because of the anti-Communist 
bias of the dominant political forces in West Germany, in 
addition to the preponderance of population in West as to 
East Germany, the outlook for a Communist victory in a free 
"' . -·---,-..-----.-,..... .. _______ - . . .. - ·-
election in Germany is not favorable from the Communist view-
-- - .._, ___ •~r--~·----··-· -· • -·- •• -·· -
point. But the dominant Communist positions within the 
, 
Soviet Union itself and in the satellite states of Eastern 
"" 
Europe were not founded upon free elections. With the recog-
- . 
nition of this fact, the Soviet approach to the solution·or 
its security requirements,· ln relation to the problem of 
German reunification, could point in no other direction but 
that which would g~§l._!:~1?:~.~~- .~1:1~ p:r,ed_(!tni.1:lli_nc~ __ o"!_ Sov;~t .. Jn_ter-
eats. 
The Eden Plan, .formulated by the present British Prime 
Minister, then Foreign Secretary .Anthony Eden, envisaged the 
establishment of a German government, with participation ~y 
the occupying Powers restricted to the minimum necessary to 
guarantee the unfettered German formulation of its own in-
stitutions. The .first step, in the Eden proposal, calls for 
the h<?J.ding__QLi'.rJ:)e __ el.ectioqs throughout Germany. These 
elections would be conducted under an electoral law prepared 
5 Ibido, Po 225 o 
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and promulgated by the four occupying Powerso It would 
guarantee free elections and the elements necessary in their 
.... -----·----••··---..,.,~----~•=""•~~~··"•"··r.,esa ••·~·.•~ ""a"•c,,--,•.,. ,~., •• 
conducto The elections would be 
representing the Four Powers, and might also include repre-
sentation by neutral observerso Its decisions would be by 
majority voteo 6 
The second step of the Eden proposal would be the eon-
-~:..:,,,___--.~ .. -~---·-~-·-=-------
vocation of a cons ti tp.ent_a~_semb~y resulting from these 
electionso While this assembly proceeded in the prepara-
tion of a constitution, part of the supervisory machinery 
would remain in effecto 7 Step ~~~' the actual (l.r~:f.~i-~~----<::>~ 
tge ~c_Qn,$titutio9,_ would also include preliminary negotia-
tions concerning the peace treatyo The constituent assembly 
would be authorized to create a provisional all-German 
Authority empowered to enter discussions with the occupying 
Powers on the preliminary stages of a peace treatyo This 
Authority would assist the assembly in the preparation of 
the constitution and would prepare the nucleus for future 
·s 
all-German ministrieso 
Step four of the Eden Plan would be the adoption of -----------
the Constitution and the formation of a German Government 
possessed with full powers and responsibility for the 
~··---. -~--~-~--·-»---~ -.--.-. -~'----····--~~------ ·=-··-"'·--·-~- .. - -- ---------~~--,,. ., .... _, . .,. ----·-. -- ,.,._,' .. , . •, - -·· 
_n._E3g_C>_tt~1t~~---pf'_, __ a_ p_!.?t:1.ce t..:r-~~~f~- This Government would de-
cide, at its own discretion, which, if any, of the existing 
6 Ibido, PPo 223-2240 
7 Ibid., Po 2240 
8Ibido 
international obligations binding upon the West and East 
German Governments 9 would become obligations of the united 
Germany. Prior to the conclusion of the peace treaty, the 
occupying Powers would continue to exercise certain rights 
relative to their forces in Germany and to their security, 
to Berlinj to reunification, and to the peace treaty. The 
peace treaty would become effective when ratified by the 
Four Powers and Germany. 9 
'I'he Soviet refusal to permit reunification on other 
114 
than their own terms was evidenced in the criticisms of the --,--~---~c~·-
Eden Plan as r_§-1._~ed '!JY. s,c,yie t Foreign Mini stC:Jr MqJ()J~!-~. A. 
major point of the Soviet opposition lay in the provision 
whereby de_gJ._i~J()!}~ __ gf_t_h~,-~,~ptS_:£Vi~9.py. commission would be 
!!18.CJfL?Y a major~-~! ... ~?.~~ c:,f its members o That this would be 
inimical to any influence by the Russians upon the elector-
al machinery was almost a certaintyo At least, the ability 
to make decisions by majority would allow progress to be 
madeo Because of a lack of legitimate objections to the 
Eden proposal., Molotov obstinately insisted that the 
obligations of the West German Government would become ob-
ligatory upon the government of the united Germany. In an 
attempt to curry German support, he declared that the plan 
did not give the German people actual freedom in preparing 
and holding the elections. Molotov came to the crux of the 
Soviet opposition to the Eden Plan when he declared that a 
9 Ibid., Po 225. 
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reunited Germany must not be bound by obligations to any 
group of powers. 10 
With the introduction of the Molotov Plan for German 
reunification and the proposal for a "General European 
Treaty on Collective Security in Europe 11 , further illustra-
tion was not required in order to present Soviet objectives 
in Germany and Europeo 'rhe essence of the proposals lay 
in the aim to neutraliz.e _trie united Germgny by virtue of 
guaranteed Communist participa.tj_on in the establishment of 
··--··-·-·-.,··-··-.,-~-----~·- • - -.v - - --·-·-- .. -
its gg.v_~.rnJ:!lel1 tal ins ti tutiqn.so Also, the proposals had as 
their objective the dissolution of the North Atlantic Treaty 
Organization through the establishment of a general European 
collective security system which was designed to 11prevent the 
establishment of groups of European states directed against 
other European states=-- 11 oll Reunification of Germany under 
the Soviet plan would insure German pacification in the East-
West struggle as long as Commun:i.sts were in the government 
of a reun:i.ted Germany even though the government were not \ 
\ 
Communist-controlledo With sovereignty fully restored and 
Western forces w:i.thdrawn, the path would be cleared for 
Communist machinations 9 such as transpired in Eastern Europe 9 , 
which would place the Communists in full control of the 
governmento 
The Russians have deviated but little in their proposals 
for German reunification since the espousal of the Molotov 
lOibido, PPo 61-650 
lluoSo Depto of State.? Bulletin, XXX (1954)}' 2700 
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Plan at Berlino As later developed 9 this plan would operate 
in conjunction with the plan for a European collective 
security pact. An integral component of these proposals is 
the Soviet insistence that East Germap,y,, __ p_e_qi;u~ie 9f its -c---.-·--·-------·"-··---··----··-·.--- ... ~-... ---·.,.·····----········-. ·---~---· , __ , _____ ........ ····-···-··- ~- -··· ~ . . . 
different political, economic, and social structures, must 
_ ............. ~~,...._,.,... ___ ._. ___ .~-:-.•,, .. ,··-.,·-··-'··~-·--,~ ,-.- ··-,.~ ·.« • ... ·,.-.· •. , .. ,•.-, .. -.-,·-.··. ,. "., .... · .. ·c·•·•··,.,..--._.,,.-,,,._..,_., ....••• .-,, ...... --,.,.~ .. ,.-•····.,-...•. , .,. -· 
be allowed an equal voice in the establis:b.Il'.len.t.of the govern----.,. ............ _...,_ ...... "',.,..__~ ... ,.,,.-~.,.,._-~···-~--·-··'""·'-"- .... , .......• , .. , ........ - .,..,_ -- -. -.... · .. _ .. _. _____ ' -···-· --····-···· ---·-· .. - .,,,-... , .. ,.,...,.,_-:.,--,-~-.-.~ .. _ .. ,. . ·.---.--.,··,,. 
~-~_!:al ins ti tu~;gn_E3_gf §. Jmi»te.d_, .. Germapyg 12 This obstinate 
·-------··-.. ·.>--~-~...,, .... -~~,_-...... 
demand is made, notwithstanding the lack of a popular base 
for the Soviet-sponsored East German regime and the fact 
that the population of West Germany more than doubles that 
of East Germany. 
Specifically[} the Molotov Plan envisages the formation .._,_.,_ ______ _ 
of a Erovisional all-German government by the parliaments of 
_____ ..... _"=",.·----~?~-. ... ~ .. ,~~----·~-------......_ .......... ,.--,-·---.·-·-········· .. _ ·····--· .• _,.,., ...... ....., ·--
East and West Germanyo The existing governments would be 
temporarily retained, should their replacement ttprove diffi-
cult~.13 As its primary task, the provisional Government 
would prepare an electoral law and conduct all-German 
. --......... -~ .. --·-··~--...-~-~ ...... _____ .,.. ___ ·------~···- - ._ ........... ~·--··· .. ,,.- --
elections. This electoral law would insure that the elec-
r----~- I =r··-·,·~-.,-
tions were ttdemocratic in nature'' and guarantee the partic-
ipation of "democratic organizatlonsn.14 Under the Molotov 
proposal, the occupying Powers would withdraw all forces 
.. -
from Germany prior to the elections,15 leaving the provisional 




l5Ibid o [J po 229. 
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Government in almost complete controlo Another task of the· 
provisional Government would include the representation of 
Germany "in the prepartation of the peace treaty" and in 
international organizationso It would also have as one of 
its duties the prevention of Germany's adherence to ttcoali-
tions or military alliances directed against any power whose 
armed forces participated in the war against Hitler's Germany"o 
It would guarantee the free activities of 11democratic parties 
and organizations" and ban all "Fascist, militarist, or other 
organizations hos ti le to democracy and to---peace 11 o It would 
have authority over questions of transport, postal and tele-
graph services 1 free movement of people and goods throughout 
Germany and "other questions concerning---the German people 
16 
as a whole"o 
In summary 9 this plan ingenuously proposes that the 
Western Powers agree to a repetition of the Communist as-
sumption of power in Eastern Europeo Although the provi-
sional Government would be empowered to negotiate with the 
Four Powers relative to the peace treatyj there would no 
doubt be delays, and the negotiations would not necessarily 
result in the formulation of a treatyo In the interim~ the 
Communist position could easily be consolidatedo Most ob-
jectionable of all is the Soviet assumption that the puppet 
Government of the German Democratic Republic should participate 
. ·i-;/:.··· ;·_ 
equally with the Government of the Federal Republic of Germany 
in the establishment of a constitution and government for a 
16Ibido, Po 2280 
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united Germanyo The lack of a representative character of 
the Government and legislative organs of the German Democratic 
Republic is exceeded in its obviousness only by the quantita-
tively larger respective bodies of the Soviet Uniono Even 
though the Soviet proposal is replete with references to the 
necessity to banish all "non-democratic" and ttFascist" organ-
. 17 
izatlons,, there is a wide gulf separating the Soviet and 
Western connotations of such ostensibly simple words and 
phrases, the application of which gives witness to even more 
appalling divergences in beliefso 
The general consensus of the Western negotiators at the 
Conference was that the Soviet Union, cognizant of the unfavor-
ability of its proposals., did not truthfully desire reunifi-
cationo Their doubts, if any., were removed in the presenta-
tion of the Soviet proposal for a "General European Treaty 
on Collective Security in Eu±-opetto In the interpretation of 
the Western Powers.I) this plan was designed to destroy the 
North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), to remove the 
United States from participation in European affairs.I) and had 
as its basis the continued division of GermanyolB 
As stated in the So~iet proposal, the Treaty would 
provide for a system composed of European states.9- tttrre-
spective of their social systems", and its purpose would be 
to eliminate the "formation of groups of European states 
-
directed against other European states--- 0 • The Treaty 
17Ibido 
18rbido, pp. 267-269; U.S. Depto of State, Bulletin, XXX 
(1954), 2700 
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would be open to a "united, pacific, democratic German state", 
and pending unification, to both East and West Germany" In 
fact, in the Soviet view, the reunification of Germany would 
be greatly facilitated by the entry of the two German states 
into this collective security systemo The removal of antag-
onistic European power groups would create conditions which 
would enable the two German states to establish a basis for 
the settlement of their problems and upon which a merger 
could be evolvedo 19 
By making the eventuality of German reunification con-
'-~·-·"---·---------'-- - . "" , 
Q._ttLoJl~.l.1JP9l'l "the_c1\f3_::1p~uti. on of NATO and EDC, the Russians 
hoped to place the burden for continued world tensi.ons and 
the division of Germany upon the Western Powerso It also 
hoped to weaken the desirability of rearmament in West Ger-
many in view of the German fear of permanent division and 
apprehension that rearmament would perpetuate this division~ 
In March, 1954, following the Berlin Conference, the 
Soviet Union proposed, in a note to the United States Gov-
ernment, that the United States join in the Soviet-proposed 
European collective security systemo As an alternative to 
this proposal, should it not be acceptable to the United 
States, the Russians suggested that NATO be enlarged to in.., 
elude the Soviet Uniono 20 To both suggestions, the United 
States replied negatively, asserting that the Russian pro-
posals were based on a continuation of the division of 




Germany and that Soviet entry into NATO would be "contrary to 
the---principles on which the defense system and the security 
of the Western nations depend 11 o21 The Russians retaliated 
with charges that the refusal by the United States served to 
substantiate the "aggressive" character of NATOo22 
Soviet hopes for defeat of West German rearmament lifted 
when the F'rench National Assembly voted, on August 30, 1954, 
against the EDC Treatyo 23 However, under strong pressure by 
the United States and Great Britain, 24 a substitute for EDC 
was arrived at in conferences held in London and Paris during 
September and October, 19540 The new organization, the Western 
European Union (WEU), although not of the supranational char= 
acter of EDC, provided for contributions from the armed forces 
of the signatories to the NATO command in Europeo Through 
this organization, which was designed as a regional grouping 
of continental nations functioning within NATO, West Germany 
would be permitted to form a national army and would regain 
25 
full sovereigntyo West German sovereignty was restored on 
21Ibido, p. 7570 
22UoSo Dept. of State, Bulletin, X.,"'CXI (1954), 399. 
23Julius W. Pratt, A History of United States Foreign 
Policy (New York, 1955), p .• 7260 
24 ( ) UoSo Depto of State)> Bulletln, XXXI . 1954 , 363-364, 
515-5220 
25 
Ibid., pp. 515-522; United States Department of State, 
London and Paris Agreements, Depto of State Pubo Noo 5659 
(Washington, 1954), ppo 5-60 
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May 5, 1955, and it deposited its instrument of accession to 
the North Atlantic Treaty on May 6, 1955. 26 
In accordance with the campaign of "peaceful co-
existence", which was being waged with intensity following 
its initiation in 1953 after the death of Stalin, the Soviet 
Union attacked WEU in the same manner as it had denQ'IJllced 
EDc.27 The new orga~ization was branded as "aggressive" in 
character and the product of United States "imperialists 11 .28 
The Russians reverted to previous tactics by attempting to 
destroy French support for WEU through their assertions 
that United States and British guarantees of French security 
were illusionary in view of previous performance. The Russians 
bluntly warned that rearmament of West Germany within NATO 
and WEU would insure the permanent division of Germany.29 
Notes were addressed to the three Western Powers in an 
attempt to reopen negotiations upon German reunification.30 
The Western Powers considered these Soviet proposals simply 
as delaying tactics, since the Paris Agreements (establishing 
WEU) were being pushed for ratification in the parliaments 
of the signatory states. 31 At a conference in Moscow, from 
November 29 until December 2, 1954, Russia and its European 
26u,s. Dept. of State, Bulletin, XX.XII (1955), 791. 
27New Times (Moscow), No. 45, November 6, 1954, p. 6. 
28New Times (Moscow), No. 41, October 9, 1954, pp. 9-15. 
29Ibid. 
30u. s 0 Dept. of State, Bulletin, XXXI (1954), 902-907. 
31Ibid., pp. 901-902. 
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satellites declared that should the Paris Agreements be 
implemented, these co1.mtries of the npeace camp 11 would adopt 
"joint measures in the organization and command of their 
armed forces 11 • 32 In December, the Soviet Government addressed 
joint notes to Great Britain and France, warning that should 
the Paris Agreements be implemented, the Soviet Union would 
consider the mutual aid pacts existing between each of these 
countries and the Soviet Union as being null and void.33 On 
May 5, 1955, the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the 
u.s.s.R. formally abrogated these pacts which had originally 
been directed toward the containment of Germany. 34 Also in 
May, representatives of the Soviet Union and its satellites 
met at Warsaw, Poland, where a Mutual Assistance Treaty was 
concluded and a decision was reached to establish a Joint 
Command of the armed forces of the Treaty states.35 
Since the implementation of the Agreements providing 
for the restoration of West German sovereignty and its re-
armament, the Soviet Union has retreated from its blunt 
assertion that this action would mean permanent division.36 
However, it has regressed only to the extent necessary to 
cause the hope of reunification to continue to be a 
32New Times (Moscow), Noo 49, December 4, 1954, p. 8, 
p. 72 (Supplement). 
33New Times (Moscow), Noo 51, December 18, 1954.P p. 2 
(Supplement). 
34New Times (Moscow), Noo 16, May 14.P 1955, p. 31. 
35New Times (Moscow), No. 21, May 21, 1955.P PP• 68-70. 
36.!lli• .P p. 13. 
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disconcerting element in West German political affairs. If 
the division is allowed to exist long enough, there is the 
possibility that West Germany will negotiate directly with 
the Soviet Union or with the East Gertnan regime. In this 
manner, the Russians could hope to achieve concessions 
which would either neutralize Germany, or place Communists 
in strategic governmental positions. 
The Summit Conference 
In 1955 there was a marked allev-ia tion of the bitter 
Soviet diatribes against the capitalist nations of the 
Westo In the atmosphere created by the new Soviet policy 
of 11 peaceful co-existencett, the prospects for German reun\'." 
fication appeared more favorable than in several years. 
The Soviet initiative in the restoration of Austrian sever-
eignty in May augured well.for the resumption of negotiations 
upon the subject of German reunification.37 The Soviet 
consent to a meeting of the he:ads of Government of the Four 
Powers, to be held in Geneva during July, 1955, was inter-
preted in the West as a reaction to the unity and strength 
displayed in the implementation of the Paris Agreements. 
United States Secretary of State D.:ulles attributed the 
shift in Soviet policy to "Western determination and uni-
tyn.38 Others interpreted the Soviet shift in policy as 
37New Times (Moscow), Noa 17, April 23, 1955, pp. 2-3 
( Supplement) • 
3BuoSo Dept. of State, Bulletin, XX.XII {1955), 871-877. 
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being merely a tactical maneuver, necessitated by internal 
requirements to strengthen the regime following the demise 
of Stalino These requirements had developed from the in-
tensive policy of industrialization which had been pursued 
from the earliest days of the regimeo The intensification 
of this harsh policy, following World War II, had resulted 
in increased burdens upon the working class and a further 
decrease in the production of consumer goodso A generally 
unsuccessful agricultural policy added to the poor internal 
economic situation. In order for the regime to stabilize 
its control of the internal situation, a lessening of the 
tensions in the international situation was necessary so 
that some of the emphasis could be shifted from heavy in-
dustry to the consumer economyo As a result, the Hussians 
had embarked upon the policy of 11 peaceful co-existence 11 o39 
Thus it was in an atmosphere of general conciliation 
that the heads of Government of the United States, the 
United Kingdom, France, and the Union of Soviet Socialist 
Republics met at Geneva {July 18-23, 1955) to consider the 
major problems facing the world, among which was the Ger-
man problemo The heads of Government did not attempt to 
arrive at the solutions to these problems, but rather to 
prepare the groundwork for a later meeting of the Foreign 
Ministers of these respective states. 
39Frederi ck Schuman JI 11 'I1he Dia le c tic of Co-existence 1\ 
Current His to:r:._!, XXX { 1956), 33-38; Ro C. Tucker, 11 S talini sm 
and the World Conflict", Journa]. of InternationaLAffairs, 
VIII ( 1954), PPo 7-2lo 
1?5 
Because the Soviet Union had linked the problems of 
.German reunification and European security and bad declared 
them inseparable, 40 Premier Edgar Faure of France presented 
.· - ·- ·-- .. -.,--.--- --
a plan for German reunification which had as its basis the 
Eden Plan, augmented by guarantees to the Soviet Union 
against future German aggressiono Faure suggested that if 
Germany, reunited under the Eden Plan, chose to enter WEU, 
it would be limited to the armaments allowed West Germany 
within WEU. The Western Powers would guarantee to the Sov-
iet Union that if Germany engaged in aggressive acts, it 
would be deprived of its rights under NATOo The French 
Premier further proposed inclusion of Germany in a general 
security organization, composed of all European stateso 
Existing alignments would be left intact, with a view to-
ward eventual coalition into one systemo Should Germany 
choose to enter the Western security system, assurances 
would be extended to the Eastern bloco Should Germany 
choose to enter the Eastern bloc, guarantees against Ger-
man aggression would be extended to the Westo41 
British Prime Minister Anthony Eden indicated British 
willingness to enter into a security pact composed of the 
Four Powers and Germany which, according to its terms, 
would bind each signatory to render assistance to the victim 
40uoSo Depto of State, Bulletin, XX.XI (1954), 902-9070 
4L_ · 
-united States Department of State, The Geneva Conference 
of Heads of Government, Juty 18-23, 1955, D~pt. of State :Pub. 
No. 6046 TWashington, 1955, pp.25-270 Heieinafter referred 
to as Geneva Conference of Heads of Government, 1955. 
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of aggressiono Furthermore, any state which violated the 
peace would be denied any assistance enjoyed under existing 
agreementso 42 
German reunification, as proposed by Premier !3u:lg!'l-nin 
of the Soviet Union, would be made dependent upon the es-
tablishment of an all-European collective security systemo 
German reunification would be postponed for an indefinite 
period while the collective security system, in a two-stage 
period of development, came into beingo Durlng the first 
stage, the members of the all-European collective security 
system would continue to adhere to existing agreements, 
but would pledge themselves to settle all disputes by ami-
cable methodso At the second stage, the existing regional 
European security systems (NATO and WEU and the Warsaw Pact 
bloc) would be dlssolved and the all-European system would 
emerge o Premier Bulganin placed emphasis upon the existence 
of two German states having different political, economicj 
and social systemso He declared that they could not be 
"mechanically merged" without committing injustices to both 
stateso According to his plan, the two states would become 
members of the all-European collective security system, 
thereby nullifying the possibility of the rebirth of German 
militarism and rendering possible gradual rapproachment 
43 between the two stateso 
42Ibid., PPo 33-340 
43 Ibido, PPo 39-41. 
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Two events followed the Summit Conference which were 
motivated in the hope of giving further substance to the 
Russian argument of the existence of two separate German 
states having entirely different political, economic, and 
social systemso On September 13, 1955, agreement was 
reached between the Soviet Union and the German Federal 
Republic upon the establishment of diplomatic relations 
between the two countrieso44 The move received the approval 
of the United States, which viewed it as a 11 victorytt for 
Western policy and an indication of a reversal in the Soviet 
nbankrupt German poli cy 11 o 45 However, on September 20, the 
Sovi.et Union concluded a treaty wi.th the German Democratic 
Republic, by which nominal sovereignty was gained by the 
Soviet satelliteo46 Rather than an indication of a reversal 
of a "bankrupt German policy 0 9 these moves indicated the 
determination of the Soviet Union in its insistence that 
settlement of the German problem was now primarily a concern 
of the two German stateso47 This would mean that there was 
no basic change in the Soviet demand and requirement for a 
pacifist Germanyo If Germany could not be controlled, it 
would remain dividedo 
44New Times (Moscow), Noo 38, September 15, 1955, p. lo 
45UoSo Depto of State~ Bulletin, XXXIII (1955), 494-495. 
46New Times (:Moscow) j Noo 39, September 22, 1955, pp. 7-11 
( Supplement 1. 
47Geneva Conference of Heads of Government 1955, pp. 77-
80; UoSo Depto of State, Bulletin, XXXIII (1955), 559. 
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Conference of Foreign Ministers, Geneva, 1955 
The Foreign Ministers of the Four Powers met at Geneva, 
Switzerland, from October 27 through November 16, 1955, to 
attempt a settlement of the broad issues discussed by the 
heads of Government at the Summit Conferenceo The spirit 
of co-operation had declined in view of continued Soviet 
l 
attacks upon WEU and NATOo A reaffirmation of the Soviet 
determination not to permit the entry of a reunified Ger-
many into these organizations considerably dampened the 
prospects for conclusive settlements by the Conferenceo48 
The Foreign Ministers of the Western Powers again pro-
posed German reunification on the basis of the Eden Plano 
To assuage Soviet apprehensions on the possibility of the 
entry of a reunified Germany into NATO and '\IVEU, a Treaty 
of Assurance was affixed to the Eden Plano The Treaty 
would be signed simultaneously with the agreement to re-
unify Germany under the Eden Plano Its provisions for. 
mutual assurance would come into effect if the reunited 
Germany entered NATO and WE.Uo A zone would be established 
on the east and west sides of the eastern frontier of the re-
united Germanyo In this zone, armaments and forces would 
be limited and controlled through effective supervisiono 
Members of. the Warsaw bloc would be entitled to establish 
and maintain a radar warning system in the western portion 
of this zone, while the NATO bloc would receive reciprocal 
48New Times (Moscow), Noo 44, October 27, 1955, PPo 4-5. 
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privileges in the eastern portion of the zone. Members of 
both security blocs would b e obliga ted to take action 
against an agg ressor of either g roup.49 In the presentation 
of this plan for German r eunificatioti, the Western Powers 
clea r ly displayed their determination not to dissolve NATO 
or WEU, although in accordance with the Eden Plan, Germany 
could join any bloc which it preferred to entero 
As at the Berlin Conference, the Russians charged that 
the We stern plan was designed to coerce Germany into join-
ing the Western bloco Soviet Foreign Minister Molotov 
again emphasized the incompatibility of German rea rmament 
with geneTal European securityo50 
In rejoinder to the Western proposal, the Russians in-
traduced a revised version of the general European Collective 
Security Treaty, which followed the proposals of Premier 
Bulganin at the Summit Conferenceo The Soviet formula 
continued to be based upon the Russian desire for the dis -
solution of NATO and WEU and the neutralization or control 
of a reun i fied Germany o t ccording to t he Soviet plan , an 
overall European collective security system would be estab-
lished which wo uld include the existing opposed systems o 
I 
The signatories would undertake to settle all disputes 
peaceably, although the rights of individual and collective 
49united States Department of State, The Geneva Meetin-g 
of Foreign Ministers, , Oct o 27-Novo 16 , 1955, Dept. bf State 
Pubo No. 6156 (Washing ton, 1955'": pp. 29-30 • . Hereinafter , 
referred to as Geneva Me e ting of Foreign Ministers, 1955. 
5oibid., pp. 40-41, Po 43. 
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self-defense would not be infringed upon. There would be, 
as in the Western plan, a special zone for the limitation 
and control of armaments and forceso 51 The portion of the 
plan which was unacceptable to the West was the stipulation 
which called for the eventual dissolution of the present 
security systems and their merger into one European systemo 
I 11urthermore, the plan was based upon a continua ti on of the 
division of Germany which, in the view of the Western Pow-
ers, would not serve to lessen tensions bet.ween the two 
opposing blocsa 52 
Coupled wlth this proposal was the Soviet plan for the 
formation of an all-German Council, composed of representatives 
from the parliaments of the two German stateso This Council 
would act as a consultative body and work toward the 
achievement of co-ordination in the political, economic, and 
cultural life of the two stateso 53 This Soviet proposal 
envisaged the establishment, in addition to the all-German 
Council, of committees which would co-ordinate matters re-
lating to economic and cultural ties between the two states, 
currency and financial transactions, post and telegraph, 
and communicationso The strength, armaments, and disposi-
tion of security and border police would be regulated by 
the all~German Councilo It would be empowered to act in 
51Ibido, PPo 77-Blo 
52 UoSo Depto of State, Bulletin, XXXIII (1955), 819-8230 
53Geneva :Meeting of F'oreign Ministers, 1955, po 980 
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matters relating to European security and the"unification 
of Germany as a peaceful and democratic state 11 o 54 In a final 
repudiation of the Eden Plan and the Western formula for re-
unification by freej properly supervised elections, Molotov 
bluntly asserted that the social and economic reforms secured 
during the development of the German Democratic Republic could 
not be sacrificed in a purely 1tmechanical 11 mergero Therefore, 
Molotov declared, elections were incongruous until such 
time as a co-ordination of the two systems was effectedo55 
With this firm statement of the Soviet position, the 
prospects for German reunification were relegated to the 
unfavorable status existing prior to the Summit Conferenceo 
As had the Berlin Conference, the Geneva meeti.ng of the 
Foreign Ministers proved fruitless in relation to the Ger-
man problemo The Soviet position had changed relatively 
little during the interim following the Berlin Conferenceo 
The Soviet desire for insurance against possible German 
aggression in the future was recognized as a legitimate 
objectiveo The uncompromising demands that NATO be dis= 
solved and that German Communists be guaranteed a decisive 
role in the establishment of the institutions of government 
of a united Germanyj however, were viewed as extending be-
yond the aims of legitimate security requirements, becoming 
instead poorly disguised attempts at aggrandizemento 
54Ibido, PPo 98-990 
55Ibido I Po 950 
CHAPTER V 
CONCLUSION 
An examination of the proposals put forward by the 
Soviet Union for the reunification of Germany leads to the 
conclusion that reunification is not and has not been de-
sired by the Soviet Union except under Soviet termso 
Although Soviet propagandists have striven to create the 
impression that the Soviet Union is the foremost partisan of 
reunification, the proposals put forward by the Soviet 
authorities reveal an altogether different objectiveo This 
objective is the security of the Union of Soviet Socialist 
Republics, its ruling Communist elite, and the bulwark of 
satellites which serve as buffers against possible attack 
upon the western Soviet frontierso 
The security of the Soviet Union requires that Germany 
be reunified upon Soviet terms or not at allo Otherwise, 
the European balance of power would be placed in a state of 
flux which would endanger the security interests of the Sov-
iet Uniono The valuable Soviet foothold and vantage point 
in East Germany will not be sacrificed in a reunified Ger-
many left to its choice of allieso A fully rearmed and 
united Germany could once again become a dominant European 
power and as such., hold the European balanceo A restored 
G'ermany would endanger the Soviet grip upon .. tp.e subservient 
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states of Eastern Europe, as well as the grip of the puppet 
regimes of these states upon their subjectso 
As long as there continues to be a reluctance by West 
Germans to rearm, as a consequence of the fear of permanent 
division, Soviet interests are served beneficially" This 
is a major aim of Soviet policy in relation to Germany, 
ioe., to keep Germany weak and to prevent its reaching the 
stage of development where Soviet interests in Eastern Eur-
ope will be threatened by a revanchist Germany posessed 
with the power sufficient to reacquire the lost German 
province so 
In the pursuit of its basic security requirements, the 
Soviet Union has spread its rule, through the media of circum-
stance, the Soviet Army, and international Communism, over the 
states of Eastern Europe from the Baltic to the Adriatica 
That it would allow this security to be jeopardized by a 
resurgent Germany is not foreseeablea 
The Soviet Un1on has attempted to stabilize this power 
situation primarily through four methods" The first, the 
Concert of the Great Powers, was short-lived and collapsed 
when the Western components of this Concert realized the ex-
pansionist aims of the Soviet Union and world Communismo 
The second method has been through the division of 
Germanyo The policy of division in itself has been bene= 
ficial to the Soviet Union through its exacting exploitation 
of the productive capacities of East Germanyo Should 
reunification be permitted according to the Western 
13,f 
'proposals, this valuable asset would be lost to the Soviet t_ 
economyo While Germany remains divided, ·the forward post~.·. 
tion of the Soviet Union ,in East Germany serves as an ad-
vantageous base for the sovietization of all Germany. 
Continued division will tend to make West Germany a weak 
ally of the West; it will assure the Soviet Union_control of 
the East German state; and it )111111 continue to offer tne .. -
. . : . 
prospect ~f eventual Communist coni~ol of. all Germany t'.hr01igh 
. .. . .-. .. .. ·. 
direct negoti~tions between East and West Germany or be_t;een 
the Soviet Union and. West Germanyo 
As another method to stabilize the European power sit ... · 
uation, the Soviet Union has striven for German reunifica-
tion upon a basis of neutralization and disarmamento Its 
plans for reunification are qualified persistently by the .. 
requirement that the puppet Government of East Germany be 
given an equal voice in the establishment of the government 
for a uni tea Germanyo That the Western Powers will be duped'· 
into a scheme similar to that employed in the Communi~t: 
domination of E.astern Europe does not appear probableo .. The 
nations of the West .appear fully· cognizant of the inherent 
dangers of the Communist menace,·notwithstanding the at-
tempts through the "peaceful co-existence" stratagem to 
weaken the resistance of these nations to Communlst beguile.;. 
' ' 
mento '11he loss of the highly industrialized West Germany 
to the Soviet Union would seriously alter the European 
. balance of power and subject. the reinaining free states of. 
' ' ' 
' ' 
' ' 
Europe to Communist aggrandizement, either economically or 
militarily, or through the omnipresent danger of Communist 
infiltration and subversion. 
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It would require sizeable forces to perm&nently insure 
German neutralization, even if Germany were reunited accord-
ing to the Eden Plan. Even though the memory of German 
militarism and National Socialism remains embedded in the 
minds of the Western European neighbors of the Germans, the 
fear of the encroachment of the Soviet Union and world Com-
munism has served to cause these states to strive for the 
integration of West Germany, under controls, into the North 
Atlantic and Western European defense systemso The concept 
of a neutralized Germany is one held largely by those who 
believe that Germany herself is the primary problem rather 
than a fundamental antagonism between Western democracy and 
the totalitarian Communism of the Soviet Uniono However, 
the forced neutralization of Germany would not solve the 
conflict between democracy and Soviet Communismo 
A neutral Germanyj unless effectively controlled and 
supervised, would be unsatisfactory to the security re-
quirements of both East and W~sto Neither East nor West 
wishes to see Germany once again hold the European balance 
of power as it did prior to World War IIo At that time 
Germany possessed the capabilities, economic and military, 
to play one side against the othero 
Germany's geographic location and her economic and 
natural resources make it impossible for her to remain 
neutral in the East-West struggleo This ma;sr be ascertained 
from the obstinance wl th whl.ch each contender in the E.ast-
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West controversy has retained its vantage points in the 
presently divided Germanyo That this conflict for German 
loyalty would cease upon German neutralization is not prob-
ableo Conversely, neutralizatipn would create a power 
vacuum which would serve only to intensify the ef.forts of' 
both sides to gain controlo Given sufficient time to 
regain its full potential, it is possible that Germany 
would emerge strengthened as a result of these effortso 
The latest, and current, proposal by the Russians as 
a method by which a stable European equilibrium would be 
created and maintained, and through which Germany would be 
effectively neutralized, is the plan for an all-European 
collective security system., In addition to German neutrali-
zation, this plan has as its object the dissolution of the 
Western system of defense which is the product of many 
years of arduous labor and a consequence of the apprehen-
sions created by Soviet intransigence in Eu.ropeo 
This latest Soviet proposal, which envisages the con-
tinued division of Germany until such time as the basic 
differences between the two German states may be reconciled 
and a merger effected, epitomizes the dilemma facing the 
worldo Notwithstanding the efforts by the Communists to 
create a lethargic opposition through recent gestures of 
conciliation, there can be no reconciliation between the. 
aggrandizing ideology of world Communism and the principles 
of democracy as held by the free nations of the Westo The 
two systems may 0 co-exist 11 , but it will not be a ttpeaceful 
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co-existencetto At present, reconciliation with the Commun-) 
ists may be achieved only when such reconciliation is of 
major benefit to the Communistso Reconciliation between 
the two German states, to serve the interests of the Soviet 
Union 1 will be a lengthy processo By the continued Soviet 
espousal of uncompromising Ptoposals for reunification, the 
problem of reunification of Germany is a replica of the 
greater problems of the ideological conflict which divides 
the worldo Only when this-basic conflict is settled will 
a sa tLsf'_a_c tory reconcilia tLon be achieved in Germany a 
SELECTED BIBLIOGRAPHY 
Books 
Byrnes, James F. Speaking Fra.nkly"o New York: Harper and 
. Brothers Publishers, 1947 o 
C . 
Calvocoressi, .Petero Survey of International Affairs 1947-
19480 London: by Oxford University Press for the 
Royal Institute of International Affairs, 19520 
---=-~-..-----,:,-0 Survey of International Affairs 1949-19500 
London; by Ox.ford University Press for the Royal · 
Institute of International Affairs, 19530 
___ _,,,, ________ • Survey of International Affairs 1951. 
London: by Oxford University Press for the Royal 
Institute of International Affairs, 19540 
___ _,,,, ______ .,..o Survey of International Affairs 19520 
London: by Oxford University Press for the Royal 
Institute of International Affairs, 19550 
Clay, Lucius Do Decision in Germanyo Garden Cityi Double-
day and Company, Inc., 19500 
Curl, Peter Vo, edo Documents~ American Foreijn Relations 
19530 New York: by Harper for Council on ·oreign 
Relations, 19540 . 
____ _,,.........,..._.._,.,,..._o Documents on American Foreign Relations 
19540 New York: by Harper for Council on Foreign 
Relations, 19550 
Degras, Jane, edo Soviet Documents .2.!! Foreign Policy 1933-
1941. Volo IIIo London: by Ox.ford University Press 
for Royal Institute of International Affairs, 19530 
Dennett, Raymond, and Robert K. Turner, edo Documents on· 
American Foreign Relations, July.!, 1945-December 31, 
19460 Volo VIIIo Princeton: by Princeton Unive~sity 
Press for the World Peace Foundation, 19480 
• Documents on American Foreign Relations, 
---J,-a_n_u_a_r_y--=1--·necember 31, 19480 Volo Xo . Princeton: . by 




o Documents on American 
-__;_--=J,.....a_n_u_a_r_y--.;-1--De c ember 31, l 94 9 • · Vol o 
Princeton University Press for the 
Foundation, 19500 
Forei'n Relations, 
XI. rinceton: by 
World Peace 
Deutscher, I. Stalin: A Political Biographyo New York: 
Oxford University Press, 1949. 
Googlrich, Leland M., and Marie Jo Carrol, edo Documents 
on American Foreign Relations, July 1944-~ 1945. 
Volo VIIo Princeton: by Princeton University Press 
for the World Peace Foundation, 1947,o 
Hill, Russell Bo Struggle For Germany. New York: Harper 
and Brothers Publishers, 1947. 
Ingram, Kennetho History of the Cold Waro New York: 
Philosophical Library, 19550 
Joesten, Joachimo Germany: What Now? Chicago: Ziff~ 
Davis Publishing Company, 19480 
Krzesinski, Andrew J. Poland's Rights to Justiceo New 
York: The Devin-Adair Company, 1946. 
McNeill, William Hardyo Survey of International Affairs 
1939-1946s "America, Britain _and Russia, Their -
Co-operation.and Conflict, 1941-1946"0 London: -by 
Oxford University Press for the Royal Institute of 
International Affairs, 19530 
Morgenthau, Henry, Jr. Germany Is Our Pr.oblem. New York: 
Harper and Brothers Publishers, 1945. 
Nettl, Jo P .. The Eastern Zone and Soviet Policy in Germany, 
1945-50. London: Oxford University Press, 1951. 
Oppen, Beate Ruhm vono, ed .. Documents on Germany Under 
Occupation, 1945-1954. London: byOxford University 
Press for theRoyal Institute of International 
Affairs, 19550 
. -· 
Pratt, Julius Wo A History of United States Foreign Policyo 
New Yorks Prentice-Hall, Inco, 19550 
Stettinius, Edward R. Jro Roosevelt and the Russians: ·The 
Yalta Conferenceo Edo Walter Johnson:- Garden CityS--
Doubleday and Company, Inco, 19490 
Truman, Harry So 
Garden City: 
Memoirs: Year of Decisionso Volo Io 
Doubleday and 'ITompany, Inco, 19550 
Warburg, James Po Germany-Key To Peace o · Cfl,mbrldge: 
Harvard University Press, 19530 · 
140 
o Germany-Bridge .2.! Battlegroundo New 
~~----y-o-r-k-:~=H-a-rcourt, Brace and Company, 1946, 1947. 
Journal Articles 
Adenauer, Konrado "Germany, The New Partnero" Foreign 
Affairs., XX.XIII (January, 1955), 177-184 .. 
Anthon, Carl Go "East Germanyo" Current History, XXX 
(April, 1956), 231-2370. 
Beloff, Maxo "No Peace, No Waro 11 Foreign Affairs, XXVII 
(January, 1949), 215-232. 
Cole, Tayloro 11Neo-Fascism in Western Germany and Italyo" 
_The. American Poli ti cal Science Review, XLIX {March, 
l955j, 131-1440 
Dethleffsen, Erico 11 The Chimera· of Germany Neutrality." 
Foreign Affairs, XXX (April, 1952), 361-367. 
Fay, Sidney Bo nThe UoS. and West Europe. 11 Current 
History, XXVIII (January, 1955), 36-430 
., ttEurope's Expelleeso" Current History, 
-----x=I-I--(A~p-r-i~l, 1947), 321-3290 
Florin sky, Michael T. "Uni_ted Sta tea-Soviet Rela. tions: 
1954." Current History, XXIX {January, 1955)~ ~5:21. 
Lauckhuff, :Perryo "Germa_n Fteaction to Soviet :Policy, 1945~ 
1953." Journal of International Affa._irs, VIII (No. l, 
1954)' 62-730 -
Mosely, Philip E.o ttn1smemberment of Germanyo" Foreign 
Affairs, XXVIII (April, 1950), 482-499 .. 
• "The Occupation of Germanyo 11 Foreign 
-----A-f~f-a-i~r-s-,-...,XXVIII {July, 1950), 580-6050 . 
.. 
Nettl, Petero "German Reparations in the Soviet Empireott 
Foreign Affairs, XXIX (January, 1951), 300-3080 
• "Economic Checks on German Unity." 
---F"""'-o-r-e-i"'""g-n--.A"'""'ffairs., XXX (July, 1952), 554-564. . .. 
Pollock., James Ko "The West· German Electoral Law of 1953.n 
The American Political Science Review; XLIX (March, 
l955), 107-1310 
141 
Schmid., Carloo · ''Germany and Europe: The German Social 
Democratic Programo 11 Foreign Affairs, XXX (July, 
1952), 531-545. . 
Schuman, Frederick. ttThe Dialectic of Co-existence.n 
Current History., XXl (January, 1956), 32-p7. 
' ' ' 
·r .. 
Sternberg, Charles. 11 The _German Refugees and Expell,esi. "·. 
Journal ·of International Affairs, VIII (No. 1, 1959)., 
35.-420 .,- ' 
Taborsky, Edward. 11Benes and tl1e Soviets.u: Foreign_ 
Affairs, XXVII .. (January, 1949), 302-3+5• · 
Tucker., R. c. ttstalinism and the World Cop.fliet. H ' Journal 
of International Affairs, VII;! (No. l, 1954), 7~2L. ·• 
Government Publications 
Office of the U.S. Chief of Counsel For Prosecution of .Axis 
Criminality. Nazi Conspiracy and Ag5ression. Volo I. 
Washington: Government Printing Office, ·. 1946. 
Office of the U.S. High Commissioner For G!9rmany. Eleetfons 
and Political Parties in Germany 1945-1952. Bad 
Godesberg/Mehlem, Germanyf prepared by Policy Reports 
Secretary, Office of Executive Secret~ry, 195g. 
United Sta.tea Department of State •. Germany_ 1947-19491 The 
~ in Documentso Dept. of State Pub. No. 3556. 
European and British Commonwealth Series ~or, Washington: 
Government Printing Offie~., 1950. 
----,,-----=--" Foreign Ministers Meeting, Berlin Diseus--
sions, Jan. 25-Feb. 18., 1954. Dept. :of State Pub~ No. 
5399. Washington: Government Printip.g Office, 19540 
_________ __,,, __ • London and Paris Agreements. Dept. of 
State Pubo Noo 56590 Washingtoni Government Printing 
Office, 1954. · · 
• The Geneva Conference of Heads of Govern-
___ m_e_n_t,....,---.J .... u"""'l-y 18-23, 19550 Dept of Stat~ Pti.b~ No. 6046. 
Washingtons Government .Printing Offfpe, 19550 
• The Geneva Meeting of Foreign Ministers, 
---o"""c_t,_o___,2...,7.,..-'"""N..-ov. T6,° 1955. Dept.· of State Pub •. No.' 6156. 
Washingt"o'n7 Governiiient Printing Offipe, 1955. 
-----.... ........ ---~~· The Department of State Bulletino Vol. 
XXVI. Washingtont GoveI'.nment Printing Office, 1952. 
142 
The Department of State Bulletino Vol. 
XXVII. ·,Washington: Government Printing Office, · 1952. 
The Department of State Bulletin. Vol. 
XXIX. Washington: Government Printing·office, 1953. 
The Department of State Bulletin~ Vol. 
XXX. Washington: Government Printing·Office, 1954. 
----=--=--.o The Department of State Bulletin. Volo 
XX.XI. Washington: Government Printipg Office, 1954. 
----==,...._~,....· The Department of State Bulletin. Vol. 
XXX.II. Washington: Government>PrintingOffice, 1955. 
--------.,,.,.,• The Department of State Bulletin. Volo 
XXXIII. Washington: Gov,ernment Printing·Officejl 1955. 
Periodicals 
Joint Committee on Slavic Studies. The Current Digest of 
the Soviet Press. Volo v. Ann Arbor: 1953-1954.-
New Times (Moscow). No. 41, October 9jl 1954. 
No. 44, October 30, 19540 
--------· No. 45, November 6, 1954. 
0 -------- No. 46, November 13, 1954. 
0 -------- No. 48, November 27, 1954. 
0 No. 49, December 4)1 1954. 
0 -------- No. 51,, December 18" 1954. 
0 -------- No. 17, April 23,, 1955 {Supplement). 
0 -------- No. 16, May l4jl 1955. 
No. 21, May 21, 1955. 
0 -------- No. 38j September 15, 19550 
0 -------- No. 39" September 22jl l9p5 (Supplement). 
0 
___ ......_ __ _ No. 44, October 27 jl 1955. 
0 -------- No. 46, November 10, 1955. 
No. 8, February. 16, 1956. 
VITA 
James Herbert Johnson 
Candidate for the Degree of 
Master of Arts 
Thesis: SOVIET FOREIGN POLICY AND THE REUNIFICATION OF 
GERMANY 
Major Field: Political Science 
Biographical: 
Personal Data: Born at 1rishomingo, Oklahoma, August 
2, 1928. 
Educa.tion: Attended grade school· at Washita Farms 
School, Tishomingo, Oklahoma; graduated from Tisli-
omingo High School in 1945;·graduated from Murray 
State School of Agriculture, Tishomingo, in 1947; 
received the Bachelor of Arts degree from Oklahoma 
Agricultural and Mechanical College with a 'major. 
in Political Science in 1951; completed require-
ments for the Master of Arts degree in May, 1957. 
Professional Experience: Ente~ed the United States 
Air Force in August, 1951; served in Germany in 
Air Intelligence until March, 1955; released 
from active duty in May, 1955. 
